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Abstract 
Shared cI usters represent an excellent platform for the execution of parallel 
applications given their low price/performance ratio and the presence of cluster 
infrastructure in many organisations. The focus of recent research efforts are on 
parallelism management, transparent and efficient access to resources, and making 
clusters easy to use. In this thesis, we examine reliable parallel computing on clusters. 
The aim of this research is to demonstrate the feasibility of developing an operating 
system facility providing transparent fault tolerance using existing, enhanced and 
newly built operating system services for supporting parallel applications. In 
particular, we use existing process duplication and process migration services, and 
synthesise a group communications facility for use in a transparent checkpointing 
facility. This research is can'ied out using the methods of experimental computer 
sCIence. 
To provide a foundation for the synthesis of the group communications and 
checkpointing facilities, we survey and review related work in both fields. For group 
communications, we examine the V Distributed System, the x-Kernel and Psync, the 
ISIS Toolkit, and Horus. We identify a need for services that consider the placement 
of processes on computers in the cluster. For Checkpointing, we examine Manetho, 
KeyKOS, libckpt, and Diskless Checkpointing. We observe the use of remote 
computer memories for storing checkpoints, and the use of copy-on-write mechanisms 
to reduce the time to create a checkpoint of a process. 
We propose a group communications facility providing two sets of 
services: user-oriented services and system-oriented services. User-oriented services 
provide transparency and target applications. System-oriented services supplement the 
user-oriented services for supporting other operating system services and do not 
provide transparency. Additional flexibility is achieved by providing delivery and 
ordering semantics independently. 
x 
An operating system facility providing transparent checkpointing is 
synthesised using coordinated checkpointing. To ensure a consistent set of checkpoints 
are generated by the facility, instead of blindly blocking the processes of a parallel 
application, only non-deterministic events are blocked. This allows the processes of 
the parallel application to continue execution during the checkpoint operation. 
Checkpoints are created by adapting process duplication mechanisms, and checkpoint 
data is transferred to remote computer memories and disk for storage using the 
mechanisms of process migration. The services of the group communications facility 
are used to coordinate the checkpoint operation, and to transport checkpoint data to 
remote computer memories and disk. 
Both the group communications facility and the checkpointing facility 
have been implemented in the GENESIS cluster operating system and provide proof-
of-concept. GENESIS uses a microkernel and client-server based operating system 
architecture, and is demonstrated to provide an appropriate environment for the 
development of these facilities. 
We design a number of experiments to test the performance of both the 
group communications facility and checkpointing facility, and to provide proof-of-
performance. We present our approach to testing, the challenges raised in testing the 
facilities, and how we overcome them. For group communications, we examine the 
performance of a number of delivery semantics. Good speed-ups are observed and 
system-oriented group communication services are shown to provide significant 
performance advantages over user-oriented semantics in the presence of packet loss. 
For checkpointing, we examine the scalability of the facility given different levels of 
resource usage and a variable number of computers. Low overheads are observed for 
checkpointing a parallel application. 
It is made clear by this research that the microkernel and client-server 
based cluster operating system provide an ideal environment for the development of a 
high performance group communications facility and a transparent checkpointing 
facility for generating a platform for reliable parallel computing on clusters. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Parallel processing allows applications to access computing power 
exceeding that of a single CPU. Applications can be altered or developed such that 
various components of the application execute simultaneously. This can be achieved 
by using parallel programming tools, distributed programming languages, sequential 
programming languages supported by distributed shared memory, or parallelising 
compilers [Goscinski 1997]. Once altered, parallel applications have the potential to 
perform their operations several times faster than their earlier sequential form. 
A variety of platforms have been developed to support parallel 
applications. Until recently, supercomputers and other multiprocessor computers were 
the most popular vehicle for parallel processing. However, they are very expensi ve and 
their cost to performance ratio is very high. Of all the platforms, clusters are probably 
the most accessible to individuals and organisations as they can often be developed 
from an existing network of computers within an organisation. A cluster is a collection 
of independent (possibly heterogeneous) computers, connected together Vla a 
commodity network, e.g., IBM PC compatibles connected via Ethernet. 
A lack of good parallel software represents a major obstacle for parallel 
processing, particularly on clusters, to become a part of the computing mainstream. 
Recent research efforts have focused on parallelism management, transparent and 
efficient access to resources, and making clusters easy to use [Goscinski 2000]. These 
areas improve the cluster platform for parallel processing by providing efficient 
execution on, and easy access to, the platform. However, as a collection of independent 
computers used by multiple users [Goscinski 2000], clusters are more susceptible to 
failure. The issue of reliable computing on clusters is addressed in this work. 
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1.1 Motivation 
To improve the reliability of a cluster, we must provide mechanisms for the 
operating system and applications to survive failures. In a cluster, failures can come 
from a number of sources. Computers can fail as a result of power failure, component 
failure, user intervention, etc. The supporting network is also susceptible to power 
failure, cabling or other hardware faults, network reconfiguration, etc. Alternatively, 
instead of hardware failing, the operating system itself could fail. The failure of the 
operating system has a similar effect on an application. In each case contact is lost with 
a computer supporting one or more processes of the application. 
Large parallel applications have a higher rate of failure due to their 
increased use of resources in the cluster and their tendency to run for longer periods of 
time. Importantly, any minor fault could cause the failure of such an application, which 
would then need restarting. Fault tolerance functionality can be used to combat the lack 
of reliability in clusters, such that the operating system and applications are able to 
survive failures. In particular, replication can be used to improve the reliability of the 
operating system [Zhou and Goscinski 1997], and rollback recovery can be used to 
improve the reliability of message passing applications [Elnozahy et al. 1999], or 
Distributed Shared Memory applications [Morin and Puaut 1997]. 
Rollback recovery involves taking snapshots or "checkpoints" of the 
processes of a parallel application and then restoring some or all of them upon the 
failure of the application [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. Checkpointing can be introduced at 
either the application level or at the operating system level. Application level 
checkpointing generally requires input from the user, whereas operating system level 
checkpointing is generally transparent [Silva and Silva 1998]. Several issues have 
been identified by Silva and Silva: 
• Programmer effort - at the application level, programmers must specify the data to 
be included in a checkpoint and where checkpoints should be taken, which is 
difficult without a good knowledge of the parallel application; 
• Portability - operating system level checkpointing schemes cannot be easily ported 
to other platforms; 
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• Checkpoint size - operating system level checkpointing must capture the entire 
application context (data segment, stack segment, and execution context), which 
includes unnecessary temporary data; 
• Flexibility - application level checkpoints can be used for other purposes such as 
post-processing analysis or data visualization; and 
• Restartability of checkpoints - application level checkpoints do not consider 
kernel-dependent state attributes, hence can be easily restarted on different 
systems; 
These issues are somewhat biased towards application level checkpointing. However, 
several important aspects have been ignored, which we now discuss. 
For portability, we agree that operating system checkpointing schemes 
cannot easily be ported to other platforms. However, the parallel application itself is 
still portable, and if the target platform also provides a transparent checkpointing 
service then no functionality is lost. To reduce the size of checkpoints, several 
optimisations can be made at the operating system level which cannot be replicated 
easily at the application level. In particular, incremental checkpointing and concurrent 
checkpointing both reduce the checkpoint size and the overhead of creating the 
checkpoint [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. The flexibility proposed by Silva and Silva (above), 
although attractive, would require a good knowledge of the application's checkpoint 
structure and significant effort by the programmer to benefit from the flexibility. In 
particular, a programmer would need to know which data structures used in the 
application were significant as well as the semantics of their use in the application. 
Creating a checkpoint involves capturing the active state of a process so 
that it can be restored later upon the failure of that process [lalote 1994]. Two 
operating system mechanisms utilise similar mechanisms: process duplication and 
process migration. Process duplication, such as the Unixfork() system call, creates an 
exact copy of a process in execution. Logically, process duplication differs from 
checkpointing only by activating the process once the state of the process has been 
copied. Process migration uses a similar mechanism, encapsulating the state of an 
active process, transferring the state to a remote computer, and restoring that process 
on the remote computer. We believe that the mechanisms of process migration could 
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be used to address the issue of restartability of checkpoints on different computers and 
for transporting checkpoint data to remote computers. The applicability of process 
duplication and process migration mechanisms are addressed in this work. 
The remaining issue is that of programmer effort. We agree with Silva and 
Silva's recognition that application level checkpointing requires more programmer 
effort than operating system level checkpointing. Furthermore, we believe that any 
system functionality, not directly related to the goals of a parallel application, should 
be provided transparently. Services such as remote interprocess communication, 
remote process creation, and process migration should be transparent, as are traditional 
operating services such as virtual memory and process scheduling. Similarly, an 
application programmer should not need to be concerned with the reliability of the 
platform upon which it is running. There are three potential benefits to providing 
operating system functionality transparently: 
• Programming applications is simpler - programmers do not need to be concerned 
with the reliability of the underlying platform, and can better focus on the 
application itself; 
• Application mechanisms are simplified - applications no longer need to include 
mechanisms to deal with the loss of (any number of) its member processes, e.g., 
two phase commit mechanisms, etc.; 
• Application Portability is improved - application provided fault tolerance 
mechanisms can be platform dependent and hence the application is difficult to 
port. Providing transparent fault tolerance eliminates the need for these 
mechanisms, improving the portability of the application once the mechanisms are 
removed. 
The processes of a parallel application could be located on any computers 
within a cluster. For checkpointing, communication is required between these 
computers to coordinate the creation of the checkpoints, to determine how to recover 
an application, or to collect the resources of a process being restored. Given that the 
communication systems of clusters are slow [Goscinski 1997], this communication 
activity represents a high cost, especially if several computers need to be contacted. 
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One approach to reducing the cost associated with communicating among 
several computers in a cluster environment is group communications. In particular, 
messages could be delivered to several computers simultaneously if the group 
communications facility were to utilise the multicast mechanisms of a network 
Furthermore, we believe that advanced services of a group communications facility 
could be used to further optimise checkpointing and simplify the operation of such a 
facility. In this thesis we address the development of a group communications facility 
for supporting checkpointing and examine the benefits provided to checkpointing by 
this facility. 
Importantly, there are three alternative approaches to checkpointing: 
coordinated, uncoordinated, and communication-induced [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
Coordinated checkpointing requires a higher level of communication during the 
creation of checkpoints than uncoordinated checkpointing. Coordinated checkpointing 
requires much less communication than uncoordinated checkpointing when restoring 
an application that has failed. Lastly, communication-induced checkpointing has low 
communication requirements both during the creation of checkpoints and during 
recovery. However, applications suffer additional IPC overheads during the normal 
operation [Alvisi et al. 1999]. The selection and development of an operating system 
facility for transparent checkpointing using one of these approaches is a subject of this 
work. 
1.2 Research Aims 
The aim of this research is to demonstrate the feasibility of developing an 
operating system facility providing transparent fault tolerance using existing, enhanced 
and newly built operating system services for supporting parallel applications 
executing on clusters. To achieve this aim, a number of tasks need to be completed, 
including: 
(1) Synthesis of a group communications facility providing services that can be 
used to simplify the operation of the checkpointing facility. This facility should 
provide: 
transparency to the application programmer; and 
mechanisms focused on supporting other operating system services, in 
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particular checkpointing, for the efficient distribution of data and 
management of resources; 
(2) Synthesis of an operating system facility providing transparent checkpointing. 
This facility should have the following features: 
should not require any modifications to an application before 
checkpointing can be used; and 
should add minimal overhead when applied to a parallel application; 
(3) Development of a facility for checkpointing parallel applications on clusters in 
the GENESIS cluster operating system. This facility should utilise existing 
operating system mechanisms, in particular group communications, process 
duplication, and process migration; 
(4) Studying the performance of the implementations of the group communications 
facility and the checkpointing facility. In particular, performance tests should 
measure the performance benefits achieved by providing group 
communications mechanisms specifically for operating system services, and the 
overhead introduced by the checkpointing facility to applications; 
1.3 Research Methods 
The proposed work will be carried out using the principles of experimental 
computer science [Snyder et al. 1994]. Experimental computer science demonstrates 
two important concepts related to this work: proof-of-concept and 
proof-of-performance [Snyder et al. 1994]. Under proof-of-concept, experimentation 
can demonstrate how a complex assembly of components can realise a new idea and a 
particular set of objecti ves. Under proof-of-performance, an experiment can be used as 
an apparatus or test-bed for direct measurement or evaluation of a computing 
phenomenon. 
The synthesis, design and development of a group communications facility 
providing transparency to the application programmer and mechanisms for the support 
of operating system services act as proof-of-concept of using a group communications 
facility in these roles. Furthermore, measurements of the performance of the group 
communications facility and operating system services that use the group 
communications facility provide proof-of-performance of providing group 
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communication mechanisms specifically for supporting operating system services, in 
addition to transparent services for user applications. 
The synthesis, design, and development of a transparent checkpointing 
facility using group communications, process duplication, and process migration 
demonstrate the feasibility of an operating system facility that provides transparent 
fault tolerance using existing operating system services, and also act as 
proof-of-concept of the research aims presented in Section 1.2. Similarly, the 
implementation and testing of the system act as proof-of-performance and indicate that 
checkpointing can be implemented efficiently using group communications facility. 
1.4 Overview of this Thesis 
In Chapter 2, we survey and review related work, describing existing 
approaches to group communication and checkpointing facilities. This forms the 
foundation for our work. For both group communications and checkpointing, we 
provide an overview of the field and summaries of related projects. In particular, for 
group communications we examine the V Distributed System, the x-Kernel and Psync, 
the ISIS Toolkit, Horus and Ensemble. For checkpointing we examine Manetho, 
KeyKOS, libckpt, and Diskless Checkpointing. From examining the related work, we 
establish a foundation for the generation of the group communication and 
checkpointing facilities. 
In Chapter 3, we present the logical design of a group communications 
facility for supporting the checkpointing facility. We present our requirements of the 
group communications facility, then show the operation of a facility fulfilling those 
requirements. The major design issue presented in this chapter is the provision of two 
sets of group communication services: user-oriented services and system-oriented 
services. User-oriented services provide location transparency and target applications. 
System-oriented services supplement the user-oriented services, providing additional 
services that are not location transparent and target operating system services. The 
group communications facility is designed to be constructed within a microkernel and 
kernel server based cluster operating system using the client-server model. This 
architecture provides a number of advantages that are emphasised in this chapter. 
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We present the logical design of a transparent checkpointing service in 
Chapter 4. This facility uses coordinated checkpointing to provide fault tolerance to 
parallel applications executing on clusters. Importantly, unlike other coordinated 
checkpointing efforts, this facility does not block the entire parallel application. 
Instead, only the application's interprocess communication is blocked during the 
checkpoint operation. The checkpointing facility is designed for construction in a 
microkernel-based operating system. The mechanisms of other operating system 
services are adapted for checkpointing, simplifying its implementation. In particular, 
the mechanisms of process duplication and process migration are used in the design of 
the checkpointing facility, as are the services and mechanisms of the group 
communications facility that is presented in Chapter 3. The mechanisms of process 
duplication and process migration are used for the creation and transport of checkpoint 
data in the cluster, respectively. The services and mechanisms of the group 
communications facility are used for identifying the processes of a parallel application, 
to manage the blocking and un-blocking of interprocess communication, as a 
communication mechanism for coordinating the creation of checkpoints and to 
disseminate replicas of checkpoints to remote computers which act as an alternative 
stable storage medium to disk. 
The focus of Chapter 5 is to present proof-of-concept by showing the 
implementation of the group communications facility and checkpointing facility in the 
GENESIS cluster operating system. In particular, for group communications we 
present the syntax and semantics of group communication primitives and the 
mechanisms used for membership management, message ordering and delivery 
semantics, and dynamic allocation of multicast IP addresses. For checkpointing, we 
focus on the operation of the Checkpoint Manager for coordinating the creation of 
checkpoints, the blocking of interprocess communication and the invocation of the 
group communication, process duplication, and process migration facilities for 
creating, distributing, and managing checkpoint data. 
In Chapter 6, we present our performance testing and evaluation of the 
group communications facility and checkpointing facility. Measuring the performance 
of both facilities presents significant challenges, hence we begin by presenting these 
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challenges and our approach to overcome them. We describe the execution 
en vironment, method of testing, and operation of our experi ments. We demonstrate the 
performance of different aspects of these facilities, and evaluate the results achieved. 
In particular, the performance measurements for the group communications facility 
clearly demonstrate the advantage of providing mechanisms specifically for operating 
system services. For checkpointing, we show the low overheads incurred through our 
approach, demonstrating the benefits of utilising existing operating system services. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 we draw conclusions and propose future work, 
summarising the major results and achievements of this research. We also cover 
possible extensions to, and future directions for this work. 
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Chapter 2. Related Work 
In Chapter 1, we proposed the development of a checkpointing facility 
using existing operating system services, in particular process duplication, process 
migration, and group communications. In this chapter, we review related work in the 
fields of group communications and checkpointing, and present an overview of 
existing facilities in these areas. In Section 2.1 we explore the field of group 
communications, followed by the field of checkpointing in Section 2.2. 
2.1 Group Communications 
Group communications and supporting technologies have become popular 
in distributed systems for supporting applications such as sharing computational load, 
fault tolerance, decentralised naming, distributed scheduling, distributed transaction 
management, and multimedia [Cheriton 1986], [Cheriton and Mann 1989], 
[Powell 1996], [Rough and Goscinski 2001B], [van Renesse et al. 1994A]. To 
achieve the aims of our research, we must develop a group communications facility 
providing services to both (user) parallel applications and for the support of system 
services. We analyse the services provided by existing facilities in Section 2.1.1 to 
provide a good foundation for the selection of services to provide to user applications 
and for the support of system services. We continue our analysis in Section 2.1.2 by 
reviewing several existing facilities. Finally, in Section 2.1.3 we summarize the 
current state of research in group communications. 
2.1.1 Review of Group Communication Features 
There are a number of design decisions that are made in building a group 
communications facility that are common to both one-to-one communication and 
group communication [Coulouris et al. 2001]. These include such decisions as 
whether to use buffered or un-buffered communication, blocking or non-blocking 
primitives, etc. [Tanenbaum 1995]. These issues are not unique to group 
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communication, hence we do not examine them here. Instead, we focus on those 
services that are specific to group communications. In particular, we examine group 
structures, group management, message delivery semantics, and message ordering 
semantics. We examine these features to provide a foundation upon which to propose 
the features for our group communications facility. 
Group Structure 
Two different structures of groups are evident: closed and open groups. 
Closed groups restrict the processes that are allowed to send messages to the group to 
processes that are members of the group. Open groups do not maintain this restriction, 
any process is allowed to send messages to the group 
[Kaashoek and Tanenbaum 1994]. Both closed and open groups have their uses, 
closed groups are useful in parallel processing applications, and open groups for 
implementing replicated servers [Tanenbaum 1995]. 
Group Management 
Two approaches to group management can be seen: static group 
management or dynamic group management [Kaashoek and Tanenbaum 1994]. Under 
static group management, the members of a group are determined prior to the creation 
of the group, and are generally specified as part of the group creation operation. Once 
created, the membership of the group cannot be altered; no processes can be added to 
the group, nor can any processes be removed from the group. Altering the membership 
list requires deletion of the existing group and recreation of a new group with the 
membership changes in place. Alternatively, dynamic group management presents no 
such restrictions. Process groups can be created or destroyed by any process at any time 
and processes can join or leave groups at will. No limits are placed on the number of 
processes in a group, nor are limits placed on the number of times a process can join 
or leave a group. 
Static group management is suitable where the hardware platform is 
unlikely to change, e.g., massively parallel architectures, or where applications are 
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well defined, non-adaptive and non-interactive [MPI Forum 1997]. Clusters are 
dynamic in nature, hence dynamic group membership management is more suitable 
[MPI Forum 1997]. In particular, computers can be added or removed from the cluster 
at any time [Goscinski et al. 2001], requiring changes to group memberships. 
Message Delivery Semantics 
For delivery semantics, Kaashoek and Tanenbaum determine that group 
communication facilities can provide either unreliable delivery or reliable delivery, for 
which they define three levels of reliability [Kaashoek and Tanenbaum 1994]. In total, 
the semantics observed by Kaashoek and Tanenbaum are: 
(1) unreliable delivery; 
(2) k-delivery - delivery is considered successful once k processes have received 
the message, where k is a constant specified by the user; 
(3) quorum delivery - delivery is considered successful when the majority of the 
member processes of a group have received a message; and 
(4) atomic delivery - either all surviving processes receive a message or none do. 
Importantly, these semantics only focus on the delivery of messages to 
processes. Specifically, there is no consideration of the placement of the processes on 
computers. In the shared cluster environment, it is possible that several processes may 
be located on a single computer. This is often the case where a high level of IPC is 
required. One of our aims is to provide group communication mechanisms to operating 
system services. Such operating system services manage the placement of resources on 
the computers of the cluster. Hence, to provide an efficient delivery service for 
operating system services, the selection of computers as the destination entity, rather 
than processes, should be possible. 
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Message Ordering Semantics 
Hadzilacos and Toueg observed three ordering semantics 
[Hadzilacos and Toueg 1993]: 
(1) no ordering - messages are delivered to processes as they anive and no ordering 
is imposed on the messages; 
(2) FIFO ordering - all messages sent by a member process are delivered to all 
other member processes in the order they were sent; and 
(3) causal ordering - all messages that are related are ordered, i.e., if a member 
process of a group sends a message 'B' as a direct result of receiving a message 
'A' , all other members in that group wi II recei ve A before B; 
Kaashoek and Tanenbaum add a fourth ordering semantic 
[Kaashoek and Tanenbaum 1994]: 
(4) total ordering - every member process receives all messages in the same order. 
Causal ordering and total ordering semantics can also be extended to 
include communication with non-member processes communicating with a group, or 
cases where group memberships overlap (processes are members of several groups 
with causal/total ordering) [Birman 1996]. 
As observed for message deli very, the semantics for message ordering 
only consider the delivery of messages to processes. Operating system services are 
often applied to all processes on a computer, e.g., a distributed shared memory region 
updatelinvalidation message. For such services, it is more efficient to send a message 
to each computer, not to each process. 
2.1.2 Survey of Group Communication Facilities 
A large number of group communication facilities exist. Here we examine: 
the V Distributed System, the x-Kernel and Psync, the ISIS Toolkit, Horus, and 
Ensemble. Although other facilities exist, the selected facilities provide a good 
overview of the field. We examine the VMTP protocol as part of the V Distributed 
System, given that the results from this project were used in the development of 
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Internet standards, hence are significant. In particular, the specification of the VMTP 
transport protocol is widely available as an Internet RFC [Cheriton 1988B], as is their 
early work on host groups and the IGMP protocol [Cheriton and Deering 1985], 
[Deering 1989]. Furthermore, research into the V Distributed System was the first to 
introduce process group computing [Birman 1996]. 
The GENESIS cluster operating system is used to demonstrate 
proof-of-concept of the checkpointing facility. GENESIS uses a microkernel and 
client-server based operating system architecture. The x-Kernel is also a microkernel 
based operating system, hence should be examined. The x-Kernel provides a 
framework for the development of protocols, both one-to-one protocols such as TCP 
and UDP, but also for group communication protocols such as Psync. The Psync 
protocol is a minimalistic protocol, deferring most functionality to the user 
applications [Peterson et al. 1989]. 
The ISIS toolkit introduced the concept of virtual synchrony, popular 
among group communications facilities, hence is worth examining. Furthermore, the 
ISIS toolkit has also achieved relatively large adoption, being used in the New York 
Stock Exchange, Swiss Exchange, air traffic control in France, VLSI fabrication 
plants, and mobile telephony products [Birman et al. 2000]. 
Horus began as a redesign of the ISIS toolkit to provide additional 
flexibility, security, and to handle network partitioning [Horus 2001]. We review 
Horus to try to determine what the ISIS authors see as lessons learnt. Horus also claims 
to incorporate ideas developed by ISIS, Transis, and the x-kernel. 
The Ensemble system follows on from the work of the Horus project, and 
is in fact a reimplementation of the Horus system in a subset of the ML programming 
language [Birman et al. 2002]. The Ensemble team identify the problem that group 
communication systems provide either a fixed set of services, e.g., ISIS, or highly 
configurable services but don't offer the services needed by applications, forcing the 
programmer to extend their capabilities, e.g., x-Kernel and Horus [Hayden 1998]. The 
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authors also identify the need to maintain high performance. Ensemble attempts to 
address these problems. 
The V Distributed System 
The V system is a microkernel based distributed operating system that 
executes on clusters. V computers cooperate using message passing to provide a virtual 
machine where processes communicate using a base set of communication primitives, 
which are provided in the form of remote procedure calls (RPCs) [Cheriton 1988A]. 
V provides a set of operations on groups of processes, interprocess 
communication (lPC) being one operation [Cheriton and Zwaenepoel 1985]. Other 
operations are provided for process management, including group process suspension, 
resumption, and termination. This is achieved by identifying groups with a 32-bit 
identifier which matches the syntax and semantics of process identifiers, allowing the 
two to be used interchangeably [Cheriton and Zwaenepoel 1985]. For IPC, RPC 
semantics can result in mUltiple responses. The requesting process can choose to 
ignore any/all responses after the first response. 
The transport protocol used in V is the Versatile Message Transaction 
Protocol (VMTP), also proposed as an Internet standard [Cheriton 1988B]. VMTP 
supports remote procedure call semantics, multicast, and real-time communication 
[Cheriton 1986]. Delivery is guaranteed, although acknowledgement mechanisms are 
not used. Instead, the RPC requests are (re-)transmitted a predefined number of times, 
or until a response is received back from one of the processes in the destination process 
group [Cheriton and Zwaenepoel 1985], resulting in the possibility of duplicate 
requests being received by a server [Cheriton 1986]. Ordering is guaranteed, although 
this is inherited by allowing only one RPC to be outstanding at a time. Any delayed 
responses from previous requests are discarded. Neither causal ordering nor total 
ordering are provided. 
V provides open group semantics and dynamic group management 
[Cheriton and Zwaenepoel 1985]. For a group to exist, there must be at least one 
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member process. This requires that the first member process is specified during the 
creation of groups and groups are automatically destroyed when the last member 
process leaves the group. Groups can be defined as local or global. Local groups are 
limited to a single computer and global groups are accessible across the V domain. 
Groups can also either be restricted or unrestricted, either limiting joining processes to 
the same user (owner) or allowing any process to join the group, respectively. 
The x-Kernel and Psync 
The x-Kernel is an operating system microkernel designed to facilitate the 
development of network protocols. Three objects are provided for implementing 
protocols [Hutchinson and Peterson 1991]: protocols, sessions, and message objects. 
A protocol object represents a network protocol, e.g., IP, UDP, TCP, or Psync. A 
session is an instance of a protocol object representing the state of a particular 
connection. Lastly, the message object represents the actual data unit being transferred 
(user data and associated protocol headers). 
Psync provides minimal service, deferring any functionality not required 
by all applications to higher-layer protocols [Peterson et al. 1989]. Communication in 
Psync begins by establishing a "conversation" (connection) between the necessary 
processes. Establishing this conversation requires the specification of all involved 
processes, and no functionality is provided for adding to this list. Hence, Psync offers 
static membership management. 
Processes can leave the conversation at will, however, processes that leave 
are considered to have failed for any future communication. To prevent this, 
Peterson et al. recommend that applications use a "termination agreement", which 
must be provided by the programmer to run on top of Psync. The termination 
agreement acts as an arrangement between the processes of the application that 
communication is no longer required and will be terminated [Peterson et al. 1989]. 
Causal ordering is provided, where all messages are delivered to all 
processes and are delivered in order based upon a "context graph" which indicates the 
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dependencies between messages [Peterson et al. 1989]. Incoming messages identify 
their dependencies to receivers and are not delivered unless the messages they depend 
upon have previously been delivered. Any messages missing in a dependency graph 
can be requested from either the computer that sent them or from the computer that sent 
the message that depends on the missing messages. Applications can also manually 
invoke retransmission of a message, which can be done if it is clear the message is 
missing at the application level (timeout whilst waiting for an RPC response). 
The ISIS Toolkit 
The ISIS toolkit was significantly influenced by the V Distributed System, 
except development was focused on fault tolerance and providing strong 
synchronisation guarantees to the user. Importantly, fault tolerance is not provided to 
applications, only to ISIS services. This ensures that if part of an application survives 
a failure, the ISIS services will continue to be available 
[Birman and van Renesse 1994A]. ISIS provides asynchronous IPC between abstract 
endpoints (ports) [Birman and van Renesse 1994B]. RPC is also provided, where the 
requesting process can choose to receive any number of responses from group 
members (including zero members) [Birman and Joseph 1994]. Only atomic delivery 
semantics are provided (known as ABCAST), and causal ordering can be selected as 
an option (known as CBCAST) [Birman and Joseph 1994]. 
ISIS provides both open and closed groups and communication is 
optimised by specifying four styles of process group (shown in Figure 2.1): peer 
groups, client-server groups, diffusion groups, and hierarchical groups 
[Birman 1994A]. Peer groups are where a set of processes work closely together for 
applications such as data replication. Client-server groups allow processes external to 
a group to communicate with that group for the purpose of requesting a service by 
multicasting the request to all members of the group. The members of the group can 
also communicate with each other. A diffusion group is also a client-server group, 
except the clients receive messages from the servers as a group, without requesting any 
services. Finally, hierarchical groups divide a process group into a tree like hierarchy. 
New members initially contact the "root" group, and are subsequently redirected to a 
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Peer Group Diffusion Group 
Client-Server Group Hierarchical Group 
Figure 2.1: ISIS Group Styles 
constituent "subgroup". Member processes can send messages to the entire 
membership of the hierarchical group, but ordinarily only send messages to the 
members of their sub-group. 
The ISIS toolkit offers dynamic process group management 
[Birman 1994A], [Birman and Joseph 1994] Importantly, the system can remove a 
member from a group if they are considered to have failed 
[Ricciardi and Birman 1994]. A key technology introduced in ISIS is virtual 
synchro1lY, which guarantees that every group member receives messages and sees 
changes to group memberships in the same order as every other group member 
[Birman 1994A]. Virtual synchrony ensures that the system state is consistent across 
all message deliveries, membership changes and failures [Birman 1994A]. However, 
the authors acknowledge two problems with the virtual synchrony model 
[Birman 1993]. First, given a partition of the network, execution can only continue in 
one partition, the primary partition [Birman 1994B]. This partition is defined as 
containing the majority of the members [Ricciardi and Birman 1994]. Secondly, there 
is a risk that hosts could be incorrectly classified as faulty. 
Horus 
Horus is a redevelopment of ISIS, motivated by the problems of existing 
group communication systems perceived by the authors. In particular, the authors 
claim that existing group communication systems try to be "all things to all users", e.g., 
providing all forms of ordering semantics, etc., resulting in unnecessary overheads 
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being imposed on applications and systems that are too complex and are difficult to 
maintain, extend, optimise, etc. Hence, the design of Horus incorporates the principles 
of microkernel operating systems, the x-Kernel, and object-oriented systems 
[van Renesse et al. 1996]. 
The separation of mechanism from policy was gained from microkernel 
systems, resulting in a high-performance and highly flexible "plug and play" 
architecture [van Renesse et al. 1994A]. The x-Kernel's architecture, where protocols 
implement only simple features and are tied together to satisfy the needs of the 
application, was reproduced in the form of the Horus Multicast Transport Service 
(MUTS) [van Renesse et al. 1994A]. Finally, object-oriented system concepts allowed 
a protocol interface to be defined for supporting most protocols whist allowing hooks 
for extending the interface and adding new features [van Renesse et al. 1995]. 
Horus provides a highly flexible group communications serVIce by 
allowing each group to dynamically configure the protocol layers used for their 
communication [van Renesse et al. 1994B] by stacking protocols together in a "Lego-
Block" model [van Renesse et al. 1996]. This stacking of protocols is enabled by the 
Horus Common Protocol Interface (HCPI), designed to support the features of most 
protocols whilst allowing optional extensions [van Renesse et al. 1995]. The HCPI 
defines the interface used by and provided by each protocol implementation. This is 
achieved through the specification of a set of "downcalls" and "upcalls", defining the 
data flows between layers. Horus provides unreliable or reliable FIFO, causal or total 
ordering semantics. 
Ensemble 
The goal of Ensemble is to build a system that provides the performance 
and flexibility required for supporting distributed applications, whilst allowing formal 
methods to be applied to test the correctness of the protocols [Hayden 1998]. The basic 
functionality provided by the Ensemble system is to track group membership and to 
support communication between group members and incoming communication from 
non-group members. Further functionality is provided by a set of small communication 
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protocols, known as micro-protocols, that provide a service, e.g., sliding window, 
signing and encryption, and group membership [van Renesse et al. 1998]. 
Ensemble defines a framework for composing micro-protocols, specifying 
the interfaces used by each protocol. Interactions between the micro-protocols is in the 
form of events, used instead of the procedure calls and thread invocations of Horus to 
reduce the likelihood of deadlocks, and to make the protocols easier to trace and debug, 
more portable and provide better performance [van Renesse et al. 1998]. 
Unlike Horus, Ensemble allows the protocol stack to be dynamically 
reconfigured, and provides the Protocol Switching Protocol (PSP) to enable this. 
Dynamic reconfiguration can be initiated either by changes in the execution 
environment or by the requirements of the application changing. The PSP coordinates 
the introduction of the new protocol stack to an application by ensuring the new stack 
is constructed on each participating computer and then switching to the new stack and 
discarding the old stack [van Renesse et al. 1998]. 
2.1.3 Summary 
In this section, we have presented an overview of the field of group 
communications. In particular, we have examined the features of group 
communications (group structures, group membership management, message delivery 
semantics, and message ordering semantics) and existing group communication 
facilities (The V Distributed System, x-Kernel and Psync, The ISIS Toolkit, and 
Horus). For group communications, both open and closed groups have applications 
and should be provided. Dynamic group membership is better suited to clusters, hence 
should be used. Lastly, both delivery semantics and ordering semantics only consider 
delivery of messages to processes. These should be expanded to support operating 
system services more efficiently. 
An important advantage offered by the V system over other group 
communication facilities is the use of a naming structure that can identify processes 
and groups interchangeably in operating system primitives, allowing process 
21 
management operations to be performed transparently on groups of processes. 
However, V uses RPC semantics which are not always appropriate for developing 
complex distributed systems [Birman and van Renesse 1994B]. Furthermore, only one 
RPC request can be outstanding at anyone time, which could limit the performance of 
an application. 
The x-KernellPsync provides minimal service, resulting in a protocol with 
low overheads. However, additional demands are placed on the functionality of the 
application, which is left to the programmer to provide. In particular, if any 
communication is attempted with a group after a process has left the group, that process 
is considered to have failed. The application requires a termination agreement to avoid 
this. Furthermore, retransmission of a message can be invoked either by the delivery 
of a message that depends upon the missing message or by the user. Retransmissions 
can be requested from either the computer that originally sent the message or from a 
computer that sent a dependent message. To provide this, copies of a message must be 
maintained on the originating computers and on computers sending dependent 
messages, resulting in a high demand for resources. 
An important contribution by the ISIS toolkit is to optimise group 
communication mechanisms using four styles of groups: peer, client-server, diffusion, 
and hierarchical. However, the programmer must first identify the appropriate group 
style for their application, which could change throughout its development lifetime. A 
simpler approach would be to provide only open and closed group semantics. 
The redevelopment of ISIS under the Horus banner resulted in an approach 
to develop a highly configurable platform for group communications. However this 
was achieved at the expense of the programmer, who must determine which protocols 
are combined to form a stack for each process group. Furthermore, the composition of 
these stacks can be affected by the underlying network and by the placement of Horus 
[van Renesse et al. 1996], be it in user space, in an operating system kernel, or in 
between. Finally, the configurability of Horus suggests that highly efficient group 
communication protocols should be generated. However, the extensive use of layering 
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and the requirement of a generic interface between the protocols likely eliminates this 
benefit. 
The Ensemble system continued the work of the ISIS/Horus team, again 
presenting the programmer with a set of micro-protocols which can be combined 
together to form a customised communication service. This time, the focus was on 
proving the correct operation of the protocols, on dynamic reconfigurability of the 
protocol stack, and on the performance of the system. The procedure calls and thread 
invocations of Horus were replaced with an event based model for easier tracing and 
debugging, increased portability and better performance. 
2.2 Cbeckpointing 
To achieve the aims of this research, we wish to develop an operating 
system facility providing transparent fault tolerance for the generation of a platform for 
reliable computing on cluster using checkpointing. In particular, a facility for 
transparent checkpointing of parallel applications using message passing is to be 
developed. Checkpointing is used in backward error recovery, where the state of each 
process in a parallel application is periodically recorded on stable storage. Should any 
processes of the parallel application fail, the application is restored (rolled back) to one 
of the recorded states [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. Rolling back a process has the effect of 
discarding results that were achieved following the recording of the process' state that 
was restored. 
2.2.1 Review of Checkpoint-based Rollback Recovery Mechanisms 
Checkpointing involves storing an image of an application in execution on 
stable storage, and successfully restoring that image to an active state upon the failure 
of any components of that application. For a single process that does not interact with 
other processes or the user, this would require storing all of the resources of the process 
that have changed throughout its execution, including the value of variables in the 
process, its environment, control information, register values, etc. [lalote 1994]. 
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Checkpointing an application that is composed of several communicating 
processes is a more complex task. The use of message-passing systems creates 
dependencies between the processes of the application during its normal operation. 
Rolling back a process may require several other processes to also roll back to maintain 
a consistent system state (rollback propagatio1l). An application must be rolled back 
to a globally consistent state, i.e., a union of the states of the processes composing an 
application that could have been reached through the normal execution of the 
application [Babaoglu and Marzullo 1993]. A globally consistent state is one where 
for every process that has received a particular message, the checkpoint of the sending 
process reflects having sent that message. If a consistent system state is not achieved, 
restarting the sending process will likely result in the same message being resent. 
One of the most influential papers on the field of checkpointing is that of 
Chandy and Lamport [Chandy and Lamport 1985]. Indeed, all of the work in 
checkpointing message passing applications until now can be viewed as a modification 
of Chandy and Lamport's work [Kalaiselvi and Rajaraman 2000]. Chandy and 
Lamport identified that to achieve a globally consistent state, the state of interlinking 
communication channels must be saved in addition to the state of the individual 
processes of the application [Chandy and Lamport 1985]. 
There are three techniques for checkpoint-based rollback recovery: 
uncoordinated checkpointing, coordinated checkpointing, and communication-
induced checkpointing [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
Uncoordinated Check pointing 
For uncoordinated checkpointing, checkpoints are created for each process 
of the parallel application independently of each other. Upon failure, each of the 
checkpoints are examined to determine a consistent state, known as a recovery li1le. 
Each process is then rolled back to the recovery line and execution continues. Those 
processes that are unaffected by non-deterministic events may continue their execution 
without rolling back [Elnozahy et al. 1999], i.e., those processes that have not 
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Figure 2.2: Domino Affect in Uncoordinated Checkpointing 
exchanged messages with other processes and have not interacted with their 
environment (terminal input/output) may continue execution. 
The key benefit of uncoordinated checkpointing is that each process is 
checkpointed autonomously, meaning checkpoints can be taken when it is most 
convenient, e.g., when only a small amount of state information needs to be saved. 
However, there are several problems with uncoordinated checkpointing, which we 
now discuss. 
The major problem with uncoordinated checkpointing is the domino affect 
[Randell 1975]. As a result of checkpointing the application processes independently, 
there is no guarantee that a recovery line will occur regularly throughout the execution 
of the application. Rollback propagation can be such that an application can be forced 
to rollback to its initial state (the domino affect). Importantly, the recovery line is not 
known until recovery has been initiated. This makes garbage collection difficult, as 
only checkpoints occurring prior to the most recent recovery line should be discarded. 
Figure 2.2 shows the effect of rollback propagation and the domino effect. 
Three processes are shown in the figure, Po through P2. The action of checkpointing a 
particular process is demonstrated by the black squares marked Cij , where i indicates 
the process being checkpointed andj provides a trivial time index (per process), where 
the larger the number, the later the event. Finally, messages are represented by arrows 
connecting the lines of the processes. Messages are labelled mx ' where x uniquely 
identifies each message. 
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Figure 2.3: Coordinated Checkpointing 
In Figure 2.2, process PI has failed and will be rolled back to checkpoint 
C 1,2' This results in message m7 having been received by process Po, but having never 
been sent. Therefore, process Po must be rolled back to checkpoint CO,2' Messages m5' 
m6' and m 10 have now been received but not sent (message m9 is not listed here 
because process PI has already been rolled back to before it received that message). 
This invalidates the execution of Plo which must be rolled back to checkpoint C2,l' and 
invalidates C1,2 so PI must also be rolled back to Cl,l' Messages ml, m2, and m4 are 
now also received but not sent, invalidating CO,2' Therefore, PO must be rolled back to 
CO,l' This returns all processes to their initial states. 
Coordinated Checkpointing 
Under coordinated checkpointing, the creation of checkpoints for each 
process of a parallel application is synchronised such that the set of checkpoints form 
a consistent state of the application [Chandy and Lamport 1985]. However, 
coordinated checkpointing suffers from overheads resulting from saving checkpoint 
data on stable storage, interference with the execution of processes by the 
checkpointing algorithms (see Figure 2.3), and the cost of communication to ensure 
consistency [Elnozahy et al. 1992], [Silva and Silva 1998]. An example of 
coordinated checkpointing is shown in Figure 2.3, where each process of the 
application is blocked for the duration of the checkpoint operation, thereby preventing 
any non-deterministic events from creating inconsistencies in the application and 
guaranteeing that a recovery line is achieved with every set of checkpoints 
[Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
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The key benefit of coordinated checkpointing is its immunity to the 
domino effect. This benefit also flows onto other aspects of checkpointing, simplifying 
restoration of a checkpoint, as the processes are always restored to their most recent 
checkpoints. Garbage collection is also simplified, as only the most recent checkpoint 
ever needs to be retained. 
Conl1nunicatioll-Induced Clzeckpoillting 
Communication-induced checkpointing combines advantages of both 
uncoordinated and coordinated checkpointing: the domino effect is avoided and 
processes are able to take some of their checkpoints independently, known as local 
checkpoints. Importantly, to ensure that the recovery line progresses, a process is 
occasionally required to take a checkpoint, known as a forced checkpoint. 
Checkpointing information is piggybacked on each message exchanged in an 
application. When a message is received, this checkpointing information is examined 
to determine whether a forced checkpoint must be taken, prior to processing the 
contents of the message [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
Importantly, there are several problems observed with communication-
induced checkpointing [Alvisi et al. 1999]: 
• communication-induced checkpointing does not scale well given a large number of 
processes; 
• twice as many forced checkpoints are required than local checkpoints, reducing the 
benefit of local checkpoints; 
• the demands placed on system resources by communication-induced 
checkpointing is highly unpredictable; 
• local checkpoints are difficult to place without a good knowledge of the 
application; and 
• communication-induced checkpointing does not perform well given regular, heavy 
communication patterns. 
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2.2.2 Survey of Checkpointing Facilities 
Here we present the operation and features of four facilities for fault 
tolerance using checkpointing. The facilities that we review are: Manetho, KeyKOS, 
Libckpt, and Diskless Checkpointing. Although other facilities exist, these facilities 
provide a good overview of checkpointing methods and their optimisations. Manetho 
allows the execution of a failed process to be replayed, handling the repeated sending 
and receiving of messages that were sent/received by the process prior to its failure. 
Interactions between the process and users are similarly handled. KeyKOS integrates 
checkpointing with the operating system's virtual memory facility, checkpointing the 
state of an entire computer, instead of individual processes. Libckpt, a programming 
library that provides (mostly) transparent checkpointing of an individual process, gives 
programmers the option of specifying regions of memory that should not be included 
in checkpoints. Finally, Diskless Checkpointing uses the memories of remote 
computers as an alternative storage medium to disk for checkpoint data. 
Manetho 
There are two components in Manetho's approach to providing fault 
tolerance for clusters [Elnozahy and Zwaenepoel 1993]: rollback-recovery and 
process replication. Process replication is not relevant to this review, hence it IS 
ignored. Transparent rollback recovery is provided in Manetho by three elements: 
(1) a communication protocol that supports maintenance of an antecedence graph, 
supports message logging, and controls interactions with the outside world; 
(2) coordinated checkpointingl that ensures a consistent set of process states on 
stable storage; and 
(3) a recovery protocol that uses the antecedence graph, message logs, and 
checkpoints to recover the system state without rolling back any surviving 
processes; 
1. Coordination is not necessary, but [Elnozahy and Zwaenepoel 19931 indicate that it is used 
to avoid storing the message log on stable storage and to simplify garbage collection. 
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Manetho assumes a piecewise deterministic system model. Under this 
model, processes consist of a set of deterministic state intervals that begin with a 
nondeterministic event [Strom and Yemini 1985], e.g., message delivery or user input/ 
output. Manetho introduces the concept of an antecedence graph, which summarises 
the nondeterministic events that lead to the existence of a particular state interval of a 
process. 
The communication protocol maintains the antecendence graph(s) and 
controls interactions with the outside world. Outgoing messages have the current 
antecedence graph of the sending process piggybacked to the message. Messages are 
logged to memory, and later to disk. Upon delivery of a message, a new state interval 
is begun in the receiver, and its antecedence graph is updated with the sender's graph 
received with the message. Hence, the antecedence graph records the sequence of 
events leading to the process' current state. 
Failed processes are restored to their most recent checkpoint. Once 
restored, a process contacts all other processes to retrieve their antecedence graphs. 
From these graphs, the restored process extracts the subgraph of its most recent state 
interval. In particular, the restored process determines which messages it sent to other 
processes, which messages it received from other processes, and any interactions with 
the environment that occurred prior to failure. The execution of the process is then 
replayed using the recovered antecedence graph to replay non-deterministic events, 
e.g., receipt of messages. During replay, outgoing messages are logged but are not sent 
to their destinations. Incoming messages that were received pre-failure are retrieved 
from the message logs of the sending process(es). Once the most recent state interval 
of the process is restored, the execution of that process continues normally (recovery 
is complete). 
KeyKOS 
KeyKOS is an object-oriented microkemel based operating system, 
providing transparent coordinated checkpointing as part of its virtual memory paging 
mechanism [Landau 1992]. Importantly, the KeyKOS checkpointing mechanism 
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checkpoints the entire system state, not just an individual process. Processes on 
different computers are not considered, hence checkpointing parallel processing 
applications is not offered. Checkpointing is achieved by blocking all processes in the 
system, writing any modified pages to disk, then restarting the processes. This 
procedure is optimised using concurrent checkpointing, and the processes are 
unblocked as soon as the memory is marked copy-on-reference and related system 
structures have been copied [Landau 1992]. 
The pages stored in virtual memory on disk are structured to ensure that the 
failure of a checkpoint doesn't alter a previously successful checkpoint. This is 
achieved by defining three regions of swap: home locations, checkpoint area, and 
working area. Pages are retrieved from swap first from the working area, then the 
checkpoint area, and lastly from the home locations. During the normal operation of 
the system, pages are swapped out to the working area. Checkpointing begins by 
blocking all processes of the application then writing all altered pages in memory to 
the working area of swap. Once complete, the working area is switched with the 
previous checkpoint area, making the checkpoint area the new working area for 
swapping, and the processes are unblocked. The pages in the checkpoint area are then 
copied to their home locations, called migration, making the checkpoint area available 
for switching with the working area at the next checkpoint. Importantly, the next 
checkpoint cannot begin until migration is complete. 
Restarting KeyKOS after failure involves determining which swap area is 
the checkpoint area and considering the working area to be empty. By retrieving pages 
from the working area, then the checkpoint area, and finally the home locations, 
restoration to the most recent checkpoint is achieved. This procedure results in fast 
restart times, as restoring any applications only involves paging them back into 
memory [Landau 1992]. The migration process is restarted after failure to ensure all 
pages are written to their home locations. 
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Libckpt 
Libckpt a portable library for the transparent checkpointing of individual 
processes executing on Unix. Libckpt provides incremental checkpointing, concurrent 
checkpointing, and user directed checkpointing optimisations. Importantly, the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the features of the underlying system. 
In particular, the concurrent checkpointing optimisation requires the operating 
system's fork() system call to use the mechanisms of copy-on-write. Furthermore, the 
incremental checkpointing optimisation relies on Unix's mprotect() system call in 
combination with a segmentation fault (SEGV) signal handler, which has been found 
to be unreliable. Introducing libckpt functionality requires a minor modification to a 
program's code - for the C language, the main() function must be renamed to 
ckpCtarget() and the libckpt library must be linked to the executable 
[Plank et al. 1995]. 
Although libckpt provides transparent checkpointing, its reliance on 
features of the Unix operating system that are accessible to the parallel application 
require that the user application does not access these functions. In particular, some 
signal handling and page protection functions cannot be used by the application for 
libckpt to be effective. Furthermore, some operating system managed state is not 
restored after the failure, e.g., process identification (PID) number and parent PID 
[Plank et al. 1995]. 
Finally, to reduce the overhead of checkpointing, libckpt optionally allows 
the user/programmer to specify regions of memory to exclude from the checkpoint 
and/or to specify when checkpoints should be taken. 
Diskless Checkpointillg 
Diskless Checkpointing uses coordinated checkpointing and provides both 
incremental checkpointing and concurrent checkpointing optimisations. During the 
creation of checkpoints, all processes of the application are frozen. Upon failure of the 
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application, each of the surviving processes IS rolled back to their most recent 
checkpoint [Plank et al. 1998]. 
The key objective of Diskless Checkpointing is to remove stable storage 
from checkpointing systems, and replace it with the memories of remote computers. 
Different techniques of RAID storage devices have been used for storing data on 
remote computers, including: parity, mirroring, one-dimensional parity, EVENODD 
coding, and Reed-Solomon coding techniques [Plank 1996]. To ensure fault tolerance 
during checkpointing and recovery, existing checkpoints are maintained until new 
checkpoints are completed. Importantly, Plank et al. recognise that the demands placed 
on processor memory is high, requiring up to two checkpoints to be stored in memory 
at the same time [Plank et al. 1998]. This is reduced through the usage of incremental 
checkpointing, ensuring that the extra pages required is only equal to the number of 
pages of memory altered since the previous checkpoint. Furthermore, only data on the 
altered pages is sent over the network, and this is further reduced by sending only the 
differences (diffs) of the pages [Plank et al. 1998]. 
Diskless Checkpointing can survive the failure of a single computer, or 
even several computers, but cannot survive system-wide failure, e.g., due to power 
failure. To resolve this issue, a two-level scheme is recommended [Plank et al. 1998]: 
regular diskless checkpoints should be supplemented by disk-based checkpoints taken 
at a much larger interval. 
2.2.3 Summary 
In this section, we have examined features of checkpoint-based rollback 
recovery mechanisms (uncoordinated, coordinated, and communication-induced 
checkpointing) and a number of existing checkpointing facilities (Manetho, KeyKOS, 
libckpt, and Diskless Checkpointing). Uncoordinated checkpointing mechanisms 
allow each process to be checkpointed when it is most convenient, however they suffer 
from rollback propagation and the domino effect. Coordinated checkpointing 
mechanisms avoid rollback propagation and the domino effect, but the processes of the 
application are blocked for the duration of the checkpoint operation. This results in 
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unnecessary overheads during the failure-free operation of an application. 
Communication-induced checkpointing mechanisms claim to provide the advantages 
of both uncoordinated and coordinated checkpointing mechanisms, but several 
problems have been observed with their scalability and performance on particular 
applications, demands on system resources, and requirements of the programmer. 
Manetho uses coordinated checkpointing and replays the execution of a 
failed process by reconstructing messages incoming to the process, and capturing 
messages outgoing from that process. However to achieve this, a specialist 
communications protocol was required for the maintenance of the antecedence 
graph(s), to track the dependencies of a process' state. Manetho uses a form of 
coordinated checkpointing that does not block the processes of the application. 
However, the set of checkpoints generated by this procedure do not necessarily form a 
recovery line. This is not required due to the use of message logs and the antecendence 
graph. 
KeyKOS provides a umque approach by utilising existing operating 
system mechanisms for providing a checkpointing facility. In particular, virtual 
memory mechanisms are used. Using virtual memory mechanisms allows the entire 
system state to be captured, rather than only a single process. Coordinated 
checkpointing is used, with the entire application blocked during the checkpoint 
operation. Restoration in the KeyKOS system is very quick, as the pages of the process 
are only swapped in as necessary. 
Libckpt, although only checkpointing individual processes, provides a 
different perspective being a user-level checkpointing service. Although considered 
somewhat portable among different Unix variants, the incremental checkpointing and 
concurrent checkpointing optimisations that are used by libckpt rely on the underlying 
operating system mechanisms such as fork() and mprotect(). Furthermore, the key 
optimisation provided by libckpt, user directed checkpointing, requires significant 
modifications to the application program. Recovery is also limited by the library's 
inability to restore certain operating system state information, e.g., process 
identification, etc. 
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Lastly, Diskless Checkpointing uses the memories of remote computers as 
a substitute for stable storage. Coordinated checkpointing is utilised, during which 
time the application is frozen. Different techniques for storing checkpoint data on 
remote computers have been investigated, however the checkpoints of failed processes 
must still be recalculated from the states of surviving processes. 
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Chapter 3. Synthesis of a Group 
Communications Facility to 
Support Fault Tolerance 
In this chapter we present the synthesis of a group communications facility 
for the support of a checkpointing facility for reliable computing on clusters. We begin 
in Section 3.1 by presenting the requirements of a group communications facility for 
both checkpointing and other applications. The architecture of a group 
communications facility addressing these requirements is presented in Section 3.2, 
followed by the logical design of the operation of the facility in Section 3.3. Finally, in 
Section 3.4 we summarise the contributions made in the design of the group 
communications facility. 
3.1 Requirements for Group Communications 
For the development of user applications, it is desirable to present a single 
system image to the programmer, with the boundaries of individual computers hidden. 
This is accomplished by providing high availability by transparently maintaining 
cluster resources, by providing fault tolerance transparently to applications, and by 
providing transparency from operating system activities [Goscinski et al. 2002]. In 
particular, location transparency, process relation transparency, execution 
transparency, and device transparency should be provided [Goscinski et al. 2001]: 
• Location transparency hides the boundaries of individual computers and presents a 
single powerful computer to the user; 
• Process relation transparency maintains parent/child relationships over the 
network; 
• Execution transparency allows processes to be moved for dynamic load balancing; 
and 
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• Device transparency offers location independent access to devices e.g., remote 
output to a user's terminal. 
A group communications facility must provide these transparencies to maintain the 
single system image. 
However, the services of a cluster operating system address umque 
problems that group communications can be used to solve efficiently, e.g., distributing 
performance and load metrics for global scheduling, invalidating or distributing pages 
of memory for Distributed Shared Memory (DSM), or managing checkpointing and 
distributing checkpoint data for reliable computing. Group communication services 
can only be applied effectively to these problems if the boundaries of individual 
computers are exposed (no location transparency). 
We propose that a group communications facility should provide two sets 
of services: user-oriented services and system-oriented services. User-oriented 
services, targeted at applications, provide transparency and are accessible to all 
processes. System-oriented services, targeted at operating system services, do not 
provide transparency and access is restricted to the operating system. 
In this section we present the requirements for a group communications 
facility for supporting reliable computing on clusters. The functionality that is required 
by users of both user-oriented and system-oriented group communication services, are 
presented in Section 3.1.1. Following this, user-oriented services are presented in 
Section 3.1.2, and system-oriented services are presented in Section 3.1.3. 
3.1.1 Common Requirements 
Before examining user-oriented and system-oriented services, there are a 
number of services that must be provided by a group communications facility. In 
particular, group naming, group type semantics, and group membership management 
must be provided. 
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Naming 
Processes need to identify a group when joining or leaving the group or 
when sending a message to the group. For the user/programmer, textual names (words 
or phrases) are the simplest form of identification. However, this type of naming is 
very inefficient and must be avoided at the system level. For the operating system, low 
level names provide an efficient naming mechanism by providing hints to the location 
of group membership information. However, these names are not user friendly and 
must be avoided at the user level. 
We propose to use two levels of naming: user names and system names. 
User names are provided for the user/programmer of the group communication facility 
and are in textual form, e.g., "MyApplicationGroup". Textual names are only used 
until the system name can be determined. System names provide hints for the operating 
system to locate group membership structures without incurring high overheads. 
Groups Types 
Two types of groups can be provided [Tanenbaum 1995]: closed and open 
groups. Closed groups only allow members to send messages to the group, non-
members are not permitted to send messages to the group. Open groups do not maintain 
this restriction, and non-member processes can freely send messages to the group. 
Closed groups often work well in parallel processing applications, where a 
number of processes work together towards a particular goal [Tanenbaum 1995]. We 
propose that closed groups are also useful for managing the protected resources of an 
operating system. Alternatively, open groups can be used in the client-server model for 
implementing replicated servers, where clients send their requests to a group of servers 
providing the same service [Tanenbaum 1995]. Hence we propose to provide both 
closed groups and open groups. 
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Group Membership Management 
There are two alternatives for group management: static group 
management and dynamic group management [Kaashoek and Tanenbaum 1994]. 
Under static group management, the members of the group are determined before the 
group is created and must be declared during the creation of the group. Once created, 
the membership of the group cannot be altered except by deleting the existing group 
and recreating a new group with the desired alterations in place. Under dynamic group 
management, groups can be created and destroyed by any process at any time. 
Processes can join and leave groups at will; no limits are placed on the number of 
processes in a group, nor on the number of times a process can join or leave a group. 
When developing a platform for reliable computing, it is important to 
recognise that a computer in a cluster could either fail or be shut down, forcing its 
removal from the cluster. Under static group management, any groups with members 
on a computer removed from the cluster would be void. New groups would need to be 
created and new group identifiers provided to all surviving group members. 
Importantly, the operating system cannot alter the group identifiers stored in the 
memory of a process, hence, recreating a static group cannot be achieved transparently 
and must be carried out by the applications themselves. Furthermore, any groups used 
for operating system functionality, such as for managing fault tolerance, would also 
need to be recreated. Recreating a group and providing new group identifiers to all 
surviving members without group communication services would be difficult and 
inefficient. 
Static group management is suitable where the hardware platform is 
unlikely to change, e.g., massively parallel architectures, or where applications are 
well defined, non-adaptive and non-interactive. Clusters are dynamic in nature, hence 
dynamic group membership management more suitable [MPI Forum 1997]. Hence, 
dynamic group membership management is used. 
We propose five primitives for the dynamic management of groups and their 
memberships: 
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(1) create - given a user name, an empty group is created and the system name of 
the group is returned for future reference; 
(2) join - given the system name of a group, a process is added to the list of 
members of that group; 
(3) leave - given the system name of a group, a process is removed from the list of 
members of that group; 
(4) destroy - given the system name of a group, the group is removed from the list 
of groups maintained on the system; and 
(5) find - given a user name, the associated system name is returned if the group 
exists. 
The first four primitives provide the usual management of groups and memberships. 
The final primitive, find, is required so that processes can check for and/or find the 
system name for an existing group they wish to create/join/leave/destroy. 
3.1.2 Requirements for User-Oriented Services 
In this section we address those semantics of message delivery and 
message ordering that a group communication service should provide as user-oriented 
services. As specified previously, these semantics are transparent to maintain the 
single system image. 
Message Delivery Semantics 
To efficiently support a diverse range of group communication 
applications, a group communications facility should provide a variety of delivery 
semantics. In Chapter 2, we observed delivery semantics of unreliable delivery, 
k-delivery, quorum delivery, and atomic delivery. However, we propose that only three 
semantics are needed for user-oriented services: unreliable delivery, semi-reliable 
delivery, and atomic delivery. 
Unreliable semantics are the lowest quality of delivery service offered, but 
also provide the lowest overheads. Under these semantics, all messages are sent 'best 
effort'. These semantics support those applications where reliability is not essential, 
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e.g., for periodically updating the state of load in a distributed system for load 
balancing or multimedia streaming (audio streaming, video streaming, etc.). The 
potential for using multicast in load distribution and load balancing has been discussed 
in [Tanenbaum 1999], multicast being regularly used as the underlying network 
mechanism for providing group communications. 
Although transparency must be maintained, it is not always possible to 
completely avoid the realities of a cluster. In particular, computers attached to one 
network segment can have their connection to the cluster severed either temporarily or 
indefinitely. To address this issue, we propose semi-reliable semantics, which accept 
that communication with processes can be lost unexpectedly, without revealing the 
association of processes to a particular computer. 
Semi-reliable semantics deliver a message to all responding destination 
computers. If any computers fail to respond, delivery to those computers is not 
guaranteed. If guaranteed delivery to every computer in the cluster is required, atomic 
semantics should be used. User level applications often demand reliable delivery. 
However atomic semantics are not necessary in many cases, as the occasional failure 
of the application is not critical. Semi-reliable semantics provide an acceptable level of 
reliability to those applications, without incurring the overhead involved in atomic 
semantics. Thus, semi-reliable semantics should be offered. 
Atomic semantics provide all-or-none delivery of messages to groups: 
either all destinations receive the message or none of the destinations receive the 
message. Atomic semantics can be used to simplify consistency protocols for 
developing fault tolerant applications. Thus, it is necessary to provide this service. 
Message Ordering Semantics 
To efficiently support a diverse range of group communication 
applications, such as those referred to in Section 2.1.2 that use the ISIS toolkit, a group 
communication service should provide a variety of ordering semantics. We propose to 
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provide two semantics for user-oriented services: no ordering and total ordering. We 
do not examine causal ordering in this thesis due to the limited time frame. 
No ordering semantics are the simplest semantics that can be provided by 
a communication service. Once an incoming message has been reconstructed on a 
computer, it is immediately delivered to its destination(s). No effort is made to order 
the incoming messages. No ordering semantics are useful where ordering of message 
is not essential, or where the cost of ordering messages is too high, e.g., multimedia 
streaming (audio streaming, video streaming, etc.), or for maintaining information 
about the state of the virtual machine. In particular, where several messages are 
multiplexed over a single network connections, short messages are delivered quicker 
than larger messages. By using short messages, state updates are delivered quickly. 
Totally ordered semantics can simplify maintaining the consistency of 
replicated information, increasing the reliability of an application [Moser et al. 1996]. 
Totally ordered semantics are often expected of non-group (one-to-one) 
communication protocols, e.g., TCP [Postel 1981]. However in non-group 
communication, there is a single sending process, whereas in group communication, 
several sending processes can be distributed on any number of computers. Total 
ordering delivers all messages from all senders in the same order to common receivers. 
Moreover, two messages sent from two senders in sequence are delivered in the same 
order to all recei verso 
3.1.3 Requirements for System-Oriented Services 
In this section we propose semantics for system-oriented group 
communication services. Access to system-oriented services is restricted to the 
operating system as transparency is not provided. We propose two additional 
semantics at the system level: at-Ieast-k delivery semantics and computer-based 
ordering semantics. 
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At-Least-k delivery 
One of the simplest of fault tolerant services is the restoration of a system 
to a consistent state following a failure. This can be achieved through the use of 
checkpointing [lalote 1994]. Ordinarily, checkpoints are stored on stable storage 
(disk), but interim checkpoints can be stored on remote processor memories in order to 
improve performance [Plank et al. 1998]. Importantly, if a computer containing an 
interim checkpoint should fail, the interim checkpoint is lost and recovery must 
proceed by using the (older) checkpoint stored on disk. We propose that at-least-k 
semantics could be used to improve the reliability of interim checkpoints. 
At-Ieast-k semantics guarantee to deliver messages to a user specified 
number of a computers (k), e.g., for k = 2, at least two remote computers recei ve a copy 
of the message. The user must be aware of the physical separation of resources in the 
cluster to be able to specify the number of computers that a message should be 
delivered to. Hence, the requirement of transparency prohibits at-least-k semantics 
from being provided to user applications. 
Computer-based ordering 
Computer-based semantics, similar to FIFO semantics for processes 
[Kaashoek and Tanenbaum 1994], guarantee that a sequence of several messages sent 
from an individual computer are delivered in the same order in which they were sent. 
This is shown in Figure 3.1, where six messages from Computers A and B arrive out 
of order on Computer C. Each message is denoted Xi' where X represents the computer 
where the message was sent, and i represents the index of that particular message (the 
message number). 
The messages arrive at Computer C in the order B20 A3, AI' B3, B 1, A2. A 
message index of 1 is expected, so the first two messages (B2 and A3) are stored in 
buffers. When message A 1 arrives, it is immediately delivered to its destination(s) as 
it is the next message index expected from Computer A. The buffers are checked for 
Computer A 
Ms A Ms B 
Ms A Ms B 
Ms B 
Computer C 
Message Arrival Order: 82,A3,A1,83,81,A2 
Message Delivery Order: A1 ,81 ,82,83,A2,A3 
Figure 3.1: Computer-based Ordering of Messages 
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Computer B 
the presence of the next message expected from Computer A, message A2, which 
hasn't arrived yet. Message B3 is received and buffered. Message Bl is also delivered 
immediately upon arrival, and messages B2 and B3 are also forwarded to their 
destination(s) and removed from the buffers. Lastly, message A2 is received and 
delivered to its destination, followed by message A3 which is delivered and removed 
from the buffers. Importantly, the global order in which messages were transmitted is 
not examined, only the order in which they were transmitted from each individual 
computer is maintained. 
We propose to use computer-based semantics to distribute checkpoints to 
remote computers. Total ordering semantics are not necessary, because a checkpoint 
cannot be distributed across several computers. Computer-based ordering relieves the 
checkpointing system from ordering updates to maintain consistency, without 
suffering the overhead of total ordering. Computer-based semantics require that 
processes are aware of the physical separation of computers in a distributed system. 
43 
The requirement of transparency prohibits computer-based semantics from being 
provided at the user level. 
3.2 Group Communications Facility Architecture 
In this section we describe the architecture of a group communications 
facility that satisfies the requirements presented in Section 3.1. We propose that such 
a facility is best developed using a microkernel based operating system as the platform. 
We begin in Section 3.2.1 by presenting the rationale of this approach. In Section 3.2.2 
we describe the architecture of an interprocess communications facility (lPC facility) 
that fulfils the design requirements of a microkernel. We select a network facility 
supporting multicast delivery, and discuss the additional requirements imposed on our 
design by the selection of multicast in Section 3.2.3. In Section 3.2.4, we describe the 
placement of group communication mechanisms in a microkernel based operating 
system. Finally, in Section 3.2.5, we address the MADCAP protocol that specifies how 
multicast addresses are to be allocated, but was not available until after this problem 
was addressed in the thesis. 
3.2.1 Operating System Architecture 
Two common structures of operating system are those based on a 
monolithic kernel, and those based on a microkernel [Rozier et al. 1988], 
[Goscinski 1991]. Those operating systems that use a monolithic kernel structure are 
somewhat inflexible due to the tight coupling of kernel components. In particular, 
memory management, process management, file management, and support for 
network communication are tightly coupled. This leads to a lack of modularity, 
increasing the complexity and time required to develop a group communications 
facility. Thus, designing a group communications facility for an operating system 
using a monolithic kernel is not desirable. 
An alternative approach is to use a microkernel-based operating system 
architecture. The microkernel itself only provides a minimal set of (low level) services, 
such as interrupt handling, context switching and local IPC [Gerrity et al. 1991], 
[De Paoli et al. 1995]. Other operating system services are provided by a set of 
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Computer A Computer B 
Microkernel (LocaIIPC) Microkernel (Local IPC) 
Network 
Figure 3.2: Network Entity Placement in a Microkernel-based Operating System 
operating system processes that cooperate using the client-server model. Each 
operating system process is generally responsible for managing a particular resource 
or providing specific functionality, e.g., process management, memory management, 
or providing a particular network protocol. The high level of modularity present in the 
microkemel-based architecture simplifies and accelerates the development of new and 
existing operating system services. Hence, we propose to use a microkemel-based 
architecture. 
3.2.2 Interprocess Communication Facility Architecture 
Before we begin the design of the new group communications facility, we 
must first consider the operation of the IPC facility in a microkemel based operating 
system as a foundation for designing the proposed mechanisms. We propose an 
architecture similar to that shown in Figure 3.2. 
The Microkemel 
The microkemel is the first point of contact for all communications, the 
interface to the IPC facility is provided by system calls. Importantly, the functionality 
of a microkemel must be minimised [Rozier et al. 1988], [Gerrity et al. 1991]. This 
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limits support for IPC in the microkemel to messages exchanged between processes 
executing on the same computer (local IPC) [Gerrity et al. 1991], 
[De Paoli et al. 1995]. Operating system processes cooperate using local IPC to 
provide additional IPC services, e.g., remote IPe. 
Operating System Processes 
Operating system processes receive messages from the microkemel to 
resolve delivery to remote computers. The location of the destination end-point is 
determined and the message is delivered to its destination using the services of the 
Transport Entity to transport the message over the network. 
The Transport, Network, and Data Li1lk Entities 
Support for IPC with processes located on remote computers requires 
support for the deli very of messages to (and from) those remote computers. This is the 
responsibility of the Transport, Network, and Data Link entities which together form 
the protocol stack. In a microkemel based operating system, each of these entities 
usually form an independent operating system process. 
3.2.3 Underlying Network Provisions and Multicast 
Another issue that must be examined before presenting the design of the 
group communications facility is the selection of an underlying network as the target 
platform. We propose a supporting network of IP on Ethernet due to its popularity and 
support for multicast. Multicast exploits a shared medium to allow a single packet to 
be transmitted to several destinations simultaneously [Cheriton and Deering 1985]. 
Without support for multicast, each packet must be sent to each destination 
individually. Multicasting provides a significant increase in performance, and thus is 
used. 
The semantics of multicast introduce a new problem. To provide a reliable 
delivery service, receiving computers in one-to-one (unicast) transport protocols 
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ordinarily return an acknowledgement packet to the sending computer after predefined 
timeout intervals or when the final packet of a message arrives at the receiving 
computer [Tanenbaum 1996]. Using multicast results in several computers receiving 
the same packet(s) simultaneously. If the same rules for sending acknowledgements in 
unicast protocols were to be applied to multicast protocols, all receiving computers 
would attempt to send an acknowledgement packet back to the sender at the same time. 
This would flood the sender, which would quickly reach its capacity for handling 
incoming traffic. 
We propose to combine two mechanisms to deal with this issue: 
(1) All timeout periods are randomised - the timeout values used to determine when 
acknowledgements are sent are not specified as absolute values, as for unicast 
protocols. Instead, a range is specified, and each timeout is randomly selected 
within the range of allowable timeouts. This results in each receiving computer 
responding at a different time, allowing the sending computer to process 
acknowledgements and free up the resources before further traffic arri ves; 
(2) The number of receiving computers is factored into the timeout ranges -
randomising timeouts does not, on its own, prevent a sending computer from 
being flooded. As the number of receiving computers increases, the number of 
acknowledgements the sending computer has to process within the timeout 
range increases. However, the sending computer requires a list of destination 
computers to achieve reliable delivery. Using the number of destination 
computers the sending computer calculates the timeout range and provides it to 
the receiving computers in the header of all outgoing packets. 
The first mechanism is required to spread the acknowledgements over a 
period of time. However, as the number of computers sending an acknowledgement 
increases, so does the rate of acknowledgements. Hence, the second mechanism is 
added to increase the time for acknowledgements to be sent. This results in a relatively 
consistent rate of acknowledgements. 
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3.2.4 Placement of Group Communication Mechanisms 
Before presenting the operation of group communication mechanisms in 
Section 3.3, we first determine what mechanisms must be examined, and their 
placement in the proposed microkemel-based operating system. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the microkemel is the first point of contact for 
IPC requests. Local IPC is handled by the microkemel, other requests for IPC are 
forwarded to operating system processes for resolution. There are three possible 
scenarios for delivering a message to a group: 
(1) All destinations are located on the current computer; 
(2) Destinations exist on both the current and remote computers; and 
(3) All destinations are located on remote computers. 
For the first scenario, if the microkemel could identify the processes enrolled in a 
group, delivery of a message to those processes would be very fast. Additionally, the 
performance of the second and third scenarios would improve if more than one 
destination were present on anyone computer. 
However, the microkemel should not deliver group messages for the 
following reasons: 
(1) The client-server model is used to provide the majority of operating system 
functionality (Section 3.2.1), resulting in a large number of messages being 
exchanged during the normal operation of the system. Most of these are short, 
non-group messages (one-to-one) passed between server processes providing 
operating system services. Introducing a series of tests into a microkernel to 
support group communications (one-to-many, rare compared to one-to-one 
messages) would likely result in a significant performance penalty to the whole 
operating system; 
(2) Group communication is a special case of IPC. Only minimal functionality 
should be provided by the microkemel [Gerrity et al. 1991]. Group 
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communication services could be provided separately, hence should not be 
provided by the microkernel. 
Hence, all functionality for group communications is provided separately from the 
microkernel; any requests for group communications are forwarded to an operating 
system process, the "IPC Manager", for resolution. The resulting architecture is shown 
in Figure 3.3. 
We must determine where each service of the group communications 
facility should be located, before we can design the mechanisms that provide those 
services. The services that must be placed (Section 3.1) are naming, group types, group 
membership management, delivery semantics, and ordering semantics. 
The IPC Manager resolves requests for IPC that are not handled by the 
microkernel. Delivering a message to many receivers for group communications falls 
into this category. This requires the IPC Manager to know the members of a group, 
hence the IPC Manager provides group naming and group membership management. 
Controlling group membership and delivering messages to groups also makes the IPC 
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Manager the ideal location for implementing group type semantics, where delivery of 
messages to closed groups requires the sender to be a member of the group. 
Transport protocols provide reliable, cost-effective data transport from one 
computer to another, independent of the physical network or networks currently in use 
[Tanenbaum 1996]. In the proposed architecture (Figure 3.3), transport protocol 
services are provided by the Transport Entity. The proposed delivery semantics are 
provided by the Transport Entity, given that several levels of reliability are proposed. 
However, ordering semantics should not be introduced to the Transport Entity, as 
messages must be ordered from both local and remote sources. Hence, we propose the 
IPC Manager should provide ordering semantics, given that it delivers group messages 
to their destinations. 
Importantly, to guarantee reliable delivery, the Transport Entity requires a 
list of the computers with group members to identify which computers must 
acknowledge delivery of a message. To allow the Transport Entity to maintain such a 
list, the IPC Manager requests the Transport Entity start receiving messages for a 
group's multicast address when a process on a computer joins a group. 
To use multicast efficiently, we propose to allocate a multicast IP address 
to each group. Given that dynamic membership management is used (Section 3.1.1), 
dynamic allocation of IP addresses is also required. The Internet Group Management 
Protocol (IGMP), required if multicast IP is to be used, provides a mechanism for 
computers to declare the multicast addresses they are using to the routers attached to 
their network [Deering 1989]. The routers will then repeat multicast traffic on adjacent 
subnets on the local subnet. However, IGMP does not define how dynamic allocation 
of multicast addresses is to be performed. Hence the problem of dynamic multicast IP 
address allocation must be addressed in this design2. Given that the Transport Entity 
already maintains a list of destination computers for each group, it can easily determine 
which multicast IP addresses are not in use. Hence, we propose to place dynamic 
multicast IP address allocation in the Transport Entity. 
2. The Multicast Address Dynamic Client Allocation Protocol (MADCAP) [Hanna et al. 1999] 
was developed after dynamic address allocation had already been addressed in this project. 
See Section 3.2.5 for a discussion of MADCAP. 
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Finally, to multicast IP packets on an Ethernet network, the IP address 
must be mapped to an Ethernet address. This mapping is specific to the Ethernet, hence 
should be provided by the Data Link Entity. Finally, incoming multicast traffic must 
be filtered out at the lowest possible level to prevent processing of irrelevant data. The 
data link entity is the first point of contact for incoming packets, hence should be 
responsible for filtering incoming packets. 
3.2.5 MADCAP 
The Multicast Address Dynamic Client Allocation Protocol (MADCAP), 
originally based on the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), was developed 
to allow computers to dynamically allocate multicast IP addresses [Hanna et al. 1999]. 
MADCAP was not available until after dynamic multicast address allocation had been 
developed for this thesis. Furthermore, MADCAP relies on a centralised server/ 
servers, whereas our protocol is fully distributed. Hence, rather than switch to a less 
reliable protocol for no benefit, MADCAP was not used for this thesis and is only 
addressed here for completeness. 
MADCAP utilises a client-server model, where clients send a discover 
message (using multicast) to locate any MADCAP servers able to allocate a multicast 
address. Any servers that are able to allocate an address send an ~ffer response (using 
unicast) describing the addresses the server is willing to provide. To accept an offer, 
the client sends a request message (using unicast) to the particular server to lease an 
address for an amount of time. The clients can then later send a renew message to 
continue a lease, or a release message to deallocate a multicast address 
[Hanna et al. 1999]. 
3.3 Operation of Group Communication Mechanisms 
In this section we examine the operation of mechanisms used in providing 
group communications. In particular, the operation of mechanisms placed in the IPC 
Manager, Transport Entity, Network Entity, and Data Link Entity are described and 
discussed. 
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3.3.1 IPC Manager 
Following the synthesis presented in Section 3.2.4, the IPC Manager offers 
group membership management, group message delivery, group type semantics, and 
message ordering semantics for group communication. 
Group Membership Management 
Group membership management involves the maintenance of group 
information through group management operations (create, join, leave, destroy, and 
.lind), and through changes to the cluster - the creation of a virtual machine, and the 
addition of computers to an existing virtual machine. 
Group membership information is fully replicated among the IPC 
Managers in the cluster. A solution using full replication was selected for its simplicity, 
but this is not a scalable solution. As the number of computers in the virtual machine 
increases, the size of the membership information maintained by the IPC Managers 
will grow such that it is not practical to maintain this information in the memory of a 
computer. Furthermore, the messages necessary to maintain this information 
consistently on each computer will also grow, and the memory capacity of the 
computers involved will be reached. The scalability of group membership information 
is the subject of future research. 
When booted, a computer has no knowledge of whether a virtual machine 
exists or which computers are apart of that virtual machine. We propose the following 
protocol to locate a virtual machine and transfer the membership. To locate any 
computers in the virtual machine, the IPC Manager broadcasts a message requesting 
any IPC Manager in an existing virtual machine to respond. If a virtual machine exists, 
the IPC Managers will delay for a random period of time before sending the complete 
membership list to the new IPC Manager. During this delay period, the IPC Manager 
monitors the network for other IPC Managers responding with the membership list. If 
a response is received, the IPC Manager aborts the transfer to prevent unnecessary 
network traffic and flooding of the receiver. 
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If no response is received, the requesting IPC Manager assumes that no 
virtual machine exists. A new virtual machine is created by creating an empty 
membership list, and then creating a special group in which all of the IPC Managers in 
the cluster enrol. This group is used for alerting the IPC Managers to changes in group 
memberships. Importantly, the procedure for contacting existing IPC Managers is used 
for establishing and maintaining the cluster virtual machine. However, maintenance of 
a virtual machine is not relevant to this discussion of group communication, hence is 
ignored. 
All group management operations that affect the membership of a group 
(create, join, leave, and destroy) must be performed both locally and on remote 
computers. The local group membership lists are modified directly, then the same 
request is sent using reliable delivery to the other IPC Managers in the cluster using the 
membership management group described above. 
Group Message Delivery 
Group messages are addressed to a group, not to the individual members 
of the group. For group membership management, the IPC Manager maintains a list of 
the members of each group. Delivering a message to a group involves locating the 
members of the group and attaching the message to the destination end-points. The IPC 
Manager delivers a message to local destinations and uses the services of the Transport 
Entity to transpOlt the message to the IPC Managers of remote computers to deliver the 
message to remote destinations. 
To deliver a message to several destinations on the same computer, the 
simplest way to deliver the message is to attach a copy of the message to each 
destination end-point. However, this places a high demand on the memory resources 
of a computer, requiring n copies of a group message, given n members on the 
computer. A more efficient method is to reference a single copy of the message. When 
a group message arrives at a computer, a reference count is associated with that 
message and is set to the number of member processes located on that computer. The 
message is then attached to each destination end-point in a shared buffer. As each 
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process accepts delivery of the message, the reference count is decremented. The 
buffer containing the message is only freed when the reference count reaches zero. 
Group Type Semantics 
The two group type semantics are closed and open group semantics 
(Section 3.1.1). Closed group semantics require the sending process to also be a 
member of a group, whereas open group semantics allow any process to send a 
message to the group. 
For closed group semantics, upon receiving a message to be delivered to a 
group, the IPC Manager checks the list of group members to ensure that the sending 
process is a member of that group. If the sending process is a member of the group, 
message delivery continues as usual, otherwise an error message is returned. For open 
group semantics, no membership check is required, and delivery of a message to its 
destination group proceeds immediately. 
Message Ordering Semantics 
Group messages arrive at a computer in an arbitrary order. The ordering 
semantics proposed in Section 3.1 are: no ordering and total ordering for user level 
group communications, and computer based ordering for system-oriented group 
communication services. Providing unordered semantics is trivial - messages are 
immediately forwarded to group members when they arrive. For other ordering 
semantics, the IPC Manager must reorder messages as necessary, such that they are 
forwarded to the destination(s) in the correct sequence. 
Total ordering semantics guarantee that messages are delivered to all 
destinations on all computers in the same order, regardless of the number of processes 
sending to that group of processes or their locations. A globally unique sequence 
number is attached to each message sent to the group. Messages with a higher sequence 
number are only delivered to their destinations once all preceding sequence numbers 
have been delivered. 
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The sequence number is maintained in a token that is passed among the 
IPe Managers attempting to resolve the delivery of a message to the group. To send a 
message to a group using totally ordered semantics, the IPe Manager must first acquire 
the token. This is achieved by sending a request for the token to all other IPe Managers 
in the cluster. Once the token is received, the sequence number is incremented and 
attached to the message to be sent. This is repeated for all queued messages before the 
token is sent to the next IPe Manager that requested it. 
Computer based ordering semantics also require messages to be identified 
for ordering consistently at each computer. However, the sequence number does not 
need to be maintained globally. Instead, a sequence number is maintained 
independently on each computer for every group. When sending a message, this 
sequence number is incremented and attached to the message. No negotiation is with 
other IPe Managers is required. 
The receiving computers maintain a table listing the sequence number of 
the last message delivered from every computer. When a message arrives, the IPe 
Manager looks up the sending computer in the table and determines the next expected 
sequence number. If the received sequence number matches the next expected 
sequence number, the message is delivered. Otherwise, the message is held until all 
messages with preceding sequence numbers have been delivered. 
Importantly, unreliable semantics could be chosen for either of the 
ordering semantics presented above, possibly introducing gaps in the series of 
sequence numbers that arrive on a receiving computer. This requires some 
modifications to the delivery process. The sending procedure remains unchanged, as 
the requirement of consistent sequence numbers is unchanged. However, the receiving 
procedure is modified by immediately delivering messages to group processes when 
they arrive. If a message arrives at a computer that has a sequence number that is lower 
than the last delivered message, it is discarded. 
55 
3.3.2 The Transport Entity 
For group communication, the Transport Entity offers maintenance of 
destination computer lists, dynamic multicast address allocation, and message delivery 
semantics (Section 3.2.4). 
Maintenance of Destination Computer Lists. 
When a process joins a group, the IPC Manager sends a request to the 
Transport Entity to start passing up incoming traffic for a particular multicast address. 
Upon receiving this request, the Transport Entity first sends a request to the Network 
Entity to adjust its filters. The Transport Entity then sends a message to the other the 
Transport Entities in the cluster to adjust their list of receiving computers for the group. 
Multicast Address Allocation 
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the Internet RFC for multicast 
communications does not specify how multicast IP addresses are to be dynamically 
allocated [Deering 1989]. To accomplish dynamic IP address allocation, we must first 
determine the range of IP addresses to allocate. The Internet RFC specifies the 
addresses from 224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255 are available for allocation 
[Deering 1989]. However some of these IP addresses have been preallocated by the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority [lANA 2000], and should be avoided. We have 
selected a range of addresses from 230.0.0.1 through 230.255.255.255 to provide a 
large address space and to avoid the preallocated addresses. Additionally, we have 
assigned the IP address 230.0.0.0 for managing the dynamic allocation of addresses. 
To allocate a multicast address, the Transport Entity sends a request to all 
other Transport Entities in the cluster to reserve the next available multicast address. 
When a Transport Entity receives this request, if they have not received a request for 
the same multicast address, they respond with a reservation confirmation message. If 
a request from a different computer has been received for the same address, the 
Transport Entity responds with a reservation denial. 
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If all Transport Entities in the cluster confirm the reservation, the 
requesting Transport Entity creates a local membership entry, and sends a request to 
the other Transport Entities to create a similar entry. If any Transport Entity denied the 
reservation, then another Transport Entity also tried to reserve the same multicast 
address. The requesting Transport Entity sends a message to the other Transport 
Entities to cancel the reservation, then wait a random timeout period before attempting 
a new reservation. 
Message Delivery Semantics 
When a request to send a message is sent to the Transport Entity for 
delivery, the following information is provided: 
• The message to be delivered to the remote computer(s); 
• The destination computer address (a multicast IP address); and 
• The required delivery service (semantics). 
lfreliable semantics are requested, the list of computers that must acknowledge receipt 
of the message is copied from the list of destination computers (see above). The 
delivery semantics proposed in Section 3.1 are: unreliable, semi-reliable, and atomic 
delivery for user-oriented group communication services, and at-Ieast-k delivery for 
system-oriented group communication services. 
Unreliable Semantics. Messages sent using unreliable semantics are transmitted and 
then forgotten (the resources associated with the message are freed). No attempt is 
made by the Transport Entity to ensure delivery. Thus, the reliability ofthese semantics 
is equivalent to the reliability of the underlying network (IP provides an unreliable, 
best effort delivery service). 
At-least-k semantics. At-Ieast-k semantics require that the Transport Entity count the 
number of destinations that have received the complete message. Once k computers 
acknowledge delivery of the complete message, message delivery is considered 
complete. However, there are still resources occupied by the message on the computers 
where delivery is not complete. To allow these resources to be freed, the sending 
Transport Entity sends a short message to all the other Transport Entities to notify them 
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that delivery is complete. Those computers that have not received the entire message 
can then discard the components (packets) of the message that were received to that 
point. 
Semi-reliable semantics. For semi-reliable delivery, the packets of the message are 
(re-)transmitted using multicast until all packets of the message have been 
acknowledged by all destinations. However, if any destination does not respond, it 
must be ignored. A destination computer is considered to be non-responsive if it has 
not acknowledged the arrival of any packets after several retransmissions. A 
destination that is non-responsive is removed from the list of computers that must 
acknowledge receipt of the message. Importantly, the list of destination computers for 
the group is not modified to ensure that future messages are delivered to the destination 
upon its return. 
Atomic Semantics. Atomic semantics require the message be delivered to either all 
computers, or the message not be delivered to any computers. This is typically 
accomplished by using a two-phase commit algorithm. The two-phase commit 
algorithm works by writing the outcome of a transaction to a log file stored on the file 
system, prior to the transaction being committed or aborted. The transaction is the 
message being delivered to all destinations (a commit) or not delivered to any 
destinations (an abort). The log file acts as a permanent record to ensure consistency 
after a failure occurs; restarted processes use the contents of this file to resynchronise 
with the rest of the application [Date 1990]. 
However, it is preferable to avoid disk access where possible. This has 
been demonstrated by work in MOSIX [Barak and Braverman 1997] and Diskless 
Checkpointing [Plank et al. 1998]. We use a modified two-phase commit algorithm 
that does not require a file service. This modified algorithm guarantees consistency 
within a network partition, but does not guarantee consistency across network 
partitions. Resynchronisation of partitions when they re-merge is not addressed in this 
thesis - it will be dealt with in further research. 
58 
Partition 1 Partition 2 Partition 3 
,---------------------------------, , , 
I , 
,----------~----------, ,----------i----------, 
/ " I ' 
: Computer A Computer B '. Computer C : Computer D I Computer E '. 
iJ~ oH~i,oj 0,1 
, " I , 
'---------~----------' ,---------~----------' \ I 
,----------------------------------' 
S = Sending Computer 
C = Commit Message Received 
Figure 3.4: Possible Network Partitioning During Commit 
The first phase of atomic semantics is to reliably deliver the message to all 
destinations. Semi-reliable semantics are used with one exception - if any destination 
computer stops responding, delivery of the message is aborted. For the second phase, 
a commit notice (a short message) is sent to all destination computers. When the 
commit notice is received, the message is delivered to its destination(s). 
A network partitioning could introduce inconsistencies in the delivery of 
the message if it were to occur during the transmission of the commit notice. Figure 3.4 
shows the three possible scenarios for network partitions: the sending computer is in 
the partition (Partition 1), at least one destination has received the commit message 
(Partition 2), or no destinations have received the commit message (Partition 3). 
The first partition presents the simplest case: the sending computer 
(Computer A) will either have already sent a commit message, or is unaware that a 
partitioning has occurred, and continues to send the commit message. All computers 
within the partition are committed. 
In the remaining two partitions, there are computers that have not received 
the commit message. Furthermore, the sending computer is not within either of these 
partitions. In each case, the computers within the partitions negotiate to maintain 
consistency within their partition. If the commit notice is not received within a 
predefined period of time, the Transport Entity sends a request to any other (accessible) 
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receivers to confirm that the message was committed. A computer that received a 
commit notice for the message ensures that all receiving computers in the partition 
commit the message by (re-)sending the commit notice. If no commit message is 
received the computer ensures that all computers in the partition abort delivery of the 
message. 
For Figure 3.4, those computers in the second partition that have received 
a commit notice confirm the message was committed. In the third (final) partition, after 
several timeouts waiting for a commit message, the message is aborted. Hence 
consistency is maintained in both scenarios. 
3.3.3 The Network Entity 
Following the synthesis presented in Section 3.2.4, we propose to provide 
the Internet Group Management Protocol (IOMP), used to declaring "host group 
memberships" to routers [Fenner 1997], in the Network Manager. Declaring host 
group memberships results in any multicast traffic received on adjacent subnets to be 
forwarded to the local subnet by the routers [Fenner 1997]. 
After allocating a multicast IP address for a group or after a process joins 
a group, the Transport Entity requests the Network Entity pass up packets arriving for 
the group's multicast address. The Network Entity first sends a request to the Data Link 
Entity to adjust its filters, then adds the multicast IP address to its own tables for IOMP. 
The Network Manager then transmits an IGMP join request on the network to alert 
routers that the computer wishes to receive multicast traffic sent to the group's 
multicast address on adjacent networks. 
3.3.4 The Data Link Entity 
Following the synthesis presented in Section 3.2.4, the Data Link Entity 
maps multicast IP addresses to Ethernet multicast addresses and filters incoming 
multicast traffic (see Section 3.3.1). 
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Mapping Multicast IP Addresses to Ethernet Multicast Addresses 
To transmit data on an Ethernet network, an Ethernet address must be 
specified in the header of a frame. The IP address must be mapped to an Ethernet 
address before the data is transmitted on the Ethernet network. The Address Resolution 
Protocol (ARP) [Plummer 1982] performs this function for non-multicast IP 
addresses. A computer requiring the address of another computer broadcasts an ARP 
packet requesting the Ethernet address matching the IP address. The computer that 
owns the IP address responds using ARP providing its Ethernet address 
[Plummer 1982]. 
For multicast IP addresses, no protocol is required to find the Ethernet 
address. Instead, a mapping between the IP multicast address and Ethernet multicast 
address is performed as a binary operation, where the low-order 23 bits of the IP 
multicast address are substituted into the low-order 23 bits of the Ethernet multicast 
address Ol-OO-5E-OO-OO-OO [Deering 1989]. 
Filtering Incoming Multicast Traffic 
The Ethernet hardware (network interface card) allows incoming multicast 
traffic to be partially filtered [AMD 1992]. To prevent more processing of messages 
than necessary, the Data Link Entity checks each packet received against the list of 
multicast addresses the computer is receiving (this information is provided by the 
Network Entity in its request to the Data Link Entity to adjust its filters). If the 
destination of a packet is a multicast address the computer is not receiving, it is 
discarded. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the logical design of a group 
communications facility for the support of checkpointing, among other applications. 
The major contributions made in this design are: the selection of a microkernel based 
operating system as the platform for developing group communications, the provision 
of system-oriented services in addition to user-oriented services, a protocol for 
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dynamic allocation of multicast IP addresses, and a protocol that guarantees 
consistency within a network partition for atomic message delivery. 
Selecting a microkemel based operating system architecture as the 
platform for the development of a group communications provides several benefits. 
Primarily, the architecture is highly modular, isolating the major components of the 
group communications facility. This allows the components of the facility to be 
developed independently, accelerating their development. The proposed design 
represents each of the transport, network, and data Ii nk protocols as separate processes. 
Another advantage of the microkemel approach is that ordering semantics for the 
delivery of messages to groups can be provided independent to the delivery semantics, 
resulting in a highly configurable service, and delivery to local processes does not 
require the involvement of the transport protocol to be invoked to order the messages. 
We recognised early that the objectives of providing a group 
communications facility to support operating system services, in particular 
checkpointing, in addition to user applications created a conflict in their requirements 
for transparency. To eliminate this conflict, we proposed to provide two sets of 
services: user-oriented services that provide transparency, and system-oriented 
services which do not provide transparency. The proposed facility provides unreliable, 
semi-reliable and atomic delivery semantics and unordered and totally ordered 
semantics to user applications. For the operating system, these services are 
supplemented by system-oriented services. In particular, at-Ieast-k delivery semantics 
and computer-based ordering semantics are offered. 
Given the requirement to allocate a multicast IP address to each group in 
the cluster, and the absence of a such a mechanism in the standard for IGMP, we 
developed a distributed protocol to manage the dynamic allocation of IP addresses. 
The proposed protocol uses a series of messages for the computers of the cluster to 
negotiate with each other to ensure that no address is used by two different groups. 
Finally, a protocol was proposed for atomic delivery semantics that 
guarantees consistency of delivery to all or none of the destinations in a network 
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partition, given loss of contact with the original sending computer. Importantly, this 
protocol does not require access to stable storage (disk) for logging the results of a two 
phase commit operation to guarantee atomicity. 
Chapter 4. Synthesis of a 
Checkpointing Facility 
using Group 
Communications 
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In this chapter, we present the logical design of a facility for checkpointing 
parallel applications executing on clusters. This facility is unique in its utilisation of 
the mechanisms of process duplication, process migration, and group communications 
to provide service. This chapter is organised as follows. We begin in Section 4.1 by 
presenting the requirements for the checkpointing facility. In Section 4.2 we present 
the logical design of a checkpointing facility that fulfils these requirements. We finish 
by summarising the benefits and disadvantages of our design in Section 4.3. 
4.1 Checkpointing Requirements 
Non-dedicated clusters are an ideal platform for parallel processing, given 
their high scalability, availability and low cost to performance ratio [Goscinski 2000]. 
However, given that clusters are composed of a collection of independent computers 
used by multiple users [Goscinski 2000], the reliability of clusters is somewhat 
lacking. The loss of a computer in a cluster, or of a single process, can cause the failure 
of a parallel application. Hence, fault tolerance functionality is required. 
It is desirable to present a single virtual machine to the cluster programmer. 
This is accomplished by providing location transparency, process relation 
transparency, execution transparency, and device transparency [Goscinski et al. 2000]. 
Each of these transparencies make programming clusters easier by allowing the 
programmer to focus on developing their application instead of the physical 
distribution of resources in the cluster. We propose the addition of a fifth transparency: 
failure transparency. The addition of failure transparency allows programmers to also 
assume a reliable platform when developing their applications. Furthermore, we 
64 
propose the development of such a transparent facility for reliable computing using 
rollback recovery and checkpointing. 
In this section we examine the requirements for the generation of a 
checkpointing facility for reliable computing on clusters. We begin by presenting the 
requirements for achieving transparency in Section 4.1.1. The events that must be 
captured during the lifetime of the application are identified in Section 4.1.2. In 
Section 4.1.3 we present the requirements for checkpointing an individual process, 
followed by the extension of checkpointing to a parallel application consisting of 
several processes in Section 4.1.4. Finally, the requirements for maintaining the 
reliability of checkpoint data is presented in Section 4.1.5. 
4.1.1 Transparency 
Checkpointing can be performed either in user mode or by the operating 
system. User mode checkpointing can be better optimised by programmer directives 
reducing the size ofthe checkpoint and time required to generate the checkpoint. These 
directives are in the form of checkpointing primitives that are invoked to identify 
which sections of a program should be checkpointed, and when a checkpoint should be 
taken [Silva and Silva 1998]. Importantly, a programmer must first modify an 
application to invoke these primitives before these optimisations are realised. 
Furthermore, the portability of applications modified using these routines is also 
reduced, given that the same primitives may not be available on other platforms. 
Hence, an approach to checkpointing that is transparent to the application is preferred. 
4.1.2 Application Lifetime 
The processes of a parallel application can change throughout its lifetime. 
To create a set of checkpoints for the entire parallel application, we must be able to 
identify the set of processes that make up the application. Given that we wish to 
maintain transparency, this must be accomplished without user intervention. The group 
communications facility presented in Chapter 3 provides group membership 
management, which is used to track the processes that are members of a process group. 
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We propose to reuse these mechanisms for tracking the processes of a parallel 
application. 
Additionally, a number of events in the lifetime of a parallel application 
must be examined to ensure that the introduction of checkpointing is successful. In 
particular, the following events must be captured: 
• instantiation of an application (and constituent processes); 
• the execution of the application; and 
• the termination of the application (and constituent processes). 
Instantiation oj all Application and Constituent Processes 
A failure could occur in a cluster at any time. A checkpointing facility must 
capture the instantiation of an application, such that if the entire application is lost due 
to an early failure, it can be reinstated. Furthermore, parallel applications executing on 
clusters create a number of child processes during their lifetime. The checkpointing 
facility must capture the creation of these child processes, and their associations with 
their parent processes. This is necessary, so that if a parent process is rolled back prior 
to the creation of any child processes, no child processes are orphaned. 
Working Lifetime oj an Application 
The execution of an application can last for a significant period of time, 
even over several days. The captured state of the application must be updated regularly 
to minimise the computation that must be repeated after a failure, and to ensure the 
progress of the application towards its goal. This is known as advancing the recovery 
line of the application [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
Termination oJthe Application and Constituent Processes 
Finally, a failure could occur close to the termination of an application or 
one of its processes. Importantly, an application that terminates normally prior to a 
failure may not need to be recovered if the final results of the application were 
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committed to output. Similarly, for a failure occurring shortly after a process exits, the 
process may not need to be restored if its parent survived and received notification of 
the child process exiting. 
4.1.3 Creating a Checkpoint of a Process 
For an application to survive failures within the cluster, its state must be 
captured periodically, such that it can be restored following such a failure. However, 
before examining how to capture the state of an entire application, we must first 
consider how to capture the state of an individual process. A process typically consists 
of a text section, registers, stack, and a data section [Goscinski 1991], 
[Silberschatz and Galvin 1998]. A process also has associated with it a set of attributes, 
stored in the process control block (PCB), which include interprocess communication 
resources and other resources, e.g., files [Stallings 1995]. The state of each of these 
resources must be saved for a process to be restored following failure as an exact 
replica of the original process. 
A process duplication service, such as the Unixj(Jrk() primitive, similarly 
saves the state of a process, except that the saved state of each resource is combined 
into a new process which is then activated [Silberschatz and Galvin 1998]. We propose 
that the mechanisms of process duplication should be used to create an inactive copy 
of a process (a checkpoint). These mechanisms adequately capture the state of a 
process for later restoration, hence should be adapted for checkpointing. 
4.1.4 Creating Checkpoints for a Parallel Application 
From Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1), there are three alternatives for 
checkpointing a parallel application: uncoordinated, coordinated, or communication-
induced checkpointing. The requirement of maintaining several checkpoints and the 
possibility of the domino effect render uncoordinated checkpointing undesirable. 
Communication-induced checkpointing similarly requires several checkpoints, 
although the domino effect is prevented. The remaining method, coordinated 
checkpointing, requires that non-deterministic events are prevented during the 
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checkpoint operation to ensure consistency between the checkpoints. Ordinarily, this 
is achieved by blocking all of the processes of the application during the checkpoint 
operation [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
We propose that coordinated checkpointing should be used, except the 
processes should only be blocked when they attempt an operation involving a non-
deterministic event, e.g., when attempting to receive an IPC message, rather than 
always being blocked for the duration of the checkpoint operation. We call this 
blocking the non-deterministic events of a process. Given that parallel applications 
executing on clusters should use a coarse grain of execution [Goscinski 1999], which 
requires only occasional communication, most processes of the application should 
continue their execution throughout the checkpoint operation. This minimises any 
overhead involved in checkpointing a parallel application. Hence, coordinated 
checkpointing will be used. 
Given our approach using coordinated checkpointing and only blocking 
the non-deterministic events of a process, creating a set of checkpoints for a parallel 
application executing on a cluster requires three stages: 
(1) The non-deterministic events are blocked for each process of the parallel 
application; 
(2) Checkpoints are created (independently) for each process of the parallel 
application; and 
(3) The non-deterministic events are released to the processes of the parallel 
application. 
Importantly, the processes of the application could be located on any number of 
computers within the cluster, hence group communications should be used to provide 
an efficient communication medium to send requests to the remote computers to block 
the non-deterministic events, create checkpoints, and unblock the non-deterministic 
events. 
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4.1.5 Management of Checkpoint Data 
We have now examined creating a checkpoint for a single process, and 
coordinated checkpointing for the entire paraIIel application. However, any computer 
within the cluster could fail, thus we now examine the storage and management of 
checkpoint data to ensure its survival beyond the loss of a computer. 
To ensure the survival of checkpoint data, it is usuaIIy placed on stable 
storage, typically disk [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. Importantly, accessing a disk is slower 
than accessing the unused memory of other computers on the network 
[Plank et al. 1998], hence remote computer memories should be used for storing 
checkpoints. However, using the memories of remote computers only guarantees that 
the failure of a single computer wi II not result in loss of the application. An application 
will not survive if both a computer supporting the application's processes and the 
computer(s) storing the checkpoints of processes executing on that computer fail, e.g., 
foIIowing power failure. Hence, checkpoints must also be stored on disk. We consider 
stable storage to include both the memories of remote computers, and disk. 
From Section 4.1.3, checkpoints should be created using the mechanisms 
of process duplication. Given the use of process duplication, we propose to use the 
mechanisms of group process migration for storing checkpoint data in the memories of 
remote computers and on disk. To increase the reliability of checkpoint data stored in 
remote computer memories, checkpoint data should be stored in the memories of 
several remote computers. We propose that this should be achieved by combining 
process migration mechanisms with group communication mechanisms. This 
technique has been demonstrated by the mechanisms of group process migration, used 
in the group process duplication service of the GENESIS cluster operating system 
[Hobbs and Goscinski 1999A]. 
To ensure that checkpoint data is distributed to remote computers 
efficiently, the mechanisms of at-Ieast-k delivery (described in Chapter 3) should be 
used. Additionally, given that the most recent set of checkpoints will form a recovery 
line, computer-based ordering semantics (Chapter 3) should be used to guarantee that 
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the checkpoint data most recently received at a remote computer forms part of the 
application's recovery line. This simplifies garbage collection by allowing any existing 
checkpoint data to be immediately discarded, hence should be used. 
4.2 The Checkpointing Facility 
In this section we describe the logical design of a checkpointing facility 
satisfying the requirements presented in Section 4.1. This faci lity uses existing 
operating system services of single process duplication, group process migration, and 
group communication. We begin in Section 4.2.1 by selecting a microkernel based 
operating system architecture as the target platform for developing a checkpointing 
facility. In Section 4.2.2 we present the location of operating system functionality 
relevant to introducing checkpointing into a microkernel based operating system 
architecture. The creation of a checkpoint for a single process is discussed in 
Section 4.2.3. In Section 4.2.4, we address the scheduling of operating system 
processes to create a checkpoint and to prevent processes from being scheduled on the 
CPU during the checkpoint operation. The blocking of non-deterministic events is 
presented in Section 4.2.5. The use of group membership management mechanisms for 
identifying the processes of a parallel application are discussed in Section 4.2.6. In 
Section 4.2.7 we address how coordinated checkpointing is used to create checkpoints 
for the entire parallel application. How checkpoint data is dispatched to the memories 
of remote computers and to disk is the topic of Section 4.2.8. Finally, in Section 4.2.9, 
we address the issue of garbage collection. 
4.2.1 Operating System Architecture 
The two common operating system structures are monolithic kernel based 
and microkernel based operating systems [Goscinski 1991]. Monolithic kernel based 
operating systems involve a tight coupling of kernel components: memory 
management, process management, file management, and support for network 
communication. Each of these components must be modified to introduce 
checkpointing mechanisms, and this lack of modularity slows the development of such 
mechanisms. 
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Alternatively, under a micro kernel based operating system architecture, 
these components are typically located in separate operating system processes 
[Rozier et al. 1988], [Gerrity et al. 1991], [De Paoli et al. 1995]. This architecture 
speeds development by allowing the checkpointing of each resource to be developed 
independent to the other resources. Furthermore, given that most operating system 
functionality is accessed through IPC requests, coordinated checkpointing can be 
implemented efficiently (see Section 4.2.5). Hence, we propose that a facility for 
checkpointing parallel applications executing on clusters is best achieved using a 
microkernel based operating system architecture. 
4.2.2 Process Management in a MicrokerneI-based Operating System 
To introduce checkpointing functionality to the operating system, we must 
first determine the location of the functionality for managing processes within the 
operating system. In a microkernel based operating system architecture, the 
microkernel only provides minimal functionality [Rozier et al. 1988], 
[Gerrity et al. 1991]. In particular, low-level process management mechanisms such as 
context switching and process scheduling (CPU scheduling) are provided 
[De Paoli et al. 1995]. Other process management functionality is provided by 
separate operating system processes. 
The resources of a process that we examine for checkpointing are: process 
structures (PCBs), memory resources, and resources for interprocess communication 
(messages, etc.). In a microkernel based operating system, these resources would each 
be managed by separate operating system processes: the Process Manager, Memory 
Manager, and IPC Manager, respectively [Goscinski 2000]. The architecture of these 
operating system processes is shown in Figure 4.1. 
It is the responsibility of the Process Manager to provide all functionality 
involving the manipulation of the process structures (the PCBs) 
[Goscinski et al. 2001]. This includes allocation and deallocation of PCBs for process 
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Figure 4.1: Process Management in a Microkernel-based Operating System 
creation and tennination, respectively, and management of process queues to block or 
unblock a process. 
The Memory Manager provides management of the physical memory of a 
computer [Goscinski et al. 2001]. This includes allocation, deallocation, and 
adjustments to the memory regions of a process (text, data, and stack regions). The 
Memory Manager is also responsible for managing the paging of memory to secondary 
storage. 
The IPC Manager is responsible for managing the IPC resources on a 
computer, and for resolving any requests for IPC that cannot be completed by the 
microkernel [Goscinski et al. 2001]. The management of IPC resources involves the 
allocation and deallocation of IPC ports and any messages attached to existing ports. 
IPC requests that are not completed by the microkernel include messages being sent to 
remote computers, and group communications (see Section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3). 
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4.2.3 Creating a Checkpoint of a Single Process 
To create a checkpoint for a process, we proposed to adapt the mechanisms 
of process duplication (Section 4.1.3). Process duplication services, such as the Unix 
fork() primitive, copy each of the resources of an active process such that an identical 
process is generated. This process is allocated a new identity and begins execution 
independent of the original process. For checkpointing, each of the resources of the 
process are copied (PCB, memory, messages, etc.), however a new identity is not 
allocated, nor does the duplicate execute independent of the original process. 
The use of process duplication mechanisms simplifies the development of 
checkpointing functionality in the operating system. In particular, by adjusting the 
process duplication service such that no new identity is allocated to the duplicate 
process, nor is the duplicate process scheduled for execution on the CPU, we have 
effectively created a checkpoint of the process. This approach provides several 
benefits: 
• Restoring the process using the checkpoint only requires eliminating the original 
(faulty) process and activating the duplicate; 
• Any optimisations made for process duplication can be used in creating 
checkpoints, e.g., copy-on-write functionality for duplicating the process' memory 
regions can be used to provide concurrent checkpointing; and 
• Process migration mechanisms can be used for transporting the checkpoint data tot 
from remote computers or disk. 
We now examine the adaptation of process duplication mechanisms for 
generating checkpoints of the process structures, memory resources, and IPC resources 
of a process in a microkemel based operating system architecture. 
Checkpointing Process Structures 
The process structures (PCBs) are managed by the Process Manager. The 
PCB is a data structure used by the operating system to manage processes and contains 
such elements as register values, scheduling information, and accounting information. 
Ready/Blocked Queue 
Checkpoint Queue 
Process 
PCB 
Figure 4.2: Relationship between Process and Checkpoint PCBs 
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Copying the PCB is not difficult, a new PCB is allocated and populated with the same 
data as the original process' PCB. For process duplication, a new process identity is 
allocated and the process is enrolled in the ready queue for scheduling on the CPU. For 
checkpointing, this mechanism is adjusted, such that the original process identity is 
maintained, and we ensure that the PCB is not scheduled on the CPU by enrolling the 
process in a new process queue, the Checkpoint Queue, which is not examined by the 
CPU scheduler. We denote the original PCB as the process PCB and the copy of the 
PCB as the checkpoint PCB for further discussions. 
For the second and further checkpoints, we reuse the existing checkpoint 
PCB to eliminate the time that would be required to deallocate the existing checkpoint 
PCB and allocate a new checkpoint PCB. To locate any existing checkpoint, or to 
locate the process PCB given a checkpoint PCB, we maintain links between the two 
PCBs. This is shown in Figure 4.2. 
Checkpointing Memory Resources 
The memory resources of a process that must be checkpointed are the text, 
data, and stack regions of the process' memory. These regions of memory are managed 
by the Memory Manager. Checkpointing these regions of memory requires copying 
both the physical memory allocated to these regions, and associated administrative 
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information, such as the starting address and length of each of these regions. 
Importantly, the text region of a process contains the code of the actual program, and 
does not change throughout the lifetime of the process. The code can be restored from 
the executable program file on disk, hence does not need to be checkpointed. 
Copying the memory of a process for process duplication is often achieved 
USIng "copy-on-write" mechanisms. These mechanisms delay copying a process' 
memory regions until either the original process or the duplicate process attempt to 
write to those memory regions. This optimisation is performed on a per page basis. For 
checkpointing, we use these mechanisms to provide the concurrent checkpointing 
optimisation, where we save the checkpoint to remote computer memories or disk 
simultaneously with the execution of the process [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. To create the 
checkpoint of the memory regions, each of the pages of the process are marked 
copy-on-write. Once the checkpoint operation is completed, the process is allowed to 
continue execution. The pages of the checkpoint can then be moved to stable storage 
without any chance of the activated process causing inconsistencies in the checkpoint. 
We extend the process duplication mechanisms for copying memory to 
support the optimisation of incremental checkpointing, where only the pages modified 
since the previous checkpoint are included in a new checkpoint [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. 
We propose that the mechanisms of copy dirty pages process migration 
[De Paoli and Goscinski 1998] should be adapted for this purpose. The existing 
mechanisms of copy dirty pages process migration identify the pages of a process that 
have been altered SInce the process was originally created 
[De Paoli and Goscinski 1998]. These mechanisms must be altered to also recognise 
the pages that have changed since the most recent checkpoint. 
The mechanisms ofthe copy dirty pages process migration strategy operate 
by maintaining a "dirty" flag for each page of a process, which is set when a process 
writes to that page in memory. This flag is not cleared for the remainder of the process' 
lifetime. We extend this mechanism by using two flags, one that represents whether the 
page has changed since the last checkpoint was created (called checkpoint required 
flag), and one that represents whether the page has changed since the process was 
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originally created (page dirty flag). When a page is written to, the checkpoint required 
flag is set. A page with this flag set is then included in the next incremental checkpoint. 
When a checkpoint is taken, the page dirty flag is updated to reflect whether or not the 
page has been written to since the process was created, and the checkpoint required flag 
is cleared. 
Check pointing [PC Resources 
The IPC resources of a process consist of a set of port structures and any 
attached IPC buffers containing queued messages. For checkpointing, copies of both 
the port structures and any queued messages must be kept until the checkpointed state 
of a process has recorded the processing of the messages. 
Actually copying the message would double the number of IPC buffers 
that are occupied by a message, which is not desirable. A similar problem was faced 
when designing the group communications facility, where one message was delivered 
to several destinations on the same computer (Section 3.3, Chapter 3). Our solution 
was to use reference counts, which allowed one copy of a message to be maintained in 
IPC buffers until several processes had retrieved copies. Given this mechanism's 
efficient use of IPC buffers, we propose to use the same mechanism for checkpointing. 
To checkpoint a message, the reference count on the message is increased by one. 
When the process recei ves the message, or before creating a new checkpoint, the 
reference count is decremented. Once the reference count reaches the zero value the 
process has received the message, and the most recent checkpoint reflects its receipt. 
Thus, the IPC buffers containing the message can now be safely freed. 
4.2.4 Scheduling Issues 
Using a microkemel-based operating system architecture introduces 
scheduling problems. For a checkpoint to be generated, the Process Manager, Memory 
Manager, and IPC Manager must each be scheduled on the CPU to copy the resources 
under their control. The following problems must be addressed: 
• the invocation of these operating system processes needs to be coordinated; and 
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• the process being checkpointed must not be scheduled on the CPU during the 
creation of the checkpoint. 
To coordinate the invocation of the Process Manager, Memory Manager, 
and IPC Manager to create the checkpoints for a process, we propose the addition of a 
new operating system process, the Checkpoint Manager. The Checkpoint Manager can 
then be modified as necessary to tune aspects of the checkpointing operation, e.g., to 
alter the interval between taking checkpoints. 
To prevent the process being checkpointed from being scheduled on the 
CPU requires the services of the Process Manager, which controls CPU scheduling. 
Before creating any checkpoint data, the Process Manager is first invoked to block the 
process. Instead of blocking the process in a separate operation, the process is blocked 
as the first step of copying the process structures. Once all checkpoint data is created, 
the Process Manager is invoked a second time to unblock the process. 
The proposed operation of checkpointing in a microkemel based operating 
system is shown in Figure 4.3. The operation begins by the Checkpoint Manager 
sending a checkpoint request to the Process Manager. The Process Manager blocks the 
process being checkpointed, creates a checkpoint of the process structures, and sends 
an acknowledgement to the Checkpoint Manager indicating that it has completed its 
tasks. Upon receiving the acknowledgement, the Checkpoint Manager sends similar 
checkpoint requests to the Memory Manager and IPC Manager. The order of the 
requests sent to these managers is unimportant, and could be sent simultaneously. Once 
both the Memory Manager and IPC Manager have acknowledged creating 
checkpoints, a request is sent to the Process Manager to unblock the process. 
4.2.5 Preventing Non-Deterministic Events 
We noted in Chapter 2 that non-deterministic events, such as several 
processes interacting with each other or with their environment, e.g., with the operating 
system or end user, could create inconsistencies in a set of checkpoints. To prevent 
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Figure 4.3: Invocation of Other Processes by the Checkpoint Manager 
these events, coordinated checkpointing algorithms typically block all of the processes 
of a parallel application before creating checkpoints for the processes (Figure 2.3). 
Blocking an entire application is undesirable due to its associated overhead. Our 
research shows that a microkernel-based operating system presents an alternative 
approach that avoids these overheads. 
In a microkernel-based operating system, most operating system services 
are accessed by sending requests via interprocess communication to operating system 
processes. This includes interprocess communication to processes on remote 
computers and all input and output operations. Instead of blocking an entire parallel 
application for the duration of the checkpoint operation, processes can be blocked only 
when they attempt interprocess communication. This prevents non-deterministic 
events by stopping the processes communicating with each other or with operating 
system processes. We can reduce the blocking of the application's processes by 
buffering any outgoing messages instead of blocking the invoking process. These 
messages are then included in the checkpoint of IPC resources to maintain the 
consistency of the checkpoint. Outgoing messages are then dispatched to their 
destinations when the IPC is unblocked. 
4.2.6 Identifying the Processes of a Parallel Application 
To allow checkpoints to be created for every process of a parallel 
application, the processes that are part of the application must first be identified. To 
accomplish this, we proposed to use the group membership management mechanisms 
of the group communications facility presented in Chapter 3 (see Section 4.1.2). A 
process group is created on behalf of the application using a generated user name. The 
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application's processes are then enrolled in this process group as they are created, and 
are withdrawn when they exit. The creation and maintenance of this process group is 
performed by the operating system process responsible for managing the creation of 
processes and is transparent to the parallel application. 
4.2.7 Checkpointing the Parallel Application 
The creation of checkpoints for all the processes of a parallel application 
using coordinated checkpointing must be controlled to ensure the consistency of the set 
of checkpoints. For simplicity, we control the checkpointing from a single Checkpoint 
Manager, which we call the coordinating Checkpoint Manager. The remaining 
Checkpoint Managers are called remote Checkpoint Managers. 
Both the coordinating and remote Checkpoint Managers create 
checkpoints of individual processes as presented in Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.2.4. 
However, when checkpointing all the processes of a parallel application, the 
coordinating Checkpoint Manager invokes the remote Checkpoint Managers to 
manage the creation of checkpoints for processes located on remote computers. 
Finally, we propose to use group communications for the interactions between the 
coordinating and remote Checkpoint Managers through each stage of the 
checkpointing operation. 
Three stages are used to checkpoint a parallel application (Section 4.1.4): 
blocking the non-deterministic events (IPC) of the application's processes, creating the 
checkpoints, and unblocking of IPC. 
Blocking the IPC of the Processes 
The IPC Manager is invoked to block the IPC of the processes of the 
application. Given that the processes could be located on multiple computers in the 
cluster, the request is sent to all IPC Managers in the cluster using group 
communications. Upon receiving this request, the IPC Manager(s) will search for any 
of the application's processes on the local computer. The IPC Manager adds a flag to 
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the IPC end-points of any processes that are found to indicate that the IPC for the 
process is blocked. The microkernel checks for this flag when a process attempts to 
send a message. If the flag is present, the microkernel will forward the request for IPC 
to the IPC Manager. Outgoing messages are held by the IPC Manager during the 
checkpoint operation to ensure that no messages are in transit when checkpoints are 
created. The outgoing messages are also included in the checkpoint of the sending 
process to ensure consistency with its internal state. Requests to receive a message are 
permitted, as the checkpoint of the sending process will already record their 
transmission. 
Before progressing to the next stage of a checkpoint operation, the 
coordinating Checkpoint Manager must be certain that the operations of the current 
stage have been applied to all processes of the application. This is accomplished by 
recording which operations have been carried out on each process, requiring an 
acknowledgement be returned to the coordinating Checkpoint Manager indicating 
which operations have been performed on which processes. To avoid the overhead of 
requiring an acknowledgement for each operation performed on every process of the 
parallel application, a list of remote processes is forwarded to all remote Checkpoint 
Managers by the coordinating Checkpoint Manager using group communications at 
each stage. The remote Checkpoint Managers then carry out the operations on their 
associated computers and return an aggregate acknowledgement indicating which 
operations were performed on which processes. 
Creating the Checkpoints 
The processes of the application are now checkpointed independently. This 
procedure is carried out as per Section 4.2.3. The coordinating Checkpoint Manager 
begins by requesting the local Process Manager to create a checkpoint of the PCB for 
every process of the application. Any requests that fail are for processes located on 
remote computers. The list of processes for which checkpointing failed is forwarded to 
the remote Checkpoint Managers using group communications. Upon receiving this 
list, the remote Checkpoint Managers use the same procedure to checkpoint processes 
on their respective computers, except they do not send out a list of processes that aren't 
80 
found. Instead, upon completing the checkpoints each of the remote Checkpoint 
Managers sends an acknowledgement to the coordinating Checkpoint Manager, 
identifying the processes that were checkpointed. As before, the coordinating 
Checkpoint Manager records the acknowledgements to ensure that all processes are 
checkpointed before moving onto the next stage. 
Unblocking Interprocess Communication 
Unblocking the IPC of the processes is not remarkably different to the 
earlier blocking operation. However, any outgoing messages that were previously 
queued are now delivered to their destinations by the IPC Manager. 
4.2.8 Storage of Checkpoint Data 
To ensure the survi val of an application, the checkpoint data must be stored 
on stable storage [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. We consider both the memories of remote 
computers and disk as stable storage (Section 4.1.5). The checkpoint data could be 
dispatched to stable storage as soon as it is created, even if the IPC of the processes is 
still blocked. However, to minimise network traffic and ensure that checkpointing 
completes as quickly as possible, it is better to delay moving the checkpoint data to 
stable storage until after checkpointing is completed on all computers. This could be 
achieved by dispatching the checkpoint data after a random delay following the IPC 
being unblocked. However, we eliminate unnecessary delay by having the 
coordinating Checkpoint Manager notify all remote Checkpoint Managers that 
checkpointing is complete. 
Upon receiving this notification, the remote Checkpoint Managers request 
their local Process Manager, Memory Manager, and IPC Manager to dispatch the 
checkpoints of resources they created and manage to stable storage. To prevent all the 
managers on all computers from sending the checkpoint data simultaneously and 
overloading the network, a short random delay is inserted by each remote Checkpoint 
Manager. 
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Checkpoint data are dispatched to remote computers and to disk by using 
the mechanisms of process migration. Importantly, the text region of a process (code) 
is restored from the executable program on disk, hence is not dispatched to remote 
computers or to disk. Two process migration strategies are adapted for dispatching 
checkpoint data: copy dirty pages, and copy dirty pages to disk 
[De Paoli and Goscinski 1998]. For copying the checkpoint data to remote computer 
memories the copy dirty pages strategy is used. This copies those pages of the process 
that have been altered since the process was created [De Paoli and Goscinski 1998]. 
This is extended to provide the incremental checkpointing optimisation, where stored 
checkpoints are updated to reflect changes in the process' state since the last 
checkpoint was taken [Elnozahy et al. 1999]. This reduces the time required to create 
a checkpoint and the network traffic required to distribute the checkpoint data. Any 
existing checkpoint data on the remote computer is either updated or overwritten. 
To improve the reliability of usmg remote computer memones, the 
checkpoints are sent to several idle computers. Hence, if a computer in the cluster were 
to fail, the checkpoint data will likely be accessible elsewhere. We use the at-least-k 
semantics provided by the group communications facility described in Chapter 3 to 
distribute the checkpoint data to remote computers. This mechanism does not complete 
delivery of a message to all computers in the cluster, instead it cancels delivery once a 
specified minimum computers (k) have acknowledged receipt of the message. This 
reduces the overhead on the sending computer and allows the execution of the 
application process to continue sooner. 
The checkpoint data is also periodically copied to disk, which is achieved 
using copy dirty pages to disk process migration strategy. In case of failure, we must 
ensure that any existing checkpoint data is not corrupted/altered until the new 
checkpoint data is safely in place. Two sets of checkpoints must be kept on disk: a 
stable set of checkpoints and the new set of checkpoints. After failing, a parallel 
application is restored from the stable set of checkpoints. Checkpoints are stored in the 
new set of checkpoints, and once all checkpoints are written, the two sets are switched. 
Which checkpoint set is the stable or current set is also recorded on disk. 
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4.2.9 Garbage Collection 
Periodically taking checkpoints can result in a large number of checkpoints 
of differing versions being stored in the cluster. We examine both the checkpoints 
stored in remote computer memories and on disk. Given the use of coordinated 
checkpointing, only the most recent set of checkpoints need to be kept in remote 
computer memories. We propose to use computer-based ordering semantics of the 
group communications facility presented in Chapter 3 to ensure that the most recently 
received checkpoint data is the most up to date. 
For checkpoints that are stored on disk, as presented in Section 4.2.8, two 
sets of checkpoints can exist: the stable set of checkpoints and the new set of 
checkpoints. Garbage collection is inherent in this model, given that a new set of 
checkpoints always overwrites the previous stable set of checkpoints. 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the logical design of an operating system 
facility supporting transparent coordinated checkpointing of parallel applications 
executing on clusters. A number of contributions have been made in this design. The 
selection of a microkemel based operating system for the development of a transparent 
coordinated checkpointing facility provides the advantage of allowing coordinated 
checkpointing to be used that does not require that the parallel application be blocked 
for the duration of the checkpoint operation. Instead, our approach blocks the 
non-deterministic events of the processes of the parallel application by blocking the 
IPC of the application's processes. 
For the creation of a checkpoint, we recognised that a checkpoint of a 
process is effectively an inactive copy of the process. Hence, we proposed to use the 
mechanisms of process duplication to create a checkpoint. This allowed us to use 
existing optimisations for process duplication, in particular copy-on-write 
functionality, in the development of the checkpointing facility. We use the 
copy-on-write mechanisms to provide the concurrent checkpointing optimisation. 
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The use of process duplication mechanisms for creating checkpoints 
suggested that process migration mechanisms would be appropriate for dispatching 
checkpoint data to the memories of remote computers and to disk. Two strategies of 
process migration were adapted: copy dirty pages and copy dirty pages to disk. We also 
proposed to extend these mechanisms to identify the pages of a process that have been 
altered since the most recent checkpoint. This allows us to provide the incremental 
checkpointing optimisation. 
Finally, the group communications facility plays a large role in the logical 
design of this checkpointing facility. Group communications are used throughout the 
checkpointing facility for communication between the computers of a cluster. In 
particular, we proposed to use group communications to coordinate the checkpointing 
all of the processes of the application, and to dispatching checkpoint data to the 
memories of (several) remote computers. Furthermore, we propose to use the group 
membership management mechanisms to track the processes of a parallel application, 
and to use the reference count mechanism of group message deli very for checkpointing 
IPC messages. 
Chapter 5. Implementation in 
GENESIS 
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In this chapter, we present the implementations of the proposed group 
communication facility and checkpointing facility in the GENESIS cluster operating 
system. The implementations provide proof-of-concept of using group 
communications to support operating system services, and proof-of-concept of using 
existing operating services in the provision of a facility for transparent checkpointing 
of parallel applications executing on clusters. 
GENESIS uses a microkemel and client-server based operating system 
architecture, matching the target platform proposed for the group communication 
facility and checkpointing facility. GENESIS provides advanced parallelism 
management, including process duplication and process migration 
[Goscinski et al. 2001], which are used in the development of the checkpointing 
facility (see Chapter 4). Introducing group communications extends the existing 
operating system facility for interprocess communication (lPC) to provide an efficient 
medium for communicating with several remote computers. The checkpointing facility 
supplements existing support for parallelism management and contributes towards the 
generation of a platform for reliable computing on clusters. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we introduce the 
GENESIS cluster operating system and its components that form a basis for the 
implementation of the proposed group communication facility and checkpointing 
facility. In Section 5.2, we present the implementation of the group communications 
facility in GENESIS, and in Section 5.3 we present the implementation of the 
checkpointing facility. Finally, we summarize in Section 5.4. 
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GENESIS is an operating system, designed to support parallel processing 
on clusters. GENESIS is composed of a microkernel and a set of operating system 
processes that operate in user space. These operating system processes, supported by 
the microkernel, cooperate using message passing under the client-server model to 
provide services to applications. Each system process has a name as an object based 
approach is used [Goscinski et al. 2000]. 
The architecture of GENESIS is shown in Figure 5.1. There are three 
levels of processes: kernel servers, parallelism management system and single system 
image servers, and user processes. The operating system processes known as kernel 
servers are responsible for managing the operating system resources. The Process 
Manager, Memory Manager, and IPC Manager manage the PCBs, memory regions, 
and IPC Structures, respectively. The Network Manager manages access to the 
underlying network, and is used to provide the transfer of data to remote computers. 
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The operating system processes that form the parallelism management 
system are the Global Scheduler, Execution Manager, and Migration Manager. The 
Global Scheduler is responsible for mapping processes to computers in the cluster to 
balance load. The Execution Manager coordinates process creation and termination 
operations by invoking the kernel servers. Lastly, the Migration Manager coordinates 
the transport of an active process to a remote computer by invoking the kernel servers. 
In this section we present an overview of the GENESIS cluster operating 
system, pnor to the implementation of the group communications facility or 
checkpointing facility. We begin by presenting the GENESIS system name In 
Section 5.1.1 and the standard message format used to define the interface of operating 
system processes in Section 5.1.2. In Section 5.1.3, we present an overview of the IPC 
facility. In the remaining sections, each of the components that are affected by the 
introduction of the group communication facility and the checkpointing facility are 
introduced. In particular, we examine the Execution Manager, Process Manager, 
Memory Manager, IPC Manager, and Network Manager. 
5.1.1 The GENESIS System Name 
Critical to any presentation of GENESIS is the system name. GENESIS 
uses a three level naming hierarchy for naming: user names, system names, and 
physical locations [Goscinski and Haddock 1994]. User names are designed to be user 
friendly, allowing users to describe objects using sets of attribute-value pairs that can 
distinguish between objects in the operating system. The system name is a data 
structure managed by the operating system that allows objects in the cluster to be 
identified uniquely. Physical locations are the actual objects being identified, e.g., the 
physical address of a memory space. 
System names allow the operating system to locate and manage operating 
system structures by providing a hint to the location of those structures 
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Figure 5.2: GENESIS System Name 
[Goscinski and Haddock 1994]. The system name, shown in Figure 5.2, contains three 
fields: 
(1) sn_type - the type of object identified by a particular system name, being a 
process (PCB), a memory region, or an IPC resource (port); 
(2) sn_origin - specifies the computer where the object was created, which is either 
where the object is currently located or where the current location of the object 
can be determined; and 
(3) sn_object - a number that uniquely identifies the object on the computer upon 
which it was created. 
5.1.2 The GENESIS Standard Message Format 
All processes in GENESIS, including operating system processes and user/ 
application processes, communicate using messages. The standard message format 
used in GENESIS is shown in Figure 5.3 [McAvaney and Rough 2001]. Two unsigned 
32 bit integers indicate the type and id of a message. The type field is assigned a unique 
identifier for each request and response message of every operating system process, 
e.g., IPCM_REQUEST_MSG indicates that a message is a request for the IPC 
Manager. The id field is allocated independently for each operating system process, 
and represents the actual service being requested/responded to for that particular 
operating system process, e.g., M_IPCM_RESOL VE indicates the IPC Manager has 
been invoked to resolve a message delivery request. 
message identification 
r~--------~A~--------~\ 
message specific data ) 
l<1li1-«:---------- Standard Message -----------.t.1 
Figure 5.3: GENESIS Standard Message Format 
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5.1.3 The GENESIS IPC Facility 
GENESIS provides interprocess communication in the form of message 
passing and remote procedure calls (RPCs). Rather than sending messages directly to 
a process, messages are sent to "ports", a logical endpoint for the delivery of messages. 
A process can allocate any number of ports to receive messages on. Message passing 
is provided by send() and receive() system calls, allowing any process to send a 
message to the port of another process, optionally specifying a "return port", where any 
reply should be sent. RPCs are provided by call(), receive(), and send() system calls. 
Every process in GENESIS is allocated a port that is hidden from the users of the 
operating system, called the "hidden port". This port is used as the return port for any 
remote procedure calls invoked by the user by using the call() system call 
[Goscinski et aI1994]. 
The architecture of the GENESIS IPC facility is shown in Figure 5.4. A 
user requests IPC by invoking system calls that are processed by the microkemel. 
Given that a microkemel must provide only the minimum functionality required to 
allow operating system processes to provide other operating system services 
[Gerrity et al. 1991], only local IPC is provided by the microkemel. Any message that 
cannot be delivered by the microkemel, e.g., remote IPC, is forwarded to the IPC 
Manager for resolution. For remote destinations, the IPC Manager invokes the services 
of the Network Manager, incorporating the RRDP and IPlEthemet servers, to transport 
messages to the remote computer. 
5.1.4 The Execution Manager 
The Execution Manager is responsible for coordinating process 
management operations in GENESIS. There are four process management operations 
provided: 
(1) Process Creation - creation of a new process or processes from a program 
image stored on disk or another computer of a cluster, similar to the Unixfork() 
and exec() call combination; 
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Figure 5.4: GENESIS Interprocess Communication Service Architecture 
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(2) Process Duplication - creation of a new process or processes by copying an 
existing process on a computer, similar to the Unixfork() call; 
(3) Process Exiting - self-termination of a process after completing its program, 
such as the C programming language's exit() call; and 
(4) Process Termination - forced termination of a process by another process. 
Importantly, the Process Manager records the relationships between processes (parent-
child relationships), hence waiting for a child process is provided by the Process 
Manager. 
There are three modes of operation for process creation 
[Hobbs and Goscinski 1999C]: single process creation, multiple process creation, and 
group process creation. Single process creation creates an individual process from a 
program image. Under multiple process creation, the user specifies a number of 
processes to be created, and the creation of several processes on a single computer is 
optimised by loading one copy of the program image and creating the required number 
of processes concurrently. The memories of these new processes are shared and are 
only physically copied when an attempt is made to write to the memory (copy-on-
write). Group process creation extends the optimisation by using group 
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communications to distribute the program image concurrently to every computer in the 
cluster where a process is to be created. 
Process duplication is also offered in single, multiple, and group modes of 
operation [Hobbs and Goscinski 1999A]. Processes can be duplicated on the same 
computer as the parent process (local process duplication), or on remote computers 
transparently (remote process duplication). All duplicates are created using 
copy-on-write. For single remote process duplication, an image of the parent process 
is first transferred to the remote computer using process migration. The parent process 
is then duplicated on the remote computer and the migrated image is discarded. As for 
process creation, multiple process duplication optimises the creation of processes by 
permitting several duplicates to be created concurrently on a computer. Similarly, 
group process duplication distributes the image of the process to remote computers 
concurrently by using group communication. 
5.1.5 The Process Manager 
The Process Manager manages the PCBs and the relationships between 
processes (parent-child relationships) in GENESIS. There are five operations 
provided: 
(1) Process Waiting - blocks a process until its child process exits; 
(2) PCB Creation - allocates a PCB to a process being created and populates it with 
the appropriate data (invoked by the Execution Manager); 
(3) PCB Release - releases the resources of a self-terminating or forcibly 
terminated process and returns feedback to the parent process (invoked by the 
Execution Manager); 
(4) PCB Migration - determines whether a process is in a migratable state, suspends 
the execution of the process for the migration operation, and transfers a process' 
state (PCB data) to a remote computer (invoked by the Migration Manager); 
and 
(5) Exception Handling - manages exceptions caused by processes, e.g., the restart 
of an operation (instruction) after a page fault. 
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For PCB migration, the Process Manager encapsulates the data stored in 
the PCB into a message which is sent to the remote computer where it is restored 
[De Paoli and Goscinski 1998]. 
5.1.6 The Memory Manager 
In GENESIS, the logical representation of a continuous segment of 
memory that has a known start address and a known length is called a 'space' 
[De Paoli et al. 1995]. The definition of the logical space is used to isolate mechanisms 
of memory management for improved portability of the operating system. The 
Memory Manager provides the following seven operations: 
(1) Space Creatio1l - allocates a new memory region (no physical memory is 
allocated until an attempt to access it has occurred); 
(2) Space Alter - increases or decreases the size of a memory region; 
(3) Space Copy - creates a new memory region that is a copy of an existing memory 
region (using copy-on-write mechanisms); 
(4) Space Attach - maps an existing memory region into a process (allows several 
processes to share memory); 
(5) Space Detach - unmaps a memory region from a process (stop sharing 
memory); 
(6) Space Migration - transfers a memory region to a remote computer (invoked by 
the Migration Manager); and 
(7) Page Fault Handling - manages page fault exceptions raised by processes, 
either by mapping the page in, e.g., swapping, or by terminating the process, 
e.g., an invalid memory reference. 
For space migration, the Memory Manager encapsulates the data stored in 
the space(s) into a message which is sent to the destination computer where the space 
is restored. Four alternative strategies are offered for transferring the memory of a 
process [De Paoli and Goscinski 1998]: direct transfer, copy dirty pages to the 
destination, copy dirty pages to shared disk, and lazy shipment/copy on reference. 
92 
Direct copy immediately transfers all of the memory associated with a 
process to the remote computer immediately. Copy dirty pages to the destination 
transfers those pages that have been modified throughout the execution of the process. 
The remaining pages are either reloaded from the program image on disk or are 
recreated at the destination. Copy dirty pages to disk sends a small number of pages to 
the destination computer (the current page of the text region, the current page of the 
stack region, and the first page of the data region that contains global variables), and 
the remaining pages are written to disk for later retrieval. Lazy shipment / copy on 
reference, as for copy dirty pages to disk, only transfers a small number of pages to the 
destination computer. The remaining pages are transferred only when they are 
referenced on the destination computer. 
5.1.7 The IPC Manager 
The IPC Manager is responsible for resolving requests for IPC that could 
not be completed by the microkernel and for managing the IPC resources in the cluster. 
The following three operations are provided: 
(1) Message Delivery - determines the current location of a port and delivers a 
message to that port; 
(2) Port Deallocation - deallocates messages and associated IPC structures then 
invokes of the microkernel to free the port of a process; and 
(3) Port Migration - transfers ports and any attached IPC structures and messages 
to a remote computer (invoked by the Migration Manager), whilst ensuring 
correct delivery of messages to the port being migrated. 
For port migration, the IPC Manager encapsulates the ports of the process 
and any messages queued on those ports into a message. The message is then sent to 
the destination, where the ports and messages are restored. 
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5.1.8 The Network Manager 
The GENESIS Network Manager is composed of two operating system 
processes: the RRDP server and the IPlEthernet server [Goscinski et al. 2000]. 
The RRDP Server 
The RRDP server implements the RHODOS Reliable Datagram Protocol 
(RRDP), a connectionless transport protocol offering both reliable and unreliable 
delivery of messages between two computers attached to a network (unicast) 
[McAvaney et al. 1997]. Two operations are provided: 
(1) Send a Message - given a message, its destination address and a flag indicating 
whether reliable transport is required, delivers the message to a remote 
computer; and 
(2) Receive a Message - forwards any messages delivered to a computer to the IPC 
Manager, along with the source and destination addresses used to send the 
message. 
For outgoing messages, RRDP divides the message into packets, each no 
longer than the maximum payload for an RRDP packet. RRDP attaches its header to 
each packet, and the packets are forwarded to the IPlEthernet server to be transmitted 
on the network. For incoming packets, RRDP reconstructs the original message and 
forwards it to the IPC Manager. 
Reliable delivery semantics use an acknowledgement and retransmission 
mechanism. The RRDP server on the receiving computer collects incoming packets 
and periodically returns acknowledgements to the RRDP server on the sending 
computer. The acknowledgements allow the RRDP server on the sending computer to 
free resources associated with acknowledged packets, and unacknowledged packets 
are retransmitted. No acknowledgement mechanism is used for unreliable delivery 
semantics. Instead, any missing packets (or misordering of packets) cause delivery of 
the message to be abandoned. 
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The RRDP header is shown in Figure 5.5. To allow several messages 
arriving simultaneously to be differentiated, the rh_messl1o field uniquely identifies 
each message sent from a particular computer. The r1csrcloc and rh_dstloc fields 
specify the IP addresses of both the source and destination computers. Packets are sent 
in groups to improve throughput and reduce the number of acknowledgements. The 
rh-15rp field specifies the current group. The rhjeq field specifies the sequence of a 
packet within a group. The r11_version field specifies the version of the RRDP protocol 
being used. The rh_qos field specifies the quality of service requested for delivery of 
a message, allowing the receiving computer to determine whether reliable delivery was 
selected, and thus whether acknowledgements should be sent. Finally, the rh_top field 
indicates the type of a packet, either a data packet or an acknowledgement packet, and 
whether a data packet is the last packet of a group and/or the last packet of a message. 
The IPIEthernet Server 
The IPlEthemet server provides functionality for transmitting on an 
Ethernet network using the Internet Protocol. There are six operations provided to 
other processes: 
(1) Register a Protocol - an operating system process has indicated that it will 
provide a particular protocol to the users of the operating system, requiring 
packets arriving for the protocol be forwarded to that process; 
(2) Deregister a Protocol - an operating system process has indicated that it will no 
longer be providing a particular protocol, requiring that packets no longer be 
forwarded to that process; 
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(3) Transmit a Packet - given a packet, source address, destination address, and 
protocol number, transmits a packet on the network; 
(4) Receive a Packet - passes packets arriving for a particular protocol to the 
operating system process that is registered as the provider of that protocol; 
(5) Route Management - allows an operating system process to configure the 
routing tables; and 
(6) Address Resolutiol1 Protocol - maps an IP address to an Ethernet address for 
transmission on the network [Plummer 1982]. 
5.2 Implementation of the Group Communications Facility 
In this section we describe the implementation of the group 
communications facility in GENESIS. In particular, we present the new and enhanced 
functionality that was introduced to the IPC Manager, RRDP server, and IPlEthernet 
server. 
5.2.1 The IPC Manager 
For group communication, the IPC Manager provides group naming, 
group membership management, group message delivery, and message ordering 
semantics. 
Group Naming 
The IPC Manager is responsible for allocating the unique identifiers to 
each group. The system name is used in GENESIS to identify all objects 
(Section 5.1.1). Introducing group communications requires the addition of a new type 
of object to GENESIS: a group. A group system name is generated as follows. The 
sll_type field is assigned a value that represents that the type of object being described 
is a group object. The sl1_origi1l field is set to the IP address of the computer where the 
group is created. Finally, the sl1_object field is set to a unique number for each group 
created on a particular computer. 
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Group Membership Management 
Dynamic group membership management was selected for the GENESIS 
group communications facility (Section 3.1.1, Chapter 3). Here we examine the 
primitives provided for managing membership lists, how membership lists are 
transferred to booting computers, and what information is provided to the RRDP 
server. 
Primitives. The primitives for managing the memberships of groups are provided as 
RPCs to the IPC Manager. Five primitives and their syntax are provided (shown in 
Figure 5.6): 
(1) create....group() creates a new process group given the user name (textual name) 
of the process group. The group parameter provides a system name to be 
populated with the identity of the new group. Finally, the opts parameter 
specifies the desired type, delivery semantics, and ordering semantics of the 
group. The return value of the function indicates the success or failure of the 
group creation; 
(2) join....group() enrols a port in a group. The group parameter specifies the group 
being joined and the port parameter specifies the port that is to be enrolled in 
the group. The system name of the group is either returned from the 
create....group primitive or obtained using the jind....group primitive. The return 
value of the function indicates the success or failure of the join operation; 
(3) leave....group() withdraws a port from a group. As for the join....group primitive, 
the group parameter specifies the system name of the group from which the port 
is to be removed, and the port parameter specifies the port to be withdrawn. The 
return value of the function indicates the success or failure of the leave 
operation; 
(4) destroy....group() deletes a group. The process group does not need to have an 
empty membership list in order to be removed. The group parameter specifies 
the group to be deleted. The return value of the function indicates the success or 
failure of the destroy operation; and 
int create_group(char *name, SNAME *group, OPTS *opts) 
int join_group(SNAME *group, SNAME *port) 
int leave_group(SNAME *group, SNAME *port) 
int destroy_group(SNAME *group) 
int find_group(char *name, SNAME *group) 
Figure 5.6: Group Membership Management Primitives 
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(5) find--$roup() determines the system name of a group given its user name. The 
name parameter specifies the user name of the process group to be searched for. 
The group parameter provides a system name data structure that is populated 
with the identity of the process group. The return value of the function indicates 
the success or failure of the find operation. 
Membership Initialisation. Group membership information is fully replicated among 
the IPe Managers in the cluster. When an IPe Manager boots, it broadcasts a request 
to any active IPe Managers to send the current membership information to it. After 
receiving such a request, an active IPe Manager delays for a random period of time 
before multicasting the membership information to all computers in the cluster. Prior 
to sending the response, the IPe Manager listens for any responses sent by other IPe 
Managers. If such a response is received, the IPe Manager abandons sending the 
membership information, ensuring that only one response is sent to the requesting IPe 
Manager, preventing it from being overloaded by a large number of simultaneous 
responses. 
The request message is shown in Figure 5.7(a). Only two fields are present 
in the request message: the message type and id. These two fields are part of the 
standard message format used in GENESIS (Section 5.1.2). The type field indicates a 
request being sent to the (remote) IPe Managers. The id field indicates that 
initialisation is requested (requesting the membership lists). 
The response, shown in Figure 5.7(b), is similar to the request message, 
except the type field now indicates an IPe Manager reply. A count field is added, 
which indicates how many group membership lists (group entries) are appended to the 
response. 
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A group entry, shown in Figure 5.7(c), represents the membership of a 
group. Hence, several fields are required to reproduce the complete membership list. 
The group_name and group_sname fields specify the user name and system name, 
respectively, that identify the group. The group_options field specifies the group type, 
delivery semantics and ordering semantics of the group. Each group is allocated a 
multicast IP address by the transport service, which is required by the IPe Manager to 
transmit a message to the group. The multicast IP address is specified in the 
111ulticascaddr field. Finally, the count field indicates how many group members 
follow the group entry. A group member, shown in Figure 5.7(d), consists of a single 
field, the porCsna111e, which specifies the system name of a port enrolled in the group. 
Requirements of RRDP. RRDP must maintain a list of computers to which a group 
message should be sent. The IPe Manager manages the list of ports that are enrolled 
in a group, and notifies RRDP of the computers upon which they are located. When a 
group is created, or when the first process on a computer joins a group, the IPe 
Manager requests RRDP start receiving messages for that group. Similarly, when a 
group is destroyed, or when the last process on a computer leaves a group, the IPe 
Manager notifies RRDP that the messages for that group no longer need to be recei ved. 
RRDP uses this information to maintain its destination computer lists (see 
Section 5.2.2). 
Group Message Delivery 
A message sent to a group may need to be delivered to several ports on a 
single computer. In Section 3.3 (Chapter 3), we proposed to use reference counting 
mechanism to save IPe resources. In GENESIS, messages are stored in [PC bldfer 
structures, a modified version of Memory Buffers from BSD Unix 
[McKusick et al. 1996]. 
The IPe buffer structure is shown in Figure 5.8. The IPe buffer structure 
consists of a fixed length header, adjustable data section, and fixed size footer. The 
ncdat field holds the actual message data. The m_next and 111_act fields are used to 
maintain linked lists of IPe buffer structures. The m_o.ff field records the distance 
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Figure 5.8: IPC Buffer Data Structure 
(offset) from the start of the data structure to the data that is stored in the m_dat field. 
The nclen field then records the length of the data stored in the m_dat field. The 
m_type field is used to record the type of data being stored in the data structure for 
diagnostic purposes, e.g., user data, packet header, etc. The mJlags field indicates 
whether the Ethernet device currently has control over the data structure for the 
transmission/reception of packets. Finally, the m_ref field counts the number of 
operating system processes still requiring the data in the IPC buffer structure. 
The reference count field (m_ref) is increased by the number of 
destinations on the computer. As each destination receives the message, it will attempt 
to free the buffers, reducing their reference counts by one. Only when the reference 
counts reach zero are the buffers freed. 
Message Ordering Semantics 
Two ordering semantics have been implemented in GENESIS: no ordering 
and computer-based ordering. The final ordering semantics, total ordering, will be 
completed in future work. No ordering semantics require little explanation, as no 
reordering of messages is required prior to their delivery. Instead, the IPCM forwards 
messages to their destinations immediately after receiving them from the RRDP server. 
Computer-based ordering requires messages sent from each computer be 
kept in order with all other messages that were sent from the same computer. The 
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number of sending computers is variable, hence we use a linked list data structure. This 
data structure is shown in Figure 5.9. A linked list is maintained (using the next field) 
for each group and is kept in order of the IP address of the sending computer, which is 
stored in the srcjP field. There are two modes in which nodes of the linked list are 
used: a record of a sending computer or as a message that has arrived out of order. For 
sending computer records, only the seq field stores the message number of the last 
message that was delivered to the group, and the oper and mbptr fields are not used. 
For out of order messages, the seq field records the sequence number of the message. 
The oper field references an IPC operation structure storing the detai Is of the message. 
Lastly, the mhptr field references the IPC buffer structures that contain the message. 
5.2.2 The RRDP Server 
The RRDP server provides message delivery to several remote computers 
using multicast. In this section we discuss alterations that were required to the RRDP 
packet header, the maintenance of the destination computer lists, and the 
implementation of delivery semantics. 
Modifications to the RRDP Packet Header 
Several extra fields were added to the RRDP packet header for group 
communications. The modified RRDP header is shown in Figure 5.lD. The RRDP 
header was modified by adding the rh_acksrc and rh_resptime fields, and by adding a 
new type of packet, a group management packet. 
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The rh_acksrc field is required for acknowledging packets sent using 
group communications. Ordinarily, an acknowledgement uses the same rh_srcloc and 
rh_dstloc fields as the sending computer. When the sending computer receives an 
acknowledgement, it recognises that the computer that sent the acknowledgement is 
specified as the destination computer (rh_dstloc). For group communications, the 
destination address for the message is a multicast address. If the same semantics were 
to be used for acknowledgement packets, the computer sending the message would not 
be able to distinguish between the different computers sending back the same 
acknowledgement. Hence, the rh_acksrc field is added, which is populated with the 
address of the computer sending the acknowledgement. 
The rh_resptime field is also for acknowledgements. For unicast 
communications, several events cause the receiving computer to return an 
acknowledgement to the sending computer, e.g., when all packets of a message are 
received. Importantly, for group communications, such events could occur at several 
destination computers simultaneously. If a large number of computers were to return 
an acknowledgement simultaneously, the sending computer would likely be 
overloaded and its buffers exhausted. 
To prevent the sending computer being overloaded, a random delay is 
inserted before an acknowledgement is sent (Section 3.2.3, Chapter 3). The random 
delay is calculated from a maximum delay that is specified by the computer sending 
the message. The sending computer counts the number of destination computers and 
calculates the maximum delay using the number of destination computers. The 
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maximum delay is then specified In the rh_resptime field, which the receiving 
computers use to set their timeouts. 
Maintaining Destillation Computer Lists 
To ensure messages are delivered to all destination computers for reliable 
group communications, RRDP requires a list of the destination computers. This list is 
constructed from infonnation provided by the IPC Manager (Section 5.2.1). The IPC 
Manager requests the RRDP server start receiving messages for a particular group. 
This information is required by all RRDP servers in the cluster, hence the infonnation 
is replicated to the other RRDP servers. 
Destination Computer List Initialisation. Similar to the Membership Initialisation 
of the IPC Manager (Section 5.2.1), the RRDP servers maintain a list of destination 
computers for every multicast address. When an RRDP server boots, it requests any 
active RRDP servers to send the current list of destination computers to it. The 
messages used for transferring the destination computer lists are shown in Figure 5.11. 
These messages follow a similar fonnat to the GENESIS standard message format 
(Section 5.1.2), but are only used in communication between RRDP servers as the 
contents of a group management packet. As these messages are only used between 
RRDP servers, the type field of the standard message format is removed. 
The request message, shown in Figure 5.11(a), specifies an id requesting 
transfer of the destination computer lists. Upon receiving this request, an active RRDP 
server delays for a random period of time before sending a response containing the 
destination computer lists. Prior to sending the response, the RRDP server listens for 
any responses being sent by other RRDP servers. If such a response is received, the 
RRDP server abandons sending the destination computer lists, ensuring that only one 
response is sent to the requesting RRDP Server, preventing it from being overloaded 
by a large number of simultaneous responses. 
The response message is shown in Figure 5. l1(b). The id field is changed 
to indicate that the message is a response. The count field is used to indicate how many 
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Figure 5.11: RRDP Destination Computer List Transfer Request and Response 
lists of destination computers are appended to the response message. Lastly, the 
llexcdynamic field is used for multicast address allocation. Appended to the response 
are count multicast address entries. Each entry represents a destination computer list 
for a particular group. The address field specifies the corresponding multicast address 
for the destination computer list. The members array contains the IP address of every 
computer that wishes to receive any messages sent to the multicast address (the 
destination computer list). The count field represents how many computers are 
specified in the list. Lastly, the deliv_qos and kspec fields are used to specify the 
delivery semantics used for the particular group. 
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Figure 5.12: Request and Response to Maintain Destination Computer Lists 
Importantly, the number of destination computers that can be in anyone 
list are limited to the definition of MAXGROUPMEMBERS, which is currently set to a 
value of 20. The GENESIS cluster currently consists of a maximum of 10 Sun 3/50 
computers, hence allowing up to 20 destination computers is more than sufficient. 
Group Creation and Multicast Address Allocation. During group creation, the IPC 
Manager requests RRDP allocate a multicast IP address for the new group. RRDP uses 
five messages for allocating a multicast address for group (shown in Figure 5.12): 
reservation, confirmation, rejection, committal and cancellation. 
RRDP begins by multicasting a reservation request to all RRDP servers in 
the cluster. The address that RRDP attempts to reserve is provided by the 
nexcdYllamic field sent in the destination computer list transfer (Figure 5.11), and is 
specified in the multicascaddr field. After attempting to reserve a multicast address, 
or when a reservation is received from another RRDP server, nexcdynamic is assigned 
the value of one more than the reservation address. The required delivery semantics are 
also specified in the reservation message (the deliv_qos and kspec fields), which are 
used once the allocation is committed. 
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When an RRDP server receives a reservation request, if no reservation 
requests have previously been received for the same multicast IP address from a 
different computer, the RRDP server responds after a random delay, confirming the 
reservation. Otherwise, if a reservation had previously been received, a rejection 
message is sent. The multicast address is specified in the multicascaddr fields of both 
the confirmation and rejection messages. 
If all RRDP servers confirm the reservation, then the requesting RRDP 
server sends a commit message to activate the multicast address. If any RRDP servers 
reject the reservation, then at least one other RRDP server tried to reserve the same 
address at the same time. The requesting RRDP server sends a cancellation message, 
then delays for a random period of time before trying again using a new multicast 
address. The random delay is used to prevent the same servers interfering with each 
other again. Again, the multicast address is specified in the multicasCaddr fields of 
both the committal and cancellation messages. 
Changes to the Destination Computer Lists. Throughout the lifetime of a group, 
computers are added and removed from the list of destination computers when 
processes join and leave the group on different computers in the cluster, or when 
processes with member ports are migrated to/from a computer. The RRDP server on 
the computer local to a process joining or leaving will receive a request from the local 
IPC Manager to adjust the destination computer lists. When an RRDP server receives 
such a request, three actions performed: updating of the local destination computer 
lists, updating the destination computer lists on remote computers, and requesting the 
IP/Ethemet server to adjust its filters (see Section 5.2.3). 
To update the destination computer lists on remote computers, a request is 
multicast to all computers in the cluster specifying the particulars of the change. The 
request message is delivered using the reliable delivery mechanisms used for 
semi-reliable delivery semantics. 
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Message Delivery Semantics 
Currently, unreliable, at-Ieast-k, and semi-reliable delivery semantics are 
implemented in GENESIS. Unreliable delivery semantics require no further 
functionality than the existing unreliable service provided for unicast communication 
(Section 5.1.8). Packets are sent to the destination computer without waiting for 
acknowledgements. If any packets are not received by a destination or are received out 
of order, delivery of the message is abandoned on that computer. 
Semi-reliable delivery semantics are adapted from the existing reliable 
delivery service provided for unicast communication (Section 5.1.8). Under unicast 
semantics, acknowledgements are periodically returned by the receiver indicating 
which packets have been successfully delivered and implicitly requesting 
retransmission of those packets that are not acknowledged. 
Several modifications were required to support multicast delivery. 
Acknowledgements are returned after a random timeout period to ensure that the 
sending computer is not overloaded. The sender keeps track of which packets have 
been acknowledged by each destination and waits for a predefined time period before 
retransmitting any packets to allow any acknowledgements to arrive. To determine 
which packets need to be retransmitted, the packets acknowledged by each destination 
are examined. The union of all packets that have not been acknowledged are 
retransmitted using multicast to minimise network traffic. If any destination computers 
fail to return an acknowledgement after several retransmissions, they are dropped from 
the list of computers to deliver the message to. 
At-Ieast-k delivery semantics are adapted from the semi-reliable delivery. 
Acknowledgements that indicate delivery of the complete message are counted. When 
this count reaches the value of k specified by the user, a special control packet is 
multicast to the receiving RRDP servers cancelling any further attempts to deliver the 
message. The packet is a normal RRDP packet with no data and the header's type of 
packet field (r1ctop) is marked as a CANCEL packet. Any destination computers 
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waiting for retransmissions will abandon the message and free the resources containing 
the packets that had arrived. 
5.2.3 The IPlEthernet Server 
For group communications, the IPlEthernet server provides the Internet 
Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and filters incoming multicast traffic. These two 
functions both require that the IPlEthernet server is aware of the multicast addresses 
that higher protocols, i.e., RRDP, wish to receive. 
When the RRDP server receives a request from the IPC Manager to start 
receiving packets sent to a particular multicast address, RRDP requests the IPlEthernet 
adjust its filtering tables. From these requests, a list of addresses being received on the 
computer is maintained by the IPlEthernet server. This list is used to declare "host 
group memberships" to routers on the subnet using IGMP, causing them to forward 
any multicast packets received on adjacent subnets. The destination IP address of 
incoming multicast packets is also compared with this list to ensure that only packets 
that are required are forwarded to higher protocols. 
5.3 Checkpointing 
In this section, we present the implementation of the checkpointing facility 
in GENESIS. Importantly, there is currently no support in this facility for recovering a 
failed process (rollback). It should be noted that checkpointing only acts as the first 
step towards a facility for transparent rollback of failed processes, which will be 
examined in future work (Section 7.2). We begin by presenting the modifications made 
to the Execution Manager to track the processes that make up an application In 
Section 5.3.1. Next, we present an overview of checkpointing in GENESIS in 
Section 5.3.2. In Section 5.3.3, we present the operation of the Checkpoint Manager, a 
new operating system process introduced to control the invocation of the operating 
system mechanisms to create checkpoints. In the remaining three sections, we present 
the changes to the Process Manager, Memory Manager, and IPC Manager to create 
checkpoints of processes. 
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5.3.1 The Execution Manager 
The processes of the application are identified using the group membership 
management mechanisms of the group communications facility (Section 4.2.6, 
Chapter 4). The processes that compose a parallel application are enrolled in a group 
as they are created, transparent to the application. To enrol processes in a group, the 
Execution Manager's support for process creation and duplication are extended to 
invoke the IPC Manager to alter the group that reflects the processes of an application, 
known as the application set. The process creation and duplication operations return a 
list of the system names of the created processes [Hobbs 1998]. Just prior to the 
completion of the operation, the hidden ports are enrolled in the application's group. 
5.3.2 Checkpointing in GENESIS 
In GENESIS, checkpointing is conducted by the Checkpoint Manager, 
Process Manager, Space Manager, and IPC Manager. In Figure 5.13, we present the 
interactions between these servers during the checkpoint operation and their impact on 
the execution of the processes of an application. 
The figure shows the execution of three processes, each on separate 
computers. Three states are visible for each process, represented by a solid arrow, a 
broken arrow, and no arrow. A solid arrow indicates a process that is executing 
unaffected by any checkpointing. A broken arrow indicates where the IPC for a process 
is blocked, although the process is allowed to continue execution. Finally, no arrow 
shows where the process is frozen whilst checkpoint data is being created. 
Checkpointing an application consists of a series of request/response 
messages, beginning with the request sent to the group of all IPC Managers to block 
the IPC of the processes. For those requests relevant only to a specific process, the 
process number is shown in a circle between the request/response pairs. Following this, 
the Checkpoint Manager attempts to freeze each of the processes of the parallel 
application and create checkpoints of their PCBs locally. The list of processes that are 
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Figure 5,13: Operation of Checkpointing in GENESIS 
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not found is sent to the other Checkpoint Managers in the cluster using group 
communications. 
To complete the checkpoints of those processes that are found, requests are 
sent to the Memory Manager and IPC Manager before the Process Manager is invoked 
again to resume the execution of the frozen process(es), shown as Proc Cant in 
Figure 5.13. Finally, once checkpoints have been created for all processes of the 
parallel application (and are acknowledged), a message is sent to the group of all IPC 
Managers to unblock the IPC of the processes of the parallel application. 
5.3.3 The Checkpoint Manager 
In this section, we present the operation of the Checkpoint Manager. Three 
aspects are presented: invoking the Checkpoint Manager to begin checkpointing, 
creating a checkpoint of a single process and creating checkpoints for every process in 
a parallel application. 
Invoking the Checkpoint Manager to Begin Check pointing 
It is not always desirable for checkpointing to be active in the operating 
system. In particular, when developing parallel applications or other operating system 
services, checkpointing is an unnecessary overhead. Hence, all checkpointing 
mechanisms are by default switched off, except for those that track the list of processes 
in an application. To activate checkpointing, an application sends a request to the 
Checkpoint Manager to begin checkpointing the application. 
The request message contains the system name of the invoking process, 
which can be any process of the parallel application. The hidden port of this process is 
determined, which is then used to locate the group used to maintain the list of processes 
of the application. Optionally, the application can specify the time between 
checkpoints being taken. The Checkpoint Manager that is invoked by the application 
coordinates the creation of checkpoints for the entire application. 
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Creating a Checkpoint of a Single Process 
Checkpoints are created for each process of a parallel application 
independently. To create a checkpoint for a process, the Checkpoint Manager must 
invoke the Process Manager, Memory Manager, and IPC Manager. The Process 
Manager is invoked first to block the execution of the process and to create the 
checkpoint of the process structures (PCB). Once this is completed, the Memory 
Manager and the IPC Manager can be invoked to checkpoint the memory regions and 
IPC resources, respectively. Given that the execution of the process is suspended, these 
two resources could be checkpointed simultaneously. However, to reduce the overhead 
of context switching, the Memory Manager and IPC Manager are invoked 
consecutively. When all of the resources of a process have been checkpointed, the 
Process Manager is invoked a second time to allow the execution of the process to 
continue. 
Creating Checkpoints for Every Process in a Parallel Application 
The Checkpoint Manager begins checkpointing an application by 
requesting the IPC of every process of the application be blocked, and obtaining the 
list of processes that make up an application from the IPC Manager. The Checkpoint 
Manager will then attempt to invoke the Process Manager to suspend the execution of 
each process and begin creating the checkpoint of the process. For those processes that 
exist on the local computer, the Process Manager will successfully acknowledge the 
creation of the checkpoint and the Checkpoint Manager continues the creation of 
checkpoints as above. For those processes that do not exist locally, an error message is 
returned by the Process Manager. 
The list of processes that do not exist locally is sent to the Checkpoint 
Managers on remote computers using group communication. On the remote 
computers, the Checkpoint Managers will determine the processes located on those 
computers by similarly requesting the Process Manager to suspend execution of each 
process in the list and create a checkpoint. Any error messages are ignored on remote 
computers. On each computer of the cluster that contains one or more processes of the 
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application, the Checkpoint Manager continues checkpointing each process 
individually, as outlined above. Once the checkpoints are completed, the remote 
Checkpoint Managers send an acknowledgement to the requesting Checkpoint 
Manager indicating which processes have been checkpointed. 
To complete the checkpointing, the Checkpoint Manager requests the IPC 
Manager unblock the IPC of every process of the application. Once this operation has 
been acknowledged, the Checkpoint Manager sends a message to the other Checkpoint 
Managers indicating that checkpointing is complete using group communication. Each 
Checkpoint Manager then delays for a random period of time, before requesting their 
local Process Manager, Memory Manager, and IPC Manager to dispatch the 
checkpoint data to stable storage. 
5.3.4 The Process Manager 
The Process Manager is invoked by the Checkpoint Manager to block the 
execution of a process for the duration of a checkpoint operation, to create a checkpoint 
of the PCB, and to dispatch the PCB checkpoint data to remote computers. To block a 
process, the Process Manager moves the PCB of the process from the ready queue of 
processes to a special process queue known as the "frozen queue". Processes on the 
frozen queue are not considered for scheduling on the CPU. Process duplication 
mechanisms are used to create the checkpoint of the PCB. These mechanisms are 
adjusted to assign the new PCB with the same identity as the original PCB. The 
checkpoint PCB is then enqueued in a special process queue (the "Checkpoint Queue") 
to ensure that it is not scheduled on the CPU. 
After the other resources of a process (memory and IPC) have been 
checkpointed, the Process Manager is invoked a second time to resume the execution 
of the process. This is achieved by moving the process from the frozen queue back to 
the ready queue. Finally, the Process Manager is invoked a third time to dispatch the 
checkpoint data of the PCB to remote computers. This is accomplished using the 
at-Ieast-k semantics of the group communications facility. To encapsulate the PCB in 
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a message for transmission to remote computers, process migration mechanisms are 
used. 
5.3.5 The Memory Manager 
The Memory Manager is responsible for creating checkpoints of the 
memory spaces of a process and for transporting the checkpoint data to remote 
computers. The mechanisms of process duplication are used to create checkpoints of 
the memory regions. These mechanisms are adjusted to maintain the identity of the 
original memory regions in the checkpoints. Importantly, the process duplication 
mechanisms for copying memory use copy-on-write functionality. Using 
copy-on-write reduces the demands on memory for holding checkpoints on the same 
computer. Furthermore, checkpoint data can be dispatched whilst the execution of the 
process continues (concurrent checkpointing). 
Each process has three memory regions: text, data, and stack. The text 
region contains the code of a program (loaded from a program file during process 
creation) and is not copied as it can be recreated from the program file. The data space 
contains the global heap of a process, where global variables are stored and memory is 
provided dynamic memory allocation. The stack region is used by processes to hold 
intermediate calculation results, parameters to procedures and functions, and local 
variables for procedures/functions. The data and stack regions form part of the process 
state, hence are checkpointed. 
After all of the resources of a process have been checkpointed, the 
Checkpoint Manager will again invoke the Space Manager to dispatch checkpoint data 
to remote computers. This is performed using the at-Ieast-k semantics of the group 
communications facility. Checkpoint data is encapsulated for transport to remote 
computers using the mechanisms of process migration. 
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5.3.6 The IPC Manager 
The IPC Manager is responsible for blocking (and unblocking) the IPC of 
the processes being checkpointed, creating checkpoints of the IPC resources of a 
process and dispatching IPC checkpoint data to remote computers. The request to 
block/unblock the IPC of every process of an application is multicast to every IPC 
Manager in the cluster. Upon receiving a request to block/unblock the IPC of an 
application, the IPC Manager locates the membership information for the group used 
to maintain the list of processes in the application and attempts to find any processes 
of the application locally. 
Blocking the IPC of a process is achieved by setting a flag in every port 
associated with the process that indicates that the IPC for the port is blocked. This 
causes the microkernel to forward any requests for IPC for outgoing messages to the 
IPC Manager for resolution. The IPC Manager holds all outgoing messages in a queue 
until the IPC for the process is unblocked. 
Three data structures represent the IPC resources of GENESIS: IPC port 
structures, IPC operation structures, and IPC buffer structures. Figure 5.14 shows the 
relationships between these data structures and the owning process. Unlike 
checkpointing the PCB and memory regions, process duplication mechanisms cannot 
be used as they allocate new IPC resources for the duplicate process. Instead, new 
mechanisms are used to duplicate the IPC resources. 
The IPC port structure represents the logical endpoint for the delivery of 
messages, known as a port. Attached to each port is a list of IPC operation structures 
which are used to represent requests for IPC from processes and to maintain the state 
of these requests. In particular, the IPC operation structure records how much data has 
been retrieved of a message. Finally, messages are stored in IPC buffer structures, 
presented in Section 5.2.1. 
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Figure 5.14: Kernel Structures for Interprocess Communication in GENESIS 
To checkpoint the IPC resources of a process, copies are made of the IPC 
port structures and IPC operation structures. Copies of these structures are required due 
to the changes made to them during the execution of a process. In particular, the IPC 
port structure is altered to manage the attached IPC operation structures, and the IPC 
operation structures are modified when a process retrieves (part of) a message. 
IPC buffer structures and their contents do not change throughout the 
lifetime of a message, thus do not need to be copied. Instead, the reference count used 
to deliver messages to several destination processes for group communications 
(Section 5.2.1) is used. The use ofreference counts on the IPC buffer structures fulfils 
our design specification for checkpointing messages (Section 4.2.3). 
After all resources of a process have been checkpointed, the Checkpoint 
Manager will invoke the IPC Manager again to dispatch checkpoint data to remote 
computers. Again, at-Ieast-k semantics are used to send the data to the remote 
computers and process migration mechanisms are used to encapsulate the IPC 
resources into a message. 
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the implementations of the proposed 
group communications facility and checkpointing facility in the GENESIS cluster 
operating system. These implementations act as proof-of-concept of using group 
communications to support operating system services, and proof-of-concept of using 
existing operating system services to provide transparent checkpointing of parallel 
applications executing on clusters. Furth enn ore , the GENESIS cluster operating 
system has been demonstrated to provide an appropriate environment for the 
development of these facilities. 
For the group communications facility, new and enhanced functionality 
has been added to the IPC Manager, RRDP server, and the IPlEthemet server. For the 
IPC Manager, we have demonstrated the operation of a protocol for transferring and 
maintaining group membership information under full replication semantics. Delivery 
of group messages is accomplished using reference counts, and the implementations of 
no ordering semantics and computer-based ordering semantics were described. For the 
RRDP server, the header was modified to support random timeouts for multicast 
semantics, and to identify the sender of an acknowledgement for multicast message 
deli very. The implementation of the protocol to dynamically allocate IP addresses was 
also presented, as were the operation of delivery semantics. IP/Ethemet was enhanced 
to support the IGMP protocol and to filter incoming multicast traffic. 
For the development of a transparent checkpointing facility, we have 
demonstrated the use of group membership management mechanisms to track the 
processes of an application. The interactions between the Checkpoint Managers, 
Process Managers, Space Managers and IPC Managers for (un-)blocking the IPC of 
application processes and creating checkpoints were shown. Furthennore, the use of 
process duplication for the generation of checkpoints, and process migration 
mechanisms for the encapsulation and transport of checkpoint data to remote 
computers and to disk, were detailed. New mechanisms for duplicating IPC resources 
were generated for the IPC Manager. Checkpoint data is dispatched to remote 
computers using at-Ieast-k delivery semantics of the group communications facility. 
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Group communication services are also invoked for blocking the IPC of the processes 
of an application and for coordinating the checkpoint operation. 
Chapter 6. Evaluation of the Group 
Communications and 
Checkpointing Facilities 
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In this chapter, we report on a number of experiments conducted to support 
our claims that a transparent checkpointing facility should be generated using the 
mechanisms of process duplication, process migration, and system-oriented group 
communication services. To achieve these objectives, we apply two sets of 
experiments. The first set of experiments, which focus on testing the GENESIS group 
communications facility, provide proof-of-performance of the benefits of providing 
mechanisms specifically for the support of operating system services. The second set 
of experiments focus on testing the GENESIS transparent checkpointing facility to 
provide proof-of-performance that a coordinated checkpointing facility can be 
implemented efficiently using existing operating system services of process 
duplication, process migration, and group communication. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1, we present the 
environment and configuration of the GENESIS cluster used to conduct the 
experiments. The experiments carried out on the GENESIS group communications 
facility and the measured performance are presented in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, we 
present the experiments and performance measurements of the GENESIS 
checkpointing facility. Lastly, in Section 6.4, we summarise the outcomes of the 
experiments. 
6.1 Experimentation Platform 
The configuration of the GENESIS cluster, used for the development and 
testing of the proposed group communications facility and checkpointing facility is 
composed of nine Sun 3/50 computers connected by lObase2 Ethernet, as shown in 
Figure 6.1. One of these computers is dedicated to serving files and is not used for 
processing. Each computer has 4 megabytes of main memory except for two 
Computer E Computer F Computer G Computer H 
Network 
Isolation 
Point 
Figure 6.1: The GENESIS Cluster 
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computers which have memory expansion boards, each with a total of 8 megabytes of 
main memory. To ensure that measured performance results are not affected by 
random Internet traffic, the network connecting the GENESIS computers is isolated for 
the duration of any testing. 
Importantly, the native Sun 3/50 hardware generates timestamps that are 
only accurate to lI100ths of a second, or to 10 milliseconds. To provide better 
accuracy, specialised timer chips were installed that offer high resolution timing with 
microsecond accuracy [Wickham and Goscinski 1995]. 
6.2 Performance of the Group Communications Facility 
In this section we present the testing and performance of the new 
GENESIS interprocess communication (IPC) facility. In Section 6.2.1, we present our 
approach to testing the group communications facility. We begin the presentation of 
our performance tests in Section 6.2.2 by examining communication to local 
destinations. In Section 6.2.3 we compare communication with a single destination 
using both one-to-one message passing and group communications. The scalability of 
the group communications facility is the focus of Section 6.2.4. We examine the effect 
of packet loss on the group communications facility in Section 6.2.5. Finally, in 
Section 6.2.6, we examine the benefits of offering system-oriented services, in 
particular at-Ieast-k delivery semantics. 
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6.2.1 Method of Testing 
Testing an IPe facility that supports group communication using multicast 
communication is more complex than testing an IPe facility that only uses unicast. The 
issues that raise the complexity for testing the GENESIS facility are the semantics of 
one-to-many communication (multicast), and the testing of delivery and ordering 
semantics. 
One-to-Many Semantics 
Traditionally, a "ping-pong" experiment is used to measure the 
performance of an IPe facility. However, this experiment does not work well on group 
communications facilities. In particular, where multicast is used, all destinations will 
receive the message simultaneously and respond immediately, overloading the source 
and causing several packets to be dropped. Retransmissions would result, degrading 
the performance of the facility. Furthermore, the number of responses will grow 
exponentially, as each response received by a group member will cause a further 
response to be sent to every other group member. 
Instead of having every process respond to the group, we define one 
process to be the master process, and the remaining processes as slaves. The master 
will send a message to the group. When a slave process receives this message, it will 
send a response directly to the master process. The master process can then count up 
the number of expected responses before initiating another message. 
However, this still does not address the problem of overloading the 
computer holding the master process. In a well behaved group communications 
application, the slaves would wait a random, short amount of time before sending any 
response, similar to the random delays used throughout the GENESIS group 
communications facility. However, using such a mechanism when testing the 
performance of a group communications facility will disguise any overheads involved 
in simultaneously delivering a message to several destinations. Our approach is to 
reduce the overload on the sending computer by using a very small return message. The 
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Ethernet interface card on the Sun 3/50 can receive a limited amount of data from the 
network without requiring the attention of the main CPU [AMD 1992]. A return 
message size of 1 kilobyte has been selected for these tests, allowing a high number of 
return messages to be handled without requiring the attention of the CPU. 
Another factor affecting the performance measurements is that of late or 
duplicate acknowledgements. Acknowledgement mechanisms are used to provide 
at-Ieast-k and semi-reliable delivery semantics. It is possible that acknowledgements 
could be lost, requiring retransmissions. Late acknowledgements could be received 
during the transmission of future messages in the ping-pong experiment, resulting in 
an unusual overhead and reducing the performance of the group communications 
facility. Retransmissions caused by late acknowledgements could similarly reduce the 
performance of the group communications facility. 
To avoid the overhead of late or duplicate acknowledgements, a small 
delay is inserted in the master process, as shown in Figure 6.2. When all the expected 
replies are received for the current message, the master process will delay for a set 
amount of time. This allows any unfinished message deliveries to complete before the 
master process sends a new message. 
Testing Delivery Semantics 
To measure the performance of at-Ieast-k and semi-reliable delivery 
semantics given various network conditions, two issues must be addressed: 
(1) Ethernet is mostly reliable, especially for performance tests, where we isolate 
the testing computers from the rest of the network; and 
(2) It is difficult to test deli very semantics that aren't totally reliable on an 
unreliable network. 
We wish to measure the performance of the GENESIS group 
communications facility given various levels of reliability on the underlying network. 
We artificially reduce the reliability of the network by selectively discarding packets 
from the network as they arrive. Packets are selected for discarding by using a random 
BEGIN 
END 
SET msg_size TO min_msg_size 
SET num_iterations TO 100 
WHILE msg_size <= max_msg_size 
SET total time TO a 
FOR msg_loop = 1 TO num_iterations 
SET start_time TO current_time 
SEND message 
FOR reply_loop = 1 TO expected_replies 
RECEIVE message 
END-FOR 
SET end_time TO current time 
SET msg_time TO end_time - start_time 
SET total time TO total time + msg_time 
SLEEP delay_time 
END-FOR 
SET avg_time TO total_time / num_iterations 
DISPLAY msg_size, avg_time 
END-WHILE 
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Figure 6.2: Placement of Delay for avoiding LatelDelayed Acknowledgements 
number generator and a threshold value, as shown in Figure 6.3. When a packet 
arrives, a random number is generated. If this random number is below the preset 
threshold, the packet is discarded. The threshold value is specified as a percentage of 
packets to discard, e.g., a threshold value of three results in approximately 3% of 
incoming packets being discarded. This algorithm is placed at the lowest possible level 
of the operating system to minimise the overhead of processing the packets before they 
are discarded. Hence, for GENESIS, we placed this algorithm in the IPlEthemet server, 
the first point of contact for incoming packets. 
Semi-reliable delivery semantics will deliver messages to all slaves in the 
cluster (computer failures are not considered for these experiments). To test 
semi-reliable delivery semantics, the master process in the ping-pong experiment 
counts a number of responses equal to the number of slave processes in the experiment. 
Two timestamps are taken, immediately before sending the message to the slaves, and 
immediately after receiving the final response from the slaves. 
BEGIN 
END 
SET threshold TO percentage of packets to discard 
LOOP forever 
CALL receive-packet 
SET number TO random number MOD 100 
IF number < threshold THEN 
CALL discard-packet 
ELSE 
CALL process-packet 
END-IF 
END-LOOP 
Figure 6.3: Algorithm for Controlling Network Reliability 
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Testing at-Ieast-k semantics is more difficult. If there are n receivers, the 
number of messages that will be returned to the master will not necessarily be n. 
Delivery is only guaranteed to k computers (testing has one process on each computer), 
where k::; 11. The slave processes that receive the message immediately respond, as per 
semi-reliable semantics. However, on those computers where delivery was aborted, the 
slave processes are not aware of any attempt to deliver the message to them and does 
not return a message. Hence, the master process should only wait for k responses 
before progressing to the next message. However, the master process is unable to 
distinguish between responses to the current message, or (delayed) responses to 
previous messages. Hence, an identification number is added to the outgoing message, 
which is returned by the receiver in their response. The master then counts k responses 
containing the correct identification number, before recording the finish time. 
Messages containing a different identification number are discarded. 
Testing Ordering Semantics 
Testing the performance of different ordering semantics IS difficult 
because we are unable to control the order of messages arriving at their destination. 
However, GENESIS provides an asynchronous blocking send primitive. This means 
that when the sendO primitive is invoked, the message is packed into buffers before 
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returning control to the invoking process. The delivery of a message to its destination 
then occurs independently of the sending process. 
For unordered semantics, as soon as the delivery of a message to its 
destination is completed, it is forwarded to the destination process. However, larger 
messages are briefly delayed by RRDP pausing for acknowledgements 
[McAvaney et al. 1997]. When a small message is sent immediately after a large 
message, the small message will generally arrive before the larger message. Under no 
ordering semantics, the small message will be delivered before the large message. 
However, computer-based ordering semantics should maintain the ordering of 
messages, regardless of their size. 
The result of this experiment under both no ordering semantics and 
computer-based ordering semantics is examined visually, confirming the correct 
operation of computer-based ordering semantics. How to test total ordering, in 
particular the measurement of the overhead of these semantics is unclear, and is the 
subject of further study. 
6.2.2 Communication with Local Destinations 
In this section we present the measurement of GENESIS local IPe for two 
processes communicating directly, and using group communications. Local IPe for 
two processes communicating directly on a single computer only requires the services 
of the microkernel. However, if group communications is involved, the IPe Manager 
must be invoked to resolve delivery of the message to all members of the group. 
We tested the performance of local IPe for messages sized between 1 byte 
and 1024 bytes (1 kilobyte) long, increasing in lots of 1 byte. The experiment was run 
1000 times for each message size, and the results are averaged to produce the figures 
used in the graph. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 6.4. A large 
variation that occurs at the 64 byte mark is due an optimisation made in GENESIS for 
short messages, which form the majority of messages sent using local IPe 
[Rough and Goscinski 2001A]. The results show that communicating a message to a 
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Figure 6.4: Local IPC - Message Passing vs Group Communications 
group with one member process on the same computer takes significantly longer than 
for communicating a message using local IPC. This is because delivering the message 
using group communication requires the services of the IPC Manager. Messages sent 
using local IPC are attached to the destination port by the microkernel. 
6.2.3 Communication with a Single Remote Destination 
Unlike local IPC, remote IPC always requires the participation of the IPC 
Manager on the computers of both the master and slave processes. For one-to-one 
message delivery, the IPC Manager locates the destination end-point and attaches the 
message. For group communication, additional functionality is required to first map 
the system name of the group to the system names of the destination end-points. The 
largest factor affecting the time required to deliver messages to remote destinations is 
the number of packets. Hence, to test the performance for a variable number of packets, 
we measure the time taken to send a message between 1 kilobyte and 50 kilobytes in 
length, increasing in increments of 1 kilobyte, and for a 1 kilobyte message to be 
returned. Each experiment was run 100 times, and the results were averaged to produce 
the graph. 
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The results of this experiment, presented in Figure 6.5, show only a slight 
increase in the time required to deliver the message using group communication than 
for one-to-one message delivery. The overhead in delivering a message using group 
communication increases in proportion to the size of the message. The increase in the 
number ofIPC buffers required to store larger messages is most likely the cause of this 
overhead, given that the reference count of each IPC buffer must be incremented. 
The semantics of the RRDP protocol require an acknowledgement to be 
returned at the end of a packet group, used to acknowledgements several packets at 
once, before proceeding to the next group [McAvaney et al. 1997]. Having the sender 
wait for an acknowledgement causes the jump in measured times at approximately 28 
kilobytes. The acknowledgement being returned by eight computers is more likely to 
be lost in the unreliable network. Hence, this likely causes the loss of consistent 
performance at the 28 kilobyte mark. 
128 
300 
250 
Q) 
E 200 
i= 
a. 
';: 150 
I-
"C 
§ 100 
0 
a: 
50 
0 
0 10240 20480 30720 40960 51200 
Message Size (bytes) 
1- 1 Receiver - 2 Receivers - 4 Receivers - 8 Receivers 1 
Figure 6.6: Performance of Group Communications Facility 
6.2.4 Communication with Several Remote Destinations 
To test the scalability of the group communications facility, we continued 
our testing of remote group communication for one, two, four, and eight destination 
processes (located on separate computers). As before, the tests were carried out for 100 
iterations each for messages 1-50 kilobytes in length. The results, shown in Figure 6.6, 
demonstrate a consistent step between one and two slave processes, and again between 
two and four, and four and eight slave processes. This overhead remains relatively 
constant, regardless of the size of the message. This is likely due to the increase in the 
number of response messages that the master process must handle from slave 
processes. 
Figure 6.7 shows the effect of message size on the speed-ups achieved 
using group communications to send a message to n destinations. The speed-ups are 
calculated against sending the message using one-to-one message delivery for each 
destination in tum. To calculate the times for one-to-one message delivery, the results 
from Section 6.2.3 are multiplied by the number of destinations (n). The speed-up for 
one destination is less than one due to the extra time required to deliver a message 
using group communication (see Section 6.2.3). The speed-ups for two, four, and eight 
destinations, each show improved performance over using one-to-one message 
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Figure 6.7: Group Communication Speed-ups vs Message Size 
delivery. However, even for eight destinations, a somewhat low speed-up of 
approximately 5x is achieved, which will be examined in further study. 
We also present Figure 6.8 to show the speed-ups achieved for a given 
message size measured for one, two, four and eight destinations. The figure shows 
messages lOkb-50kb in length, increasing in lOkb increments. Importantly, this figure 
clearly shows that the GENESIS group communications facility provides high 
performance even for short messages, e.g., for a lOkb message sent to eight receivers 
still achieves a speed-up of 4x one-to-one message passing. 
Importantly, the calculation of unicast times used for generating the results 
presented in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 does not represent the performance that can be 
achieved simply, by sending messages to each destination before waiting for any 
responses. This significantly reduces the time to deliver messages to, and to receive 
responses from, n destinations given that the time for the first request/response to 
traverse the network is overlapped with the remaining requests/responses. A 
comparison of performance of the GENESIS group communications facility with real 
unicast performance data will be examined in future work. 
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6.2.5 Performance of Semi-Reliable Semantics given Packet Loss 
To test the performance of semi-reliable semantics given packet loss, the 
reliability of the network is artificially adjusted (Section 6.2.1). Here we examine the 
performance of semi-reliable delivery semantics given a one, two, and three percent 
packet loss. Importantly, a 1 % packet loss on a modern LAN is unlikely to be 
experienced. To provide a basis for comparison, we also reproduce the results for a 
reliable network. 
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 6.9. The results for 
semi-reliable semantics on a network with artificial packet loss produces results that 
are somewhat erratic due to the inconsistencies in the random numbers used in 
discarding packets. However, the performance trends are clear. The figure shows that 
as the number of receiving destinations increases, so does the increase in time required 
to deliver the message. This is likely due to the number of packets being lost increasing 
on both the receiving computers and on the sending computer. For the receiving 
computers, the packets that are lost on each receiver will likely differ, increasing the 
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Figure 6.9: Group Communication Performance on an Unreliable Network 
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overall number of packets that must be retransmitted by the sender. For the sending 
computer, the number of acknowledgements that are received for each group of 
packets sent will be equal to at least the number of computers receiving the message. 
As the number of destinations increase, the likelihood of one or more of these 
acknowledgements being lost increases, causing further retransmissions. 
6.2.6 Performance of At-Least-k Semantics given Packet Loss 
Semi-reliable semantics require that a message is delivered to all 
destinations. In the presence of network errors, the performance of semi-reliable 
semantics was severely reduced, e.g., for eight destinations, delivery of a 50 kilobyte 
message takes more than four times as long given a 3% packet loss. At-Ieast-k 
semantics reduce the delivery requirements, allowing delivery of a message to be 
terminated sooner. We repeated the experiment to deliver a message to eight 
destinations using a 3% packet loss. However, instead of semi-reliable delivery 
semantics, at-Ieast-k semantics were selected with k = 2. 
We present the results of this experiment in Figure 6.10. To provide 
comparative results, the measured performance of semi-reliable semantics for both a 
3% packet loss and a normal network (no artificial packet loss) are reproduced from 
Section 6.2.5. The figure shows that the performance of at-Ieast-k semantics on an 
unreliable network approaches the performance of semi-reliable semantics on a normal 
network. The sudden loss of performance at approximately 28 kilobytes is likely due 
to completion of an RRDP packet group [McA vaney et al. 1997], where all packets 
must be delivered to all destinations before delivery of the second group proceeds. 
Hence delivery time is only saved during the delivery of the packets of the second 
packet group. 
6.3 Performance of the Check pointing Facility 
In this section, we present the testing and measured performance of the 
GENESIS checkpointing facility. In Section 6.3.1, we present how we have measured 
the performance of the checkpointing facility. In Section 6.3.2, we present the effect of 
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Figure 6.10: Performance of At-Least-k Semantics 
increasing the memory usage of the process on the time required to create a checkpoint. 
This is followed by the effect of increasing the size of a message queued for delivery 
in Section 6.3.3. Finally, we examine the scalability of the checkpointing facility in 
Section 6.3.4. 
6.3.1 Method of Testing 
To accurately measure the performance of the checkpointing facility , it is 
important to develop an application whose execution closely matches that of a parallel 
application on a cluster. Parallel applications executing on a cluster use a coarse grain 
of execution [Goscinski 1999], involving little IPC. Hence, any program used to 
measure the performance should focus on computation. The application that we use for 
measuring the performance of the checkpointing facility is a simple simulation that 
models an SPMD class of parallel application. The application begins by creating a 
user-specified number of processes. Each process of the application then enters a 
continuous (empty) loop which occasionally displays a brief message to the screen. 
This algorithm is shown in Figure 6.11. 
WHILE true 
FOR computation_loop = 1 TO 1000000 
NO-OP 
END-FOR 
DISPLAY "I'm still here!" 
END-WHILE 
Figure 6.11: Checkpoint Process Algorithm 
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Modelling the IPC of an SPMD application is more difficult. However, it 
is also unnecessary. As part of the checkpoint operation, the IPC of the processes of 
the application are blocked. During this time, any messages sent by the processes of 
the application are held by the IPC Manager and are delivered when the IPC of the 
processes are unblocked (Section 4.2.7, Chapter 4). For these experiments, we 
measure the total time to perform a checkpoint operation, which includes the time the 
IPC is blocked. Hence, the total time for a checkpoint operation also represents the 
maximum amount of time that a message may be held before being delivered to its 
destination. 
The performance of the checkpointing facility is measured by collecting 
timestamps in the Checkpoint Manager immediately before a request is sent to the 
Process Manager, Memory Manager, or IPC Manager, and immediately after their 
response is received. The placement of timestamps in the Checkpoint Manager is 
shown in Figure 6.12. A timestamp is indicated by the letter 'T' inside an arrow, and 
is labelled ti' where i is the index of a particular checkpoint. The timestamps surround 
six request/response pairs of the checkpoint operation: 
(1) Block [PC - Blocking the lPC of the process (applied to all processes of the 
application on all computers); 
(2) Proc Ckpt - Freezing the process and creating the checkpoint of the PCB; 
(3) Memory Ckpt - Creating the checkpoint of the memory regions; 
(4) IPC Ckpt - Creating the checkpoint of the IPC resources of the process; 
(5) Proc Cant - Unfreezing the process, allowing it to continue its execution; and 
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Figure 6.12: Placement of Timestamps in the Checkpoint Manager 
(6) Unblock fPC - Unblocking the IPC of the process (applied to all processes). 
The total time for a checkpoint operation is measured by the difference between the 
timestamp recorded before the first request and after the final response, i.e,. tIl - to (see 
Figure 6.12). 
The placement of these timestamps permits the time required for each 
stage of creating a checkpoint to be measured. For creating checkpoints for processes 
on several computers, the first and last requests of the checkpoint operation are 
performed on all computers of the application. Hence these timestamps also allow us 
to measure the total time to checkpoint a parallel application. 
6.3.2 Effect of Increasing Process Memory Use on Checkpointing 
Measuring the performance of the checkpointing facility whilst varying the 
amount of memory used by the process indicates how the checkpointing facility 
performs on larger applications. To vary the amount of memory used by the process, a 
large amount of memory is first allocated using dynamic memory allocation. Pages of 
memory are not physically allocated to the process until the process attempts to write 
to those pages. Hence, we can control the number of pages that are physically allocated 
to the process by writing arbitrary data to the desired number of pages. Without writing 
to any pages, the process uses 10 pages of memory. For this experiment, we increase 
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the number of pages to 100 in increments of 10 pages. Each experiment was run 250 
times, and the results were averaged to produce the figures used in the graph. 
The graph of the total time for the checkpoint operation is shown in 
Figure 6.13. The figure shows that the time required to checkpoint a 10 page process 
takes 41.24ms. Increasing the size of the process to 100 pages, a lOx increase, only 
required 64.85ms to create the checkpoint, a 57.25% increase. This suggests that the 
checkpointing facility scales well to large applications. 
However, we should also examine the time required to create only the 
checkpoint of the memory of the process, i.e., t5 - t4 (see Figure 6.12). These times are 
shown in Figure 6.14. In this case, the measured increase is from 7.73ms to 30.09ms, 
a 289.26% increase (almost four times longer). This remains short of the increase in 
the memory used by the process, hence is a good result. Importantly, the use of copy-
on-write mechanisms to create the checkpoint of the process memory regions are the 
cause of the low times to checkpoint the memory. The use of copy-on-write 
mechanisms removes the requirement to physically copy the memory of the process. 
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The graphs presented in both Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14 show a curve 
that appears to be exponential, which is undesirable. Investigation into the cause of 
these curves led to the discovery that the time required to create a checkpoint of the 
same memory region increases over time. This is demonstrated by scatter plots of each 
measurement for a particular size. The sample scatter plot of Figure 6.15, shows the 
time to checkpoint the memory regions of a 100 page process. The error causing the 
increase in times is located in the existing memory duplication mechanisms, which are 
outside the scope of this thesis. As a result of this discovery, the usage of duplication 
mechanisms in the Memory Manager was revisited to ensure their correctness. 
6.3.3 Effect of Increasing Queued Message Size on Checkpointing 
When a checkpoint is created for a process, it is possible that messages 
delivered to the process have not yet been retrieved. These messages must be included 
in the checkpoint of the process, hence the effect of such messages on the time required 
to create a checkpoint is examined here. To control the size of a blocked message in 
the process, we instruct the process to send a message to itself, which is never 
retrieved. The size of the message can then be controlled by varying the amount of data 
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that is sent in the message. For this experiment, we have varied the size of the message 
from Okb through 100kb in lOkb increments. Importantly, to ensure that the size of the 
process does not increase with the size of the message, 100kb of memory is 
dynamically allocated for use in the message and is filled with random data. Each 
experiment was run 250 times and the averages of the results were used to produce the 
graph. 
The graph of the total time to create the checkpoint is presented in 
Figure 6.16. The figure shows a linear increase in the total time to create a checkpoint. 
For a 10 kilobyte long message, 44.12ms were required to create the checkpoint. 
Increasing the size of the message to 100 kilobytes, a lOx increase, required 50.1ms to 
create the checkpoint, a 13.55% increase. This suggests that the checkpointing facility 
performs well given large queued messages. 
As for the memory usage of the process, we also examine the time required 
to only create the checkpoint of the IPC resources (where the message is stored), i.e., 
t7 - t6 (see Figure 6.12). These times are shown in Figure 6.17. In this case, we observe 
an increase from 6.33ms for a 10 kilobyte message to 12.29ms for a 100 kilobyte 
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message, a 94.15% increase, which is a good result. These results were likely achieved 
due to the use of reference counts on the message, removing the requirement to 
physically copy the actual message. Importantly, a slightly larger increase in times is 
recorded between 0 and 10 kilobyte messages than for other sizes. This is due to the 
lack of IPe buffer structures to store the zero length message. 
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6.3.4 Scalability of the Checkpointing Facility 
To test the scalability of the checkpointing facility, we measure the time 
required to checkpoint one process per computer for one, two, four, and eight 
computers. Unlike the previous tests for the memory usage of the process or for the size 
of a queued message, no effort is made to alter the size of the process. Instead, the 
process begins by creating a number of processes equal to one less than the number of 
computers that we wish to measure the performance of. The GENESIS Global 
Scheduler allocates these processes to separate computers to balance the load of the 
cluster. The remaining computer will contain the parent process. Each experiment was 
run 250 times, and the results were averaged to produce the graph. 
The results of these tests are presented in Figure 6.18. A large jump in the 
time required to create the checkpoint is observed between one and two computers. 
This is due to the added requirement of communicating with other computers for two 
or more computers, and the overheads associated with communicating over a network. 
A linear increase in the time required to create the checkpoint is observed for between 
two and eight computers. Importantly, the time required to create checkpoints for eight 
processes on eight computers is only 350.33ms. If this particular application were to 
be checkpointed every 10 minutes, only 0.058% of the time would be spent creating 
the checkpoints, an insignificant amount of time. This equates to approximately 50.42 
seconds per day of computation. 
Elnozahy et al. present results for coordinated checkpointing under the V 
Distributed System on Sun 3/60's in [Elnozahy et al. 1992]. This provides an excellent 
comparison given the microkernel and kernel server architecture of the V Distributed 
System and performance testing on Sun 3/60's, which are identical to our Sun 3/50's 
except for a minor increase in processor speed. The tested checkpointing facility 
similarly exploits concurrent checkpointing for copying the address space of 
processes, but also exploits the incremental checkpointing optimisation. Checkpoint 
data is written to disk for stable storage [Elnozahy et al. 1992]. 
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Elnozahy et al. measure the total time to checkpoint a variety of 
applications on 16 computers. The measured times vary from 0.2 seconds up to 60.2 
seconds. However, for five out of eight applications, the total time to checkpoint does 
not rise above 3.3 seconds. Assuming a continuation of the apparent linear increase in 
our measurements (we only have access to a total of nine computers), our facility 
would measure approximately 575ms (0.575 seconds), which is comparable given the 
slower processor of the Sun 3/50. 
To clearly show how the facility scales to several computers, we compare 
the measured performance times to those that would result if the times scaled in exact 
proportion to the number of computers in the experiment, i.e., the time required to 
checkpoint processes on eight computers would take twice as long than for four 
computers, and four times as long than for two computers. Importantly, given that 
communication over a network is required for any number of computers greater than 
one, we calculated the times from the results for two computers. The results of this 
experiment are presented in Figure 6.19. Although the time required to create the 
checkpoints for the processes of the application have grown in a linear manner, the 
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Figure 6.19: Scalability of the GENESIS Checkpointing Facility 
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times grow at a much slower rate than the number of computers involved in the test. 
Hence, this is a good result. 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the performance of the GENESIS 
implementations of the proposed group communications facility and checkpointing 
facility. For group communications, we have examined how to adapt the ping-pong 
experiment for multicast semantics, and how to test various delivery semantics and 
ordering semantics ofthe facility. The operation of computer-based ordering semantics 
were tested for correctness using a visual check, but how to measure the performance 
of computer-based ordering mechanisms remains an open problem, as does the testing 
of totally ordered semantics. 
Comparing the performance of one-to-one message delivery versus group 
communications showed that significant overhead is incurred for deli very of messages 
to local destinations using group communications. However, the overhead of 
delivering messages to remote destinations using group communications was not as 
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significant. The performance measurements for delivering messages to two, four, and 
eight remote receiving computers show good speed-ups, although the operation of 
group communications will be studied further to try and improve these results. The 
performance of at-least-k delivery semantics demonstrated significant gains over 
semi-reliable delivery semantics in the presence of packet loss, approaching the 
performance of semi-reliable semantics in a normal network (no artificial packet loss). 
For checkpointing, we examined the generation of an experiment to 
provide representative performance of a checkpointing facility for clusters and 
presented the placement of timestamps for measuring the performance of the 
checkpointing facility. Several factors affecting the performance of the facility were 
analysed. In particular, we examined the effect of increasing the amount of memory 
used by a process, the effect of the size of a queued message, and the effect of 
increasing the number of processes on separate computers that must be checkpointed. 
In measuring the performance of the checkpointing facility, we measured 
the scalability of the facility by varying the memory usage of a single usage, the size 
of a message queued for delivery to a process, and several processes located on 
separate computers, up to a total of eight processes. The checkpointing facility showed 
good scalability in each case, although we observed an exponential increase in the time 
required to checkpoint the memory of a process as the memory usage of the process 
increased. Further investigations into the cause of this increase showed that the time 
taken by process duplication mechanisms to repeatedly create a checkpoint of the same 
memory region of a process increased over time. Finally, we observed low overheads 
in creating checkpoints for a parallel application. In particular, the time required to 
checkpoint an application consisting of eight processes every 10 minutes totals 50.42 
seconds for a 24 hour period 
Chapter 7. Conclusions and Future 
Work 
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In this chapter, we summarise the contributions that have been made to the 
area of reliable computing on clusters by this research and present our conclusions. 
Furthermore, possible directions for future research are addressed. 
7.1 Research Contributions and Conclusions 
The cluster is a highly accessible platform for the execution of parallel 
applications, offering an excellent price to performance ratio. Clusters are more 
susceptible to failures than other platforms for parallel processing, given that they are 
a collection of independent computers used by multiple users. 
The aim of this research was to demonstrate the feasibility of synthesising 
and developing an operating system facility providing transparent fault tolerance using 
existing, enhanced and newly built operating system services for supporting parallel 
applications executing on clusters. This aim has been achieved through the completion 
of the following tasks: 
(1) A group communications facility that provides services that simplify the 
operation of the checkpointing facility was synthesised. Two sets of services are 
offered: 
user-oriented services, which provide transparency to the application 
programmer; and 
system-oriented services, which do not provide transparency and are 
intended for the support of operating system services, in particular 
checkpointing, where they are used for the efficient distribution of data 
and management of resources; 
(2) An operating system facility providing transparent checkpointing was 
synthesised with the following features: 
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no modifications are required to an application for checkpointing; and 
minimal overhead is added to a parallel application when checkpointing is 
used; 
(3) A facility for checkpointing parallel applications on clusters was developed for 
the GENESIS cluster operating system using the existing process duplication, 
process migration and group communications mechanisms; 
(4) The performance of the GENESIS group communications facility and the 
checkpointing facility were studied to measure the benefits of providing group 
communications mechanisms specifically for operating system services, and to 
measure the overhead introduced by the checkpointing facility to applications. 
To reach the aim, this research was carried out using the methodology and 
methods of experimental computer science. The completion of tasks 1-3 forms proof-
of-concept, where the completion of task 4 forms proof-of-performance. 
A study of the field of group communications revealed a focus on 
delivering messages to processes, without considering the placement of the processes 
on computers. Operating system services manage the placement of resources on 
computers of the cluster, hence we addressed this deficiency in our work. For 
checkpoint-based rollback recovery, we learned of three approaches: uncoordinated 
checkpointing, coordinated checkpointing, and communication-induced 
checkpointing. Uncoordinated checkpointing suffers from a high demand for resources 
and the domino effect. Coordinated checkpointing requires all processes of the parallel 
application be blocked for the duration of the checkpoint operation to prevent 
inconsistencies caused by non-deterministic events. Finally, several problems have 
been observed in the scalability and performance of communication-induced 
checkpointing mechanisms. From existing checkpointing, we observed the use of the 
memories of remote computers for storing checkpoints, and the use of copy-on-write 
mechanisms to reduce checkpoint times (concurrent checkpointing). Each of these 
observations influenced the synthesis and design of the proposed checkpointing 
facility. 
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A number of contributions have been made by this research. To address the 
lack of group communications services that consider process placement without 
sacrificing configurability, we provide user-oriented services and system-oriented 
services. User-oriented services provide transparency and are targeted at user 
applications. System-oriented services target operating system services, do not provide 
transparency, and by this expose the placement of processes on computers. To improve 
configurability, ordering and delivery semantics can be selected independently. 
The problem of dynamic allocation of multicast IP addresses was 
addressed by developing a protocol where the computers of the cluster negotiate to 
allocate a unique address for each group created. Atomic semantics also required the 
development of a protocol that ensured consistent delivery of a message within a 
network partition. 
The use of a microkemel and client-server based operating system 
architecture enabled the selection of a coordinated checkpointing, which was modified 
and enhanced. This modification and enhancement allows application processes to 
continue their execution when being checkpointed. This solution does not blindly 
block all of the processes of the parallel application. Instead, the IPC of the application 
processes is blocked for the duration of the checkpoint operation, allowing the 
processes to continue processing. 
We recognised that a checkpoint of a process is effectively an inactive 
copy of the process, hence we used process duplication mechanisms to create 
checkpoints. Furthermore, this allowed optimisations used in process duplications to 
be applied to checkpointing. In particular, copy-on-write mechanisms are used to 
provide the concurrent checkpointing optimisation. Process migration mechanisms are 
then used to dispatch checkpoint data to the memories of remote computers and to disk. 
In particular, copy dirty pages and copy dirty pages to disk mechanisms are used. 
Finally, group communications are also used throughout the checkpointing 
facility to coordinate the checkpoint operation and to track the processes that compose 
an application. In particular, the system-oriented group communication services of 
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at-Ieast-k delivery and computer-based ordering semantics are used for dispatching 
checkpoint data to remote computer. 
The proposed group communications facility and checkpointing facility 
have been implemented in the GENESIS cluster operating system. The 
implementations provide proof-of-concept and demonstrate clearly the suitability of 
using the existing operating system services of process duplication, process migration, 
and group communications in the provision of a facility for transparent checkpointing 
of parallel applications executing on clusters. Furthermore, the suitability of providing 
system-oriented group communication services to supplement user-oriented services 
for supporting operating system services has also been demonstrated by using 
at-Ieast-k delivery semantics and computer-based ordering semantics to dispatch 
checkpoint data to remote computers. 
A performance study of the group communications facility and 
checkpointing facility was carried out. For group communications, good speed-ups 
were observed for semi-reliable communication and the performance of at-Ieast-k 
delivery semantics on an unreliable network approached the performance observed for 
semi-reliable semantics on a normal network. For checkpointing, we observed low 
overheads in creating checkpoints for a parallel application. In particular, the time 
required to checkpoint an application consisting of eight processes every 10 minutes 
totals 50.42 seconds for a 24 hour period. 
In summary, this research has produced an operating system facility that 
provides transparent checkpointing using process duplication, process migration, and 
group communications. As part of this research, a group communications facility was 
synthesised that provides services that consider the placement of processes on 
computers within a cluster. Significant performance advantages were demonstrated by 
at-Ieast-k delivery semantics on an unreliable network. Furthermore, a checkpointing 
facility was synthesised using a coordinated checkpointing approach where non-
deterministic events are blocked during the checkpoint operation, instead of blindly 
blocking the processes of the application. This also allowed the processes to continue 
execution, significantly reducing the overheads incurred from checkpointing. 
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Checkpoint data is both managed and dispatched to the memories of remote computers 
and to disk using the services of the above group communications facility. 
7.2 Future Work 
This research has examined the feasibility of developing an operating 
system facility providing transparent fault tolerance using existing, enhanced and 
newly built operating system services for supporting parallel applications executing on 
clusters. A number of areas visited by this research can be explored further in future 
work in both the group communications and checkpointing fields. 
The application of system-oriented group communication services to 
operating system services should be investigated further. In particular, the 
effectiveness of system-oriented services for other operating system services will be 
considered, and alternative system-oriented services shall be pursued. The protocol 
that is used to reliably deliver messages to remote computers using multicast is a 
sender-based protocol. This style of protocol suffers from two problems: 
acknowledgement implosion and exposure to retransmissions [Poo 2001]. A number 
of techniques, including receiver-based protocols using negative acknowledgement 
mechanisms will be investigated to further improve the performance of the facility. 
The checkpointing facility creates consistent checkpoints for parallel 
applications executing on clusters. The next stages of this work are to examine the 
management of checkpoint data and the restoration of failed applications. Importantly, 
the checkpoint data is stored as process resources on remote computers and on disk. It 
should be possible to restore this data using the mechanisms of copy-on-reference 
process migration, which migrate the pages of a process only when they are referenced 
[De Paoli and Goscinski 1998]. 
The impact of checkpointing mechanisms on other operating systems 
should also be considered, e.g., Distributed Shared Memory (DSM) 
[Morin and Puaut 1997]. DSM systems allow several processes of a parallel 
application to share memory across several computers. Furthermore, it may be possible 
to apply checkpointing mechanisms in other areas. In particular, a collection of 
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checkpoints for a process, and hence for an application, effectively records the changes 
in the state of that process for a period of time. If the data of the checkpoints could be 
interpreted, it may be possible to reconstruct the execution of the process after it has 
terminated. This may be useful for the debugging of or profiling the performance of a 
process. 
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